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There is mounting evidence that sustainable scale thresholds are now being exceeded worldwide 
and environmental resource shocks (e.g. climate change, water and oil shortages) may be 
inevitable in some regions of the world in the near future. These could result in severe economic 
breakdowns, welfare loss, and in the worst-case, the collapse of modern civilization. Therefore, a 
pre-eminent challenge of our times is to determine how to design a resilient (safe-fail) economy 
– one that can endure, adapt to and successfully recover from breakdowns when they occur. 
Surprisingly, while ecological economic theory relies heavily on natural science concepts such as 
thermodynamics, insufficient attention has been paid to the important ecological concept of 
resilience, particularly as it applies to economic design. The three major policy goals of current 
ecological economic theory (sustainable scale, just distribution and efficient allocation) focus 
instead on preventing environmental resource shocks and breakdowns, but given their 
unpredictability prevention may not always be possible.  
How resilience can inform the blossoming field of ecological economics is thus explored 
in this theoretical, transdisciplinary paper. Drawing on literature as diverse as archaeology and 
disaster planning, it develops six key principles of economic resilience and applies them to 
analyze the resilience of key societal systems including our money, electricity, water, 
transportation, information/communication and emergency response systems. Overall, economic 
resilience appears to be a unique concern that is not readily subsumed under any of the three 
existing ecological economic policy pillars. In fact, efforts to build in resilience have the 
potential to both complement and at times contradict the other three goals, especially efficiency. 
The need to further study these possible tradeoffs provides strong justification for adding a fourth 
distinct policy pillar, namely ―Resilient Design‖, to core ecological economic theory. Indeed, 
ecological economist‘s longstanding criticism of economic growth meshes readily with the 
Resilience Alliance‘s own figure-8 adaptive cycle theory critiquing the resilience costs of 
growth, providing significant opportunities for the future collaboration of these two fields in 
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Chapter 1: Introduction / Study Approach 
 
 
1.1  Historical and Current Situation: Teetering on the Edge of Catastrophe 
 
“The world is unhappy. It is unhappy because it doesn’t know where it is going and because it senses 
that, if it did know, it would discover that it was headed for catastrophe” 
French President Valery Giscard d‘Estaing, 1974 
 
Throughout history most human civilizations have experienced environmental resource shocks 
(Weiss and Bradley 2001, 609). Those that have collapsed at least in part due to environment and 
resource catastrophes include the Sumerian, Teotihuacan, Mayan, Greco-Roman, Khmer, Easter 
Island, Norse Greenland, Southeast Polynesian, Native American Anasazi, and recently 
Rwandan and Haitian societies (Wright 2004, Diamond 2005). In one of the best works on the 
collapse of civilizations, Jared Diamond (2005) classifies twelve main interlinked environmental 
problems that have plagued past and present civilizations. These include: loss of natural habitats, 
wild food sources, biodiversity, and productive soil; ceilings imposed by energy, freshwater, and 
photosynthetic capacity; creation and spread of toxic chemicals, alien species, and atmospheric 
gases; and population growth and per-capita consumption. He believes all ―are like time bombs 
with fuses of less than 50 years…If we solved 11 of the problems, but not the 12th, we would 
still be in trouble‖ (Diamond 2005, 498). 
International environmental studies and indicators reveal that our current global 
civilization is at a critical point in its history. Biodiversity and ecological footprint studies by the 
World Wildlife Fund estimate that we have exceeded our planetary carrying capacity by over 
60% (WWF 2010). The United Nations‘ comprehensive Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
concludes that ―Human activities have taken the planet to the edge of a massive wave of species 
extinctions‖ (MEA 2005). Climate change is accelerating faster than predicted and serious 
impacts are now inevitable (Brown 2007; IPCC 2007). There is growing consensus among 
geologists that we have reached peak oil and natural gas supplies with no obvious fuel to replace 
them (Connor 2009; Gilbert and Perl 2008, 127; Bentley 2002). Serious threats from 
desertification, deforestation, oceanic die-off, water shortages and global pandemic loom large. 




life on earth (Lovelock 2006). As this is occurring, the global economic system remains plagued 
by financial uncertainty, high public and personal debt, rising food and energy prices, increasing 
regional poverty, the U.S. trade deficit and the global credit crunch.  
In this weakened state, global world order has become extremely vulnerable to shocks. It 
is now recognized that the ―living machinery of Earth has a tendency to move from gradual to 
catastrophic change with little warning. Such is the complexity of the relationships between 
plants, animals, and microorganisms that these ‗tipping points‘ cannot be forecast by existing 
science‖ (MEA 2005). As vividly demonstrated in the London smog catastrophe of 1952, 
environmental degradation and pollution can accumulate gradually in the environment yet 
because of complex feedback mechanisms and time lags it is detected only after it has already 
become ―a critical destructive mass‖ (Davis 2002, 44; Rosser 1991, 262). Indeed, ice core 
analyses show that the earth‘s climate can change dramatically in only decades, and thanks to 
human activities we may be on the brink of another such flip that within a hundred years could 
see the planet‘s surface poisoned by hydrogen sulphide gas clouds released by acidified oceans 
(Alley 2000; Ward 2007). More immediately, since 2005 the possibility of catastrophe has 
gained a higher profile in the mainstream media following the Asian and Japanese Tsunamis, 
Gulf of Mexico oil spill and Hurricane Katrina disasters (the latter linked to global warming). 
James Kunstler (2006, 5) predicts that converging environment and resource scarcity 
threats will lead to the Long Emergency, ―a dire and unprecedented period of difficulty in the 
twenty-first century‖. He worries that ―the social systems, subsystems, and institutions necessary 
to run advanced societies would be weakened, perhaps beyond repair, by the multiple calamities 
of the Long Emergency‖ (2006, 183). Likewise Diamond (2005, 498) concludes that: ―Because 
we are rapidly advancing along this non-sustainable course, the world‘s problems will get 
resolved, in one way or another, within the lifetimes of the children and young adults alive today. 
The only question is whether they will become resolved in pleasant ways of our own choice, or 
in unpleasant ways not of our choice, such as warfare, genocide, starvation, disease epidemics, 
and collapses of societies‖. 
It is within this sombre context that this thesis seeks to examine the resilience of our 21
st
 
century global economy: that is, its fundamental ability to endure and recover from what may be 
impending catastrophic change. Joseph Tainter (1988, 59) observes that ―an understanding of 




Diamond‘s 12 problems can be seen as symptoms of deeper defects in the philosophy, design, 
construction and performance of human social systems, including economies. Could 
consideration of the need for economic resilience have saved those prior civilizations from 
collapsing in the face of catastrophe? Could it still save our own? 
If we wish to take the precautionary principle to heart in fields such as ecological 
economics, we must concern ourselves with planning for these sorts of worst case scenarios 
which seem increasingly less far-fetched. The more knowledge we gather about environments 
and economies the more we learn how little we know: ―Because of ignorance and uncertainty, 
surprises will inevitably arise, even from our most knowledgeable decisions. If we recognize 
this, we can take steps to reduce the likelihood of surprises that are nasty and tragic, and to 
prepare ourselves to survive, even benefit from, surprises we cannot avoid‖ (Gibson 1992, 161). 
 
1.2  Research Question 
 
How can the concept and theory of resilience be incorporated into the study of ecological 
economics in order to improve our economy‘s capacity to endure, adapt to and recover from 
impending environmental resource shocks and catastrophes? Would adding consideration of 
economic resilience enhance or undermine the three main ecological economic goals of 
sustainable scale, just distribution and efficient allocation? What are some practical implications 
for human economies? 
 
1.3  Rationale 
 
All complex systems can undergo catastrophic (unexpected and nonlinear) change, and 
economies are no exception: ―human history has been one not of regular change but of 
spasmodic, catastrophic disruptions followed by long periods of reinvention and development‖ 
(Peterson et al., 2002, 92). Mounting evidence suggests that the modern global economy is 
pressing dangerously close to shrinking ecosystem boundaries, on a course that will be 
extraordinarily difficult to divert before sustainable scale is exceeded and critical thresholds are 
crossed (Speth 2008; Rees 2007 interview). Yet significant political barriers to action remain, 




solutions‖ (Levin et al. 1998, 224). Post-Kyoto climate change negotiations, for example, are 
currently at a standstill. Furthermore, human activity has started some biophysical gears in 
motion on a planetary scale (e.g. climate change, biodiversity loss and non-renewable resource 
depletion) that may simply be impossible to reverse (Davis 2002; Gjerde 1999).  
Because of this, environmental resource shocks in some regions of the world are nearly 
inevitable in the near future, potentially resulting in severe economic disruption and welfare loss. 
The spectacular 2005 breakdown in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina highlighted the 
lack of resilience in that city, and more generally the entire United States government. In a 
worst-case scenario, converging catastrophes could lead to global socioeconomic collapse and 
the end of modern civilization as we know it. Therefore a pre-eminent challenge of our times is 
to figure out how to design an economy that will be resilient in the face of coming shocks: 
―Research needs to address whether or not our vital systems have sufficient capacity for 
resilience‖ (Levin et al. 1998, 233). Resilience can be defined very generally as ―the ability of a 
system to remain functionally stable in the face of stress and to recover following a disturbance‖ 
(Redman and Kinzig 2003, 5).  
The environmental movement has long depended on the spectre of catastrophe to help 
excite the public‘s imagination. While some doom-and-gloom predictions have not materialized 
to date, the ―multibillion-dollar costs of many environmental problems justify a moderate 
frequency of false alarms‖ (Diamond 2005, 510). It is a common sentiment among 
environmentalists that it will take a catastrophe to trigger public and government awareness 
about the magnitude of the crisis that society is now facing (Cairns 2004, 34). Interestingly 
however, almost all environmental literature to date along with the vast majority of activist and 
policy efforts focuses only on how to prevent environmental resource shocks from occurring. 
Only in the area of global climate change has there been a move to also consider how to adapt to 
(or endure) impacts (Wilbanks et al. 2003).  
It is only responsible and prudent to consider: what if our efforts to prevent the worst case 
scenario actually fail? Many experts have observed the widening gap between environmental 
problems and our ability to solve them (Homer-Dixon 2000; Berkes et al. 2003, 1). Levin et al. 
(1998, 224) warn that ―We, as a society, find ourselves confronted with a spectrum of potentially 
catastrophic and irreversible environmental problems, for which conventional approaches will 




them remain woefully unprepared for a new age where ecological surprise and sudden rather 
than gradual change are the new normal (King 1995; Perrings 1998, 504). ―Call it the resilience 
gap. The world is becoming turbulent faster than organizations are becoming resilient‖ (Hamel 
and Valikangas 2003, 1).  
This thesis therefore takes a very different approach by examining how to design an 
economy able to minimize its maximum losses by ensuring that economic breakdowns caused by 
unforeseen shocks do not cascade into catastrophes or terminal collapses. This is among the first 
papers to focus on applying the concept and theory of resilience to macro-scale socioeconomic 
breakdowns. It proposes a change in mindset: assume the worst and plan accordingly (the 
principle of safe-fail). This is a logical extension of technological pessimism, a foundational 
value of the environmental movement which seems to have been forgotten lately amidst the 
hubbub over wind power, fluorescent light bulbs and carbon sequestration.   
This is not to suggest in any way that continued efforts to anticipate and prevent 
approaching environmental resource shocks are futile or should be abandoned. Prevention tends 
to be far better and less costly than a cure (Lawn 2007 interview). This dire situation was created 
in the first place by our continual failure to watch for indicators and take corrective action once 
we were aware of various problems. Even now, the less preventative action we take, the worse 
the shocks will be. But the possibility of catastrophic change that we can never anticipate also 
implies we need to start preparing for the unpredictable eventualities we cannot prevent: 
―Collapses are going to happen – even perfect foresight cannot prevent them when social 
pressures or preferences push systems to the breaking point‖ (Gunderson and Carpenter 2001, 
457). 
The basic idea of making individuals and organizations better able to buffer change is 
often talked about in a superficial way following tumultuous events but usually forgotten just as 
quickly when normal times return. In the last two years for example, resilient has become a 
trendy word in the mainstream media who use it to describe firms and economic sectors that 
have managed to keep growing in the face of the economic downturn. This thesis, however, 
examines economic resilience at a deeper level than simply how to restore corporate profits or 
restart the old unsustainable consumption engine. A deeper understanding of resilience requires 
that we consider how to prepare our economy for worst case scenarios (such as physical 




headed our way. True desirable resilience can only work if we pay attention to it in the good 
times and consciously build it into our economies before things fall apart. 
Yet the justification for preparing for catastrophe is not only about pessimistic survival: 
as a theory, resilience also provides a unique way of understanding the cycles of change in 
complex systems. Shifting to a truly sustainable society may require a flip in social attitudes 
towards a more eco-centric (or at least enlightened self-interest) worldview: ―If the global system 
breaks down, the road back to general prosperity cannot rely upon simply reviving the same 
wasteful practices‖ (Greider 1997, 466). Sometimes positive change can only happen because of 
the opportunities for renewal created by crisis. Hence this thesis also covers how to lay the 
necessary economic groundwork so that at the crucial point of catastrophic change, society can 
be pulled back from the brink of collapse and hopefully placed on a better, more sustainable 
course. 
These issues are on the brave new horizon of system thinking. As Low et al. (2003, 103) 
note, ―The concepts needed to understand the behaviour of complex systems are not yet well 
developed by social scientists‖. Resilience in particular is not familiar in social sciences as a 
developed concept and theory (Davidson-Hunt and Berkes 2003, 59). Even in a cross-section of 
academic disciplines, there seems to be surprisingly little discussion of social or economic 
resilience, let alone what the key principles of a resilient economy would be, how these would be 
operationalized in practice, or what system characteristics we should desire to make resilient. 
Perhaps few are looking at building resilience into human economies because ecologists and 
environmentalists remain largely focused on preventing catastrophes and conventional 
economists and engineers remain largely ignorant of the likelihood and magnitude of threats we 
now face (King 1995, 963).  
An alternative economic theory that integrates perhaps most readily with the concept of 
resilience is ecological economics. Ecological economics is well suited to considering the 
problem of resilience because unlike most traditional disciplines it is a holistic, emerging field 
open to new ideas, especially from ecology which is where resilience thinking has progressed 
furthest: ―Ecological economics seeks to promote truly transdisciplinary research in which 
practitioners accept that disciplinary boundaries are academic constructs irrelevant outside of the 
university, and allow the problem being studied to determine the appropriate set of tools, rather 




economic concepts and theories, it is the most logical framework with which to analyze the 
complex dynamics of environmental resource catastrophes and economic system change. 
Nevertheless, a survey of articles and books from this field, including the main journal 
Ecological Economics, shows that even here there is only limited consideration of how to 
prepare for possible environmental resource shocks, breakdowns and catastrophes. Ecological 
economist William Rees (2007 interview) believes that while a better understanding of system 
dynamics would necessitate a focus on economic resilience, for now ecological economics is 
simply not focused on the possibility of failure. Papers on the integration of resilience into the 
canon of ecological economics (using economic terminology) are largely absent. The demand 
however, exists: Holling (2004, 7) recommends that we start enhancing the ability of economies 
to adapt to change. Ehrlich (2008, 10) calls for ecological economists specifically to undertake 
studies that take stock of society‘s resilience in order to improve our organizational ability to 
respond to catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina. When resilience is discussed at all within 
ecological economics, it is almost always in terms of the resilience of natural ecosystems (see for 
example Brand 2009). While vitally important, ecosystem resilience is arguably already 
addressed to some degree by the sustainable scale goal of ecological economics. What is not 
being addressed is resilience of the human economic system, and ecological economics could 
bolster the richness and sophistication of its theory by paying attention to this important topic. 
This thesis attempts to further reunite and synthesize the long-lost twin disciplines of 
ecology and economics, which may be necessary if we are to have a sustainable future as a 
civilization. Leading ecological economists including Joshua Farley, Joan Martinez-Alier, and 
Philip Lawn (2007 interviews) believe this pursuit is beneficial. Peter Victor (2007 interview) 
notes: ―Efforts have been made to add ecology and systems theory to economics but we have a 
long way to go. I suspect that part of the problem is that most of the contributors to ecological 
economics have been economists rather than ecologists and others‖. Indeed, Matutinovic (2001, 
254) calls for ―Further exploration of functional analogues between ecosystems and 
economies… for example the relationship between diversity, efficiency and adaptability in 
ecosystems and socioeconomic systems‖. This paper helps fill this major gap by examining for 
the first time how resilience relates to the three core goals of ecological economics, in the 
process exploring such difficult questions as the potential tradeoffs between efficiency, 




how concepts from natural and general systems theory can enhance our understanding of how 
socioeconomic systems operate. 
This thesis is specifically intended to build upon and refine ecological economic theory, 
so the target audience is ecological economists. Ecological economics is still in its infancy and 
stands to benefit from efforts to strengthen its theoretical foundation. The intended audience also 
includes academics interested in systems theory, economic reform, the rise and fall of 
civilizations, and environment and resource studies generally. The exploratory, normative 
character of this paper ensures the ideas discussed within will remain at the theoretical stage for 
some time, to be debated and improved.  
Beyond academia, preliminary recommendations about how desirable resilience can be 
enhanced in real-world economic subsystems are intended for decision-makers (governments, 
firms and households) who are in a position to help build resilience into our economy. Doing so 
could also contribute to improving the economy‘s resilience to other kinds of shocks not related 
to humanity‘s impact on the environment such as financial breakdowns, terrorism or purely 
natural disasters. Future generations are also stakeholders: by focusing on the problem of 
surviving catastrophe, this study is attempting to ensure they will still have a civilization, 
however flawed, left to inherit. 
Because of the scale of the problem it seeks to address, the findings of this paper are 
widely significant: ―The reason why complex societies disintegrate is of vital importance to 
every member of one, and today that includes nearly the entire world population‖ (Tainter 1988, 
2). Any way in which this paper ultimately assists the wider world community in preparing to 
weather environmental resource shocks represents an applied contribution. 
 
1.4  Conceptual / Theoretical Framework 
 
This thesis focuses on the intersection of the concept and theory of resilience with the theory of 
ecological economics. While ecological economics itself is founded on some concepts from 
ecology and the physical sciences, resilience is strangely absent in its discussions about 
socioeconomic decisions. This section will help explain the history and relationships between 




answer this study‘s research question. Definitions of these theories and concepts can be found in 
the glossary.  
The theory at the centre of this framework is Herman Daly‘s vision of ecological 
economics. Beginning in the early 1970s, it emerged as an effort to reintegrate the diverging 
disciplines of economics and ecology in response to growing awareness of the negative impacts 
of economic growth on ecosystems (Ropke 2004, 293; Costanza et al. 1997, 48). Conventional 
neoclassical economics (and its subdisciplines like environmental economics) assume that 
economic growth is always beneficial. However Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and later Herman 
Daly and Robert Costanza applied the laws of thermodynamics to argue that economic growth is 
in fact limited by the physical reality of the earth as a finite system (Costanza et al. 1997, 62). 
Thus was born the first of three major policy goals of ecological economics: keeping the 
economy at a sustainable scale (Daly and Farley 2004, 13). From neoclassical economics, 
ecological economics carried over the goal of efficient allocation and from welfare economics 
the goal of just distribution. 
The goal of sustainable scale is essentially to prevent environmental resource shocks 
from occurring by preserving critical natural capital and its associated ecosystem services. 
Ecological economists Daly and Farley (2004, 361) write: ―Since we are dealing often with 
staying within biophysical limits, and since those limits are subject to much uncertainty and at 
times irreversibility, we should leave a considerable safety margin, or slack, between our 
demands on the system and our best estimate of its capacity. If we go right up to capacity, we 
cannot afford mistakes because they are too costly‖. Yet given that the global economy may 
already be over 100% capacity, it is surprising that ecological economics has devoted so little 
attention to the containment of economic breakdowns should they occur. 
Paralleling the rise of ecology and ecological economics, the formalized theory of 
catastrophe emerged in the 1970s out of the work of René Thom and other mathematicians as a 
means of understanding the sudden discontinuous change observed in complex systems, which 
often flip after passing thresholds (Rosser 1999, 172; Lorenz 1989, 205). In spite of the negative 
connotations of the name, catastrophes are a natural phenomenon in the evolution of complex 
systems and can include beneficial nonlinear change like major new innovations. Nevertheless, 




ones. It is much easier to have a sudden decline or collapse than it is to have a sudden 
improvement‖ (Rosser 1991, 320).  
The phenomenon of catastrophe explained in part the need for the concept of resilience: 
―an ecosystem must also be able to cope with changes (which can be catastrophic) in 
environmental conditions: that is, it must be able to cope with stress‖ (Kay and Schneider 1994, 
37). Resilience in ecosystems was first described by C.S. Holling in 1973: ―the concept of 
resilience originated in ecology, and this concept has been applied and studied primarily in the 
context of ecosystems‖ (Batabyal 1998, 235). A theory of resilience has since been proposed by 
world system scientists encompassing the ―figure-8‖ theory of complex system change - this 
thesis will consider this but especially focus on resilience as a concept.  
It is important to note there is a continuum of disruptions from breakdowns to 
catastrophes to collapse, where collapse is the worst, least desirable from of system change 
precipitated by a catastrophe which in turn is usually caused by cascading breakdowns in a 
system. Resilience therefore deals with both preventing breakdowns from cascading into 
catastrophes, and avoiding collapse after a catastrophe. Additionally, catastrophes can motivate 
systems to transform in positive ways over the long term. In these cases, we may paradoxically 
not want certain attributes of our system to be resilient if they hold back such transformation. 
Since its inception, ecological economics has attempted to apply lessons from the natural 
sciences (physics and ecology) to the mechanistic discipline of economics. To date, however, 
when they do apply ecological concepts, ecological economists mainly focus only on the 
implications of the laws of thermodynamics for the transfer of energy (throughput) in an 
economy. Important ecological concepts such as complexity and resilience have yet to make the 
transition into the majority of ecological economic literature. Perhaps this is partly because the 
neoclassical canon still underlying ecological economics remains rooted in mechanistic ideas 
about how the universe is constructed (predictable, deterministic, atomistic) which are antithesis 
to systems theory (Tisdell 2003, 41).  
However, the problem of softening and surviving breakdowns and catastrophes provides 
newfound justification for examining how resilience and other related complex systems concepts 
fit into ecological economics: ―To understand and address the challenges facing humanity, new 
perspectives, concepts and tools about the dynamics of complex systems and their implications 




also the social sciences and humanities‖ (Colding et al. 2002, 15). Indeed, ―The concepts and 
tools developed by ecologists to deal with the evolution of multiple equilibrium ecosystems have 
the potential to change fundamentally the way we approach the economics of change‖ (Perrings 
1998, 518). This approach is very much consistent with ecological economic theory, since 
―Systems analysis forms a more natural scientific base and worldview for the inherently 
integrative transdiscipline of ecological economics than classical, reductionist science‖ 
(Costanza et al. 1997, 52). From the perspective of ecological economics it is logical to think of 
ecological shocks, catastrophes and collapses as inseparable in the modern world from economic 
breakdowns, catastrophes and collapses: because of system linkages, disruptions of ecological 
systems can eventually cause breakdowns in economic systems, and vice versa. 
Even when considering how to prepare for an uncertain future, the day-to-day purpose of 
the economy cannot be forgotten: to assign society‘s resources in an equitable and efficient 
manner. The just distribution of wealth is the second major goal of ecological economics, and its 
relationship with economic resilience in particular is largely unexplored. What effect do 
economic disparities within and between countries have on their resilience to shocks that 
frequently bring these hidden social problems to the forefront? 
Achieving efficiency, the primary occupation of neoclassical economics (in the pursuit of 
growth and want fulfillment), remains important to ecological economics, but of third priority. In 
theory, the more efficient the allocation of natural and human capital within the economy, the 
larger is the scale that can be supported and the longer catastrophe can potentially be averted. On 
the other hand, traditional notions of efficiency often require specialization and optimization 
which may necessitate the sacrifice of system attributes like diversity and redundancy which 
could leave the economy very vulnerable to catastrophes. Is this paradox irreconcilable? 
In some cases sustainable scale, just distribution and efficient allocation may complement 
resilience and in other cases compromise resilience. To the extent these four goals are mutually 
exclusive, maintaining the same material standard of living while building in resilience might 
require a level of resource consumption which is unaffordable and unsustainable. Just as Daly 
and Farley (2004) seek to balance efficiency with scale and distribution, these goals may need to 
be balanced and/or integrated with economic resilience.  
This contentious set of relationships can be seen in many real-world examples, as will be 




globalization and trade are rarely articulated from an economic point of view: ―Building self-
reliant, sustainable, local, community economies requires not only good practice and policy, but 
also good theory‖ (Curtis 2003, 84). Studying the prevention of societal collapse may reveal a 
stronger theoretical underpinning for why localism truly does matter. 
This thesis therefore brings the new perspectives of understanding provided by resilience 
thinking to examine the fundamental tensions and complementarities between economic 
resilience, efficiency, scale and distribution in the efforts to create a unified ecological economic 
theory. Exploring these relationships is of critical importance because it will help to determine 
how we should design our economy to meet the needs of the present while building in safeguards 
against collapse.  
This thesis assumes there is a significant possibility that society is unable to achieve 
sustainable scale before serious catastrophes occur. The most likely reason for this is that the 
necessary political willpower for action cannot be mustered in time (due to lobbying by vested 
interests, entrenched ideologies and institutions among decision-makers, the collective action 
problem of a public failing to appreciate true costs and dangers etc.). By being realistic about the 
(un)likelihood that society can prevent shocks, this thesis strives to be practical in a theoretical 
way. However, this may lead some to wonder: if sustainable scale is exceeded due to a failure by 
society to appreciate the magnitude of the problem, how could society possibly be persuaded to 
care about resilience? As irrational as it may seem, small policy adjustments which could greatly 
enhance desirable resilience might be more politically acceptable than policies which try to keep 
the economy within sustainable scale. For example, governments are increasingly focusing more 
on adapting to climate change than mitigating it in the first place. Also, smaller vulnerable 
countries may wish to take action to prepare for coming shocks even though the political resolve 
for prevention among the major polluters is lacking. 
If ecological economists were allowed to implement their agenda, society could hopefully 
stay well within sustainable scale and environmental resource shocks would be averted. 
Therefore some might also question why ecological economics should worry about incorporating 
economic resilience when prevention seems like the best solution of all. The first reason is that 
human actions may have already set catastrophic natural feedback systems in motion (climate 
change) which even ecological economic policies would be powerless to reverse (Diamond 




the collapse itself. In a global complex society, we are less likely to see warnings of a collapse in 
time to prevent it‖ (Farley 2007 interview). 
The second reason is because chaos exists in the universe. In the 1990s, chaos theory 
evolved out of catastrophe theory to explain the unpredictability observed in nonlinear systems 
(popularly known as the ―butterfly effect‖) (Gunderson et al. 2002). Chaos theory tells us that 
because the exact starting conditions of a system or phenomenon are never known, we can never 
fully predict their behaviour even with the most meticulous measuring instruments and computer 
models. Even simple systems with known laws can demonstrate chaotic behaviour as small 
initial variances become exponentially magnified over time. Contrary to the hidden assumption 
in conventional economics that people have perfect information even about the future, we 
therefore cannot reliably predict shocks, breakdowns or catastrophes, or what we need to do to 
prevent them, or whether our efforts will even work (Beers 2009). ―It might seem that long-range 
forecasting of environmental conditions might help avoid overshooting environmental limits. 
Unfortunately, ecological research has demonstrated that predicting ecosystem thresholds or 
behaviour far in advance may be impossible‖ (King 1995, 964). 
Indeed, resilience theory agrees that ―change is ultimately inevitable and repeated, 
although repeated cycles may not follow the same pathway or result in analogous systems‖ 
(Redman and Kinzig 2003, 2). Thus, even if ecological economists were on track to meet 
sustainable scale, they would be well advised to practice the precautionary principle since not all 
shocks can be foreseen or prevented: ―we‘re unlikely to prevent all forms of breakdown‖ 
(Homer-Dixon 2006, 30). In the near future, the main source of unpredictability/chaos is of 
course likely to be climate change. As a theory of social change, resilience may also help 
ecological economists make sense of the process by which ecological economics might one day 
gain ascendancy, emerge into the mainstream and ultimately supplant neoclassical economics. It 
may take a catastrophe to wake people up to the need for ecological economics, but ecological 
economists first need to advocate for building desirable resilience into the economy to ensure 
they will have a civilization left to inherit. 
To summarize, ecological economics attempts to integrate concepts from the natural 
sciences and conventional mechanistic economics. This leads to three conceptual policy goals: 
just distribution, efficient allocation and sustainable scale. Within the umbrella of complex 




scale cannot always be achieved and some unanticipated shocks, breakdowns and catastrophes 
are inevitable. From ecology and systems theory also comes the concept of resilience, which is 
largely missing from the theory of ecological economics in terms of its economic implications 
for designing a ―safe-fail‖ economy. This thesis will therefore analyze how economic resilience 
can be integrated into ecological economics, while also examining the complex interplay 
between resilience, sustainable scale, just distribution, efficient allocation and catastrophe. 
Additionally, this thesis will seek to identify key sub-concepts such as redundancy, diversity, 
dispersity, autarky, adaptive capacity and transformability which together should provide a more 
comprehensive picture of what is meant by economic resilience. This thesis is not meant to be a 
critique of ecological economics so much as a contribution to the conceptual foundation of this 
emerging theory to help realize more of its tremendous potential. 
Basic assumption 1 for the framework to be developed here is that resilience is a useful 
thing to have given the historical record. It should be noted, however, that short run resilience 
can be desirable or undesirable depending on whether a system‘s attributes are beneficial and 
worth preserving (see Chapter 3 for more discussion on this). Assumption 2 is that ecological 
economics is a very suitable branch of economics for studying resilience. A final assumption 
underpinning this framework is that these existing concepts and theories from various disciplines 
are themselves applicable and legitimate, and that it is valid to apply them together to obtain 
insights to a new problem. This framework will be immensely useful for this study because the 
possibility of deriving new insights and perspectives on catastrophe and resilience is greatly 
magnified when one approaches the subject from a transdisciplinary vantage point.  
 
1.5  Methodology 
 
This study is mainly theoretical, focusing on breadth more than depth. The benefit of remaining 
broadly theoretical is that the results are more generalizable than if a narrower case study 
approach were adopted. The focus first and foremost is on establishing the relevancy of 
resilience to economists and their theories from which policy implications can follow. 
This study is primarily qualitative rather than quantitative, which is justifiable because 
chaos theory and our perpetual ignorance of system linkages guarantees there will be vast 




certainty will be surprise itself). This makes efforts to model them quantitatively not only 
difficult but potentially misleading. Gunderson (2003, 40) explains why traditional scientific 
methodology is not always appropriate for complex system research such as this study: ―One 
mode of science focuses on parts of the system and deals with experiments that narrow 
uncertainty to the point of acceptance by peers; it is conservative and unambiguous by being 
incomplete and fragmentary. The other view is integrative and holistic, searching for simple 
structures and relationships that explain much of nature‘s complexity… [and] assumes that 
surprises are inevitable, that knowledge will always be incomplete‖. This thesis follows the trend 
towards post-normal environmental science, where ―facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes 
high, and decisions urgent‖ (Ravetz 1999, 649).   
To answer its research question, this study uses three main methods: a secondary 
literature research, primary research through key informant interviews, and finally, based on 
information gathered to that point, a substantial qualitative ecological economic analysis and 
application. This study is divided into 7 chapters that together are necessary to answer the 
original overarching research question. In spite of the numerical sequencing of these chapters, 
this study did not develop in a linear fashion. Instead, an iterative process was followed (see 
Palys 1997, 298): answers to the research questions were open to revision over the course of the 
study as new information and insights became available. This dynamic methodology based on a 
positive feedback loop is in the spirit of this study‘s focus on complex system concepts. This 
paper‘s research is both exploratory (aims to gain new insights) and relational (seeks to 
determine how variables are related, primarily in Chapters 5-7) (Palys 1997, 77). 
Secondary literature plays an integral role in answering the research question, along with 
identifying relevant definitions, concepts, and historical information. This thesis goes beyond a 
simple traditional literature review in that it collects and synthesizes a wide and extremely 
diverse body of literature on environmental catastrophe, the collapse of civilizations, resilience 
and economics. Journals, books and academic websites are cited from fields such as economics, 
ecology, systems theory, archaeology and disaster planning.  
 Because of the scale of this topic and its theoretical nature, primary research was not 
extensive. However, semi-structured key informant interviews were conducted in order to 
provide expert up-to-date input and personalized feedback on the validity of this author‘s 




logical individuals to interview given the research question focuses on the development of this 
particular theory. Professors were interviewed from institutions including York University, the 
University of British Columbia, the Gund Institute of Ecological Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley and Flinders University, Australia. These professors were chosen from 
academic specializations listed on university websites and from those known by the author to 
have expertise in ecological economic theory. Together they represent a reasonable sample of the 
major minds in the field. A sixth professor interviewed was a world expert in resilience and the 
environmental roots of conflict. 
Interviews were conducted primarily through email to minimize the ecological impact of 
unnecessary travel, but one was conducted in person. Each key informant was asked to answer a 
set of qualitative questions that varied slightly depending on the interviewee‘s particular 
expertise. Both the data collection tools and the interview procedure itself first passed full 
University of Waterloo ethics clearance to ensure professionalism. Participants could choose to 
remain anonymous, and one did.  
The third main method of this study is extensive analysis. This can be considered a 
―method‖ for purposes of this study because most of the gathered secondary data is not written 
from the perspective of ecological economics, nor is any single source likely to explicitly address 
all aspects of the research question. Hence, data analysis in this fundamentally theoretical paper 
had to go beyond simply summarization and the identification of patterns. Findings had to be 
integrated into this study‘s theoretical framework, and ecological economics more generally, by 
using creativity and theoretical logic to identify key relationships and new implications. Most 
importantly, because of the novelty of the research being undertaken, this author had to design 
and iteratively refine his own conceptual framework (within the larger study‘s overall theoretical 
framework). This unique framework introducing economic resilience and its principles is 
detailed in Chapter 4 and then tested in Chapter 5 to determine how it fits within the broader 
theory of ecological economics in order to answer the original research question. Finally, a new 
master framework incorporating both the concept of economic resilience (and principles) and 
ecological economics is in turn applied to real life economic sectors to illustrate the new insights 
it can provide (Chapter 6). 
The methodology can be broadly summarized as gathering historical and secondary data 




(Chapter 4), application of this framework to ecological economic theory (Chapter 5), 
application to real life examples (Chapter 6) and final theoretical and applied implications 
(Chapter 7). 
 
1.6  Boundaries 
 
This study‘s unit of analysis is the emerging transdiscipline of ecological economics. Since 
ecological economics is committed to real-world policy relevance (Daly and Farley 2004, 43), 
the unit of analysis is also by extension the global economy and its subsystems. The geographic 
boundaries of this study include all areas where human economies are presently operating. 
Temporal boundaries are also broad given that ecological economics encompasses inter-
generational equity and long-term sustainability. Predicting with certainty when the next 
environmental resource shock will occur is impossible. Nevertheless, the net effects of shocks 
like climate change and peak oil are likely to manifest themselves by the middle of this century 
and be fully felt by its end (Diamond 2005, 498; Nadeau 2003, xi), so a time horizon of 100 
years serves as a rough boundary. Being based on present-day economic, technological and 
cultural conditions, this analysis remains valid for as long as these conditions characterize 
society, and so long as the threat of environmental resource catastrophes remain. This study also 
draws on historical lessons from civilizations dating as far back as 3000 B.C.  
 The boundaries of the actual research this author conducted are m narrower. Because of 
the worldwide availability of information through libraries, the internet and digital 
communication technologies, this topic could be researched while remaining within the spatial 
boundaries of south-western Ontario. The fundamentally theoretical and conceptual nature of this 
paper did not necessitate doing primary field research in any specific location, outside of one key 
informant interview. 
Due to space constraints this paper does not comprehensively identify or classify the 
many various types of environmental resource shocks and how each threatens to cause the 
breakdown of modern economies. As well as the quick summary at the beginning of this thesis, 
the threats facing our civilization have been covered in detail by other authors including 
Heinberg (2007), Homer-Dixon (2006) and Kunstler (2006). This thesis assumes at least some of 




(2003) assert that humanity is more at risk now than at any earlier phase in our history. 
Moreover, ―The vulnerabilities of complex systems often cannot be foreseen in detail. It is 
possible to classify general patterns of failure, but even elaborate schemes of classification 
cannot predict which particular failures will be most important‖ (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 177). 
Chaos theory instead implies we must be prepared for all eventualities. This thesis also does not 
cover how to prevent these shocks – that is the domain and objective of most other 
environmental literature, and again falls more under the sustainable scale (and to a lesser degree 
efficient allocation) goals of ecological economics.   
Some may wonder whether it would take a global-scale catastrophe in order to cause the 
collapse of any nation since unlike in the past, countries can now come to one another‘s aid (as 
seen so successfully after the Asian Tsunami). However, as will be explored in later chapters, 
globalized systems are now interlinked to such a degree compared to past civilizations that the risk 
of simultaneous failure is equally great (as seen in recent world financial crises) (Homer-Dixon 
2006, 180). A breakdown in just a few key countries could spread worldwide: ―Collapse, if and 
when it comes again, will this time be global. No longer can any individual nation collapse. World 
civilization will disintegrate as a whole. Competitors who evolve as peers collapse in like manner‖ 
(Tainter 1988, 214).  
Whether the  initial shock is local or global, this thesis focuses primarily on sudden large 
scale breakdowns where outside subsidies from other regions are either not available or not 
sufficient alone to prevent catastrophe. Even if outside help saves a particular community from 
complete collapse, it is still important to have resilience to lessen damage. There is certainly 
merit in considering whether gradual small scale perturbations would best be addressed within 
ecological economics under resilience or some other goal such as efficiency, but smaller scale 
disturbances largely lie outside the boundaries of this thesis. 
Since this is an economic paper first and foremost, it does not dwell on the traditional 
application of resilience to purely ecological/natural systems, aside from sampling that body of 
literature for ideas which are relevant to economics. From an ecological economic standpoint, 
maintaining resilience in ecological systems is probably already encompassed sufficiently within 
the sustainable scale goal. Natural systems do a far better job regulating their own resilience than 
humans ever could, and so the primary way that ecological economists can help build the 




on them by our economy. Nor does this study focus on social and political governance 
implications of building resilience that do not directly impact economic decisions. This paper is 
also concerned with the economic challenge of building resilience ahead of time (i.e. the physical 
capacity to respond), rather than for example the specifics of how emergency response teams and 
community leaders should behave during a crisis which is better covered in disaster management 
literature.  
Finally, this thesis concentrates on the mitigation of environmental resource shocks and 
catastrophes caused by unsustainable economic throughput. It may note brief lessons but does 
not focus on entirely random breakdowns, entirely natural shocks (e.g. most earthquakes, 
asteroid impacts) or entirely human-caused shocks (e.g. terrorism, computer viruses, war and 
economic downturns caused primarily by losses in consumer and investor confidence). This 
scoping choice was made because human-instigated environmental resource shocks and 
catastrophes have been primarily responsible for many of civilization‘s greatest collapses 
(Wright 2004; Diamond 2005). Given current rates of population and economic growth, 
environmental resource shocks seem to be the most urgent and dire threat now facing many 
regions on earth. Environmental resource shocks and catastrophes are the ones best suited for 
ecological economics to examine because they result from the interaction of physical 
(ecological) and human (economic) systems. Nevertheless, the line between environmental 
resource and purely natural/human-caused shocks and catastrophes is becoming increasingly 
blurry, for example as human activities influence global weather systems and wars are fought 
over resource scarcity (Renner 1996). Ultimately, building resilience into the economy could 
prove beneficial to societal recovery regardless of the origin and combination of specific stresses 
that precipitate a catastrophe (Robb 2007). 
 
1.7  Limitations 
 
This thesis has several limitations. First, the relative infancy of ecological economics and 
resilience thinking places limits on the amount of prior literature for this analysis to draw on. 
Second, in terms of historical analysis (Chapter 2), because catastrophes and collapses through 
history have usually thrown governments into disarray, ―record keeping during these periods is 




Third, the generalization of concepts from ecology or the natural sciences to human 
systems can be a contentious academic and political exercise: ―Simply taking the concept of 
resilience from the ecological sciences and applying it to social systems assumes that there are 
no essential differences in behaviour and structure between socialized institutions and ecological 
systems‖ (Adger 2000, 350). This author shares the concern that there is a potential for invalid 
generalizations to be made, yet believes the particular concept of resilience, when applied in a 
rigorous way, is fundamentally relevant to the specific problem of preparing economies for the 
very real threat of catastrophic change.  
Fourth, trying to answer such broad, complicated and multivariable research questions 
increases the chance that this thesis could miss details or make inaccurate conclusions. Yet 
taking a holistic approach may be the only way to properly examine such a complex problem. 
Focusing on too narrow a scale implies one is trying to assess large scale systems by generalizing 
from smaller systems, a reductionistic assumption that is not in the spirit of ecological 
economics. This study has instead chosen to approach the problem of economic resilience from 
primarily a macro-scale perspective, in keeping with many ecological economic analyses, but 
will also examine various microeconomic decisions where appropriate. As Holling et al. (2004, 
9) observe: ―No social-ecological system can be understood by examining it at only one scale‖. 
Fifth, this study is undertaking only limited primary research and experimentation, 
however this is justifiable given the scale and temporal properties of the phenomena being 
studied. Breakdowns and catastrophes are erratic events that do not occur regularly making them 
extremely difficult to do a controlled experiment on. For example those presently working in the 
fields of agriculture, energy or transportation may have little to no experience with the kind of 
large-scale system breakdowns which could be instigated by environmental resource shocks, so 
surveys and interviews of these professionals might be of only limited use. This paper will 
therefore be constrained by the predictive assumptions of this author and his academic 
interviewees and the information contained within secondary literature.  
Sixth, this study will conduct only limited empirical analysis, which may impact its 
ability to support conclusions and definitive recommendations: ―The major strength of 
catastrophe theory is to provide a qualitative topology of the general structure of discontinuities. 
Its major weakness is that it frequently is not associated with specific models allowing precise 




applied studies of economic resilience in the future. In particular, this study identifies and 
explores but does not try to resolve various potential conflicts and tradeoffs between resilience 
and other ecological economic goals like efficiency, instead leaving the door open to future 
research. 
Regarding biases, this author has been exposed to a wide spectrum of conceptual and 
theoretical approaches to economics and environment and resource studies over the course of his 
education, and so hopefully can examine these issues with a balanced and informed perspective. 
 
1.8  Overview of Paper to Come 
 
Chapter 2 will introduce the concepts of breakdown, catastrophe and collapse and examine some 
of the reasons why civilizations through history are thought to have failed under stress, and how 
this has related to the design of their economies. As Diamond (2005, 8) explains: ―We know that 
some past societies collapsed while others didn‘t: what made certain societies especially 
vulnerable?‖ This is some of the best evidence that exists since modern society has only suffered 
isolated breakdowns to date. The chapter will also briefly review how the concepts of 
catastrophe and collapse have been used in conventional economics. 
Chapter 3 will introduce the general concept of resilience, differentiating between the 
traditional engineering and ecological definitions of the term as well as between the useful 
concepts of Fail-safe and Safe-fail. It will then discuss the development of resilience as a broader 
theory centred around the figure-8 adaptive cycle of complex system change. The chapter will 
also briefly examine the resilience of historical civilizations and the degree to which resilience 
has been used to date in academic fields ranging from ecology to conventional economics.  
Chapter 4 proposes a new definition of resilience uniquely tailored to economies. As part 
of this definition, it evaluates various potential principles that the literature identifies as 
important for enhancing the resilience of a system. From this the author chooses six key 
principles which appear central to improving the economy‘s capacity to endure and successfully 
recover from environmental resource shocks: redundancy, diversity, dispersity, autarky, 
adaptability and transformability. This framework of understanding economic resilience will be 




Chapter 5, the heart of the paper, represents a first attempt at integrating the conceptual 
framework of economic resilience developed in Chapter 4 with the emerging theory of 
ecological economics. Deep consideration is given as to whether building resilience into 
economies would be compatible or at odds with the three existing ecological economic goals of 
a) sustainable scale, b) efficient allocation and c) just distribution. Each is evaluated in turn from 
a theoretical perspective. 
Chapter 6, the most applied part of the paper, analyzes how some of the most vital 
systems and linkages in real-world modern economies can be made more resilient to shocks. 
This chapter seeks to illustrate how the largely theoretical ecological economic framework from 
Chapters 4 and 5 can be used to generate practical insights. Systems examined include the money 
supply, electricity and energy utilities, the water supply, the transportation network, the 
communication and information system, the emergency response system, and the general 
interrelationships of urban systems. 
Chapter 7 concludes by exploring the central question: how should resilience be built into 
the theory of ecological economics? Should it stay as a niche concept or become a guiding 
principle or even a fourth policy goal? The chapter ends by identifying areas for further study as 
well as reflecting on some general but important implications of resilience thinking for 











Chapter 2: Historical Catastrophe and Collapse 
 
To understand the need for economic resilience, it is useful to begin by reviewing theories about 
why whole civilizations (and their economies) have collapsed. This chapter examines the impact 
that environmental resource shocks, breakdowns and catastrophes have had through the history 
of human civilization. It analyzes the role that the structural design of economies have been 
theorized to play in their collapse and then looks at five sample civilizations that collapsed 
primarily due to self-inflicted environmental resource catastrophes: the Mayans, Anasazi, 
Romans, Sumerians, and Norse Greenland societies. It concludes with a look at modern collapses 
and how the idea of collapse has been used in conventional economics. 
 
2.1  Defining Breakdown, Catastrophe and Collapse 
 
In his classic book on the collapse of civilizations, archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988, 3) writes: 
―Although collapse has been of interest for as long as societies have proven vulnerable, it has 
been a difficult mystery for historians and social scientists. Perhaps because of this, the 
development of political complexity has attracted more scholarly attention than collapse, its 
antithesis‖. What do scholars mean by collapse? Some like Heinberg (2004) and Diamond 
(2005) use the word to encompass the whole spectrum of sudden and gradual societal 
breakdowns: ―collapse may or may not result in the destruction of society‘s primary institutions‖ 
(Heinberg 2004, 10).  Homer-Dixon (2006, 110) prefers the word breakdown to describe short-
term system damage that can be repaired, reserving the terms catastrophic failure or deep 
collapse (borrowed from C.S. Holling) to describe a long-term loss of knowledge and social 
order.  
This thesis will adopt a somewhat similar approach by beginning with the term 
breakdown to describe the initial crisis point when failures start to occur. Breakdowns can occur 
when a shock overwhelms the traditional stability (robustness) mechanisms of a system and 
interrupts normal predictable operations and organization. Economic breakdowns can be 
characterized by the disruption of traditional market exchanges and supply chains, the sudden 




becoming scarce. These events typically lead to fear, anger, suffering and/or irrational behaviour 
among economic actors. 
A system experiencing breakdown initially remains within the same basin of attraction, 
however breakdowns can potentially cascade within and across different systems to the point 
where they cause the system to cross a threshold that significantly alters the behaviour and/or 
characteristics of that system. This is called a catastrophe, and occurs when a system crosses a 
threshold and flips to a new state, and potentially a new and unfamiliar basin of attraction. A 
catastrophe event is a point of key change in any system, where the future composition of that 
system, and even its survival, is most uncertain and most at stake. Opportunity and risk are both 
extremely high. Sometimes, systems can take on more desirable characteristics following a 
catastrophe, but there is also a danger they could collapse outright.  
A collapse is a terminal, long-lasting reduction in the size and/or complexity of a system. 
In terms of human civilizations, this thesis adopts Diamond‘s (2005, 3) definition of collapse: a 
―drastic decrease in human population size and/or political/economic/social complexity, over a 
considerable area, for an extended time‖. To this is added the following economic criterion: 
significant economic welfare loss among the population must also occur.  
Schwartz and Nichols (2006, 6) note that ―In the archaeological literature, collapse 
usually entails some or all of the following: the fragmentation of states into smaller political 
entities; the partial abandonment or complete desertion of urban centres, along with the loss or 
depletion of their centralizing functions; the breakdown of regional economic systems; and the 
failure of civilizational ideologies.‖ Renfrew (1979, 483) lists successive stages that economies 
of collapsing civilizations pass through: the end of centralized wealth redistribution or market 
exchange, the end of the issuing or exchange of coinage, a significant decline in trade, the 
abandonment of central administrative organizations and buildings, disappearance of the 
traditional elite class, the despecialization of labour and agriculture (reverting to local 
homesteads with diversified farming) and settlement shift and population decline. Finally Greer 
(2008, 83) describes four phases of civilization collapse: declining energy availability, economic 
contraction, collapsing public health and finally political turmoil.  
Thus there is a continuum of events involved in the failure of any system. An initial 
shock, either endogenous or exogenous, leads to one or more breakdowns in various system 




the system to the point where it is crosses one or more thresholds. This is the period of 
catastrophic change. Finally, a collapse is the worst-case outcome for the system following a 
catastrophe. Eisenstadt (1988, 236) concludes: ―The so-called collapse of ancient states and 
civilizations is one example, possibly the most extreme one, of the larger problem of how social 
boundaries are restructured and reconstructed‖. 
 
2.2  Historical Environmental Resource Shocks 
 
Tainter (1988, 198) maintains that ―Societies collapse when stress requires some organizational 
change‖. The particular type of stress this thesis focuses on are environmental resource shocks, 
which are sudden and unexpected scarcities of natural resources and/or failures of ecosystem 
services due to unsustainable levels of economic throughput and/or human population. The direct 
anthropological link between environmental degradation and the catastrophic upheaval and deep 
collapse of some of history‘s grandest economies has been explored quite well in recent years, 
especially by Wright (2004) and Diamond (2005). The Sumerian, Greco-Roman, Mayan, 
Anasazi, Southeast Polynesian, Norse Greenland and Easter Island civilizations have all 
collapsed in large part due to self-inflicted environmental resource catastrophes (Wright 2004, 
Diamond 2005).  
All are believed to have followed a broadly similar pattern of collapse: rapid population 
growth led to unsustainable agricultural practices (primarily deforestation) that caused 
environmental degradation, paradoxically leading to food shortages. The resulting civil strife and 
open warfare, often together with a final decisive environmental resource catastrophe, was 
enough to seal their collapse: ―A true collapse results in a society‘s extinction or near-extinction, 
during which very large numbers of people die or scatter. Recovery, if there is one, takes 
centuries, for it requires the regeneration of natural capital, as woods, water and topsoil slowly 
rebuild‖ (Wright 2004, 84).  
It is valuable for ecological economists to look at the fate of these once mighty agrarian 
economies because they provide vivid examples of the fundamental link between nature and a 
society‘s survival and prosperity. Heinberg (2003, 33) wonders: ―Why would a group of people 




maintain them? Why would a society capable of organizing itself into a far-flung empire, with 
communications networks and distribution systems, suddenly lose its ability to continue?‖  
Diamond (2005) proposes a five-point framework of possible contributing factors to 
collapse: environmental damage, climate change, hostile neighbours, friendly trade partners, and 
society‘s response to its environmental problems. These serve as input variables which he 
compares with the output variables of survival or collapse. Heinberg (2004, 10) observes that in 
some cases collapse may take as long as 100 to 500 years to run its course (like the Roman, 
Minoan Crete and Western Chou Empire): ―Complex societies that are limited to a single 
bioregion, such as the Classic Maya or the Anasazi, are more likely to collapse quickly as a 
result of damage to the ecosystem, while those of greater geographic extent typically persist for 
decades or centuries longer‖ (Heinberg 2004, 148). Wright (2004, 84) observes that: 
civilization is therefore most unstable at its peak, when it has reached maximum 
demand on the ecology. Unless a new source of wealth or energy appears, it has no 
room left to raise production or absorb the shock of natural fluctuations. The only 
way onward is to keep wringing loans from nature and humanity. Once nature starts 
to foreclose – with erosion, crop failure, famine, disease – the social contract breaks 
down. People may suffer stoically for a while, but sooner or later the ruler‘s 
relationship with heaven is exposed as a delusion or a lie. Then the temples are 
looted, the statues thrown down, the barbarians welcomed…  
 
Diamond (2005, 509) agrees that a key lesson ―to be learned from the collapses of the Maya, 
Anasazi, Easter Islanders, and those other past societies (as well as from the recent collapse of 
the Soviet Union) is that a society‘s steep decline may begin only a decade or two after the 
society reaches its peak numbers, wealth and power‖.  
Tainter (1988, 59-60) nicknames Diamond‘s explanation of collapse ―The Dinosaur‖: 
complex societies become so well adapted to existing circumstances that undertaking necessary 
change is very difficult. He calls Wright‘s type of hypothesis the ―The House of Cards‖ model of 
collapse: ―It suggests that complex societies, either as a rule or in certain kinds of environments, 
are inherently fragile, operating on low margins of reserve, so that their collapse is inevitable‖. 
But Tainter believes both these, and other failure to adapt explanations, are too simple to account 
for the capacity of human societies to be flexible and rational in their decisions. Since it 
challenges his core hypothesis, Diamond (2005, 420) takes deliberate aim at Tainter‘s earlier 
work, labelling it a refusal to admit that humans can mismanage their environment and resources, 




proposes various reasons why a society may fail to anticipate a problem before it arrives, may 
fail to perceive it when it does arrive, may fail to try to solve it after perceiving it, and may fail to 
solve it after trying.  
 Homer-Dixon (2006) acknowledges that the factors responsible for collapse will be 
debated endlessly by historians but he begins by proposing that a society is more likely to 
experience catastrophes when it is hit by many severe stresses simultaneously that combine to 
magnify their impact through the links among people, organizations and technologies in a society 
(synchronous failure). Yet Tainter (1988, 206) also has problems with this argument: 
Catastrophe theories suffer from the same flaw as resource depletion arguments. 
Why, when complex social systems are designed to handle catastrophes and 
routinely do, would any society succumb? If any society ever succumbed to a 
single-event catastrophe, it must have been a disaster of truly colossal magnitude. 
Otherwise, the inability of a society to recover from perturbation must be 
attributable to economic weakness, resulting quite plausibly from declining 
marginal returns. 
 
Indeed, there seems to be a connection between the design and structure of a society‘s economy 
(primarily its complexity) and its propensity to break down due to shocks, because ―The 
exuberant flowering of complex societies seems invariably to be followed by their 
unceremonious wilting and collapse‖ (Rees 2002, 264). 
 
2.3  Economic Susceptibility to Collapse 
 
Tainter (1988) famously hypothesizes that the reason civilizations eventually collapse is because 
their increasing complexity is subject to the economic law of diminishing marginal returns. By 
complexity, Tainter (1996), means ―such things as the size of a society, the number and 
distinctiveness of its parts [including technologies], the variety of specialized roles that it 
incorporates, the number of distinct social personalities present, and the variety of mechanisms 
for organizing these into a coherent, functioning whole…. Hunter-gatherer societies (by way of 
illustrating one contrast in complexity) contain no more than a few dozen distinct social 
personalities, while modern European censuses recognize 10,000 to 20,000 unique occupational 





Just as ecological economists advocate applying the microeconomic ―when to stop 
growing rule‖ (when marginal benefits = marginal costs) to the scale of the macroeconomy (Daly 
and Farley 2004, 20), Tainter believes the law of diminishing returns also applies. As a 
civilization grows, it has a natural tendency to respond to every problem by becoming more 
complex. This trend follows an inverse u-curve, ―where continued investment in complexity 
yields higher returns, but at a declining marginal rate‖ (Tainter 1996). This is because economies 
pursue solutions that give the best returns first and leave costlier, less effective solutions for 
later. Unless they continually find new inputs, Tainter asserts that all civilizations tend to pass a 
point of no return where collapse becomes inevitable because the population finds local 
organization more efficient and independence more attractive than an imperial superstructure 
with ever rising costs (Wright 2004, 92). Tainter observes that collapse is not always a disastrous 
event, as reverting to a less complex structure may actually increase welfare.  
Tainter (1988) seems to implicitly view complexity as the direct cause of collapse rather 
than a factor jeopardizing society‘s ability to endure and recuperate from catastrophe. It is 
unclear why he believes catastrophes caused by natural resource depletion are necessarily 
incompatible with his collapse theory, since greatly reduced energy inputs would exacerbate 
diminishing returns. Perhaps his original refusal to admit the possibility of environmental 
mismanagement revealed a belief in linear change and faith in human intelligence. Indeed, 
Tainter‘s stand on this issue appears to have softened over the years. He has gone on to write in 
the ecological economic literature (Tainter 1996) that a society is likely to collapse at the point of 
diminishing returns in part because ―new emergencies impinge on a people who are investing in 
a strategy that yields less and less marginal return. As such a society becomes economically 
weakened; it has fewer reserves with which to counter major adversities. A crisis that the society 
might have survived in its earlier days now becomes insurmountable‖.  
Therefore it is possible to reconcile the two major theories of collapse described above 
(environmental mismanagement versus flaws in the structure of the economy) by ascribing the 
trigger point of breakdowns to environment and resource depletion, but the actual collapse to a 
lack of economic resilience caused in part by overinvestment in complexity. Indeed, Homer-
Dixon (2006) attempts to do just that. He tweaks Tainter‘s hypothesis by focusing on 
diminishing EROI (energy return on investment): each successive unit of a particular energy 




returns, ―the society‘s resilience declines. An expanding portion of its wealth is sucked into the 
task of maintaining existing complexity, while its reserves to deal with unexpected contingences 
fall, making it more susceptible to sudden, severe shocks from the outside‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 
222). Consequently, ―In History, we can find many examples of civilizations that have been 
pushed over the edge to collapse by the combination of multiple stresses and weakened 
resilience‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 124). Eakin (2008) agrees that ―the hazard serves as a ‗trigger‘ 
or stimulus that acts synergistically with existing (socioeconomic and biophysical) structural 
conditions to shift a population into a situation of crisis‖. 
 Tainter (1988) acknowledges he was not the first to draw a link between economic 
structure and vulnerability to collapse, and several earlier theories sound similar. Flannery (1972) 
and Rappaport (1977) argue essentially that disruptions can be cushioned in less complex 
societies, but in complex societies with interlinked parts, disruptions can spread quickly because 
self-sufficiency and autonomy are reduced as specialization increases. Renfrew (1979, 488) 
argues that efficiency and specialization are the engines that allow population growth, but under 
stress, civilizations lack the option or understanding to diversify to save themselves, and instead 
depend ever more on productive efficiency and specialization until they inevitably break down. 
Likewise, Phillips (1979) ―argues that societies using resources efficiently (i.e., fully) experience 
inflexibility in resource allocation, since with more benefits a particular activity becomes harder 
to abandon‖ (Tainter 1988, 60). On the other hand, Stuart and Gauthier (1981) contend that 
―complex societies use resources inefficiently and that this is one of their weaknesses‖ (Tainter 
1988, 60). Some like Adams (1988, 21) also challenge the idea that the collapse of civilizations 
is inevitable or predetermined by the conditions that created them. 
 
2.4  Brief Civilization Sample Cases 
 
Whichever model is most correct in its details, the greatest contribution of Tainter-type models 
of collapse is that they focus our attention on the structure and design of a society‘s economy. 
Decisions made here have as much to do with whether an economy can avoid collapse as the 
particular shocks it is subjected to: ―catastrophe arguments present an incomplete causal chain: 
the basic assumption, rarely explicated, must be that the catastrophes in question somehow 




correct, then the interesting factor is no longer the catastrophe but the society‖ (Tainter 1988, 
53). Indeed, Wright (2004) views humanity‘s many failed civilizations as ―black-boxes‖ that can 
help tell us what went wrong so we can try to avert the same breakdowns. Given this, it is 
valuable to briefly review what anthropologists can tell us about the design of five historic 
economies that collapsed because of some combination of environmental resource shocks and 
lack of resilience: the Mayan, Anasazi, Roman, Norse Greenland and Sumer civilizations.  
 
2.4.1  Mayans 
  
The Mayan civilization of Mexico‘s Yucatan Peninsula was the most advanced in the New 
World before European arrival. It was actually a series of competitive kingdoms with high 
population densities packed into large bustling cities (Tainter 1988, 169). Right up until their 
collapse between 800 and 900 AD, the ambitious Mayan kings invested more and more societal 
resources into the construction of lavish art, monuments and defensive works as projections of 
their religious and economic power (Wright 2004, 102). The forested hillsides surrounding the 
cities were clear-cut to provide fuel and construction materials, as well as to make room for the 
intensive agriculture needed to support burgeoning population growth (Diamond 2005, 169). 
Likewise, ―The growing population depended heavily on a single, locally grown crop (maize) for 
food‖ (Lewis and Tietenberg 2009, 2). Perhaps as a result, the Mayans had little resilience in food 
production: ―The topographical redundancy of the Lowlands environment (over relatively short 
distances) created a situation where highly diversified production systems were not likely to exist 
in any local setting, and where neighboring populations would be experiencing nearly the same 
productivity cycles‖ (Tainter 1988, 170). 
Decreasing yields followed from deforestation and associated soil erosion and local climate 
change, culminating in a shock: the longest Central American drought (750-800 AD) in a 
millennium. Because kingdoms experienced concurrent productivity declines, harvests could not 
be averaged across the group and there was no forest food to fall back on (Greer 2008, 25). Raiding 
and open warfare between Mayan groups accelerated and populations living behind defensive 
walls farmed only adjacent areas, hastening the ecological exhaustion (Weisman 2007, 292). 
Eventually the building and maintenance of ziggurats and administrative and residential structures 




arrived it had collapsed by 90-99%, depending on the kingdom. What did fall apart quickly were 
all the signs of a complex society: the monuments, institutions of kingship and the Long Count 
calendar (Diamond 2005, 171).  
 
2.4.2  Anasazi 
 
The Native American Anasazi of New Mexico‘s San Juan Basin lived primarily in the densely 
populated Chaco Canyon. Their comfortable lifestyle was subsidized by poorer satellite 
settlements: ―different Anasazi groups supplied food, timber, pottery, stone, and luxury goods to 
each other, supporting each other in an interdependent complex society, but putting the whole 
society at risk of collapsing‖ (Diamond 2005, 155). To facilitate trade, the Anasazi invested in a 
centralized food energy averaging bureaucracy: ―By participating in this network, each local group 
could insure itself against the fluctuating, unpredictable climate of this arid land, thereby increasing 
subsistence security, and accommodating a growing population. In effect, the scale of the 
production and consumption unit was raised from the local group, occupying a restricted area, to 
the regional population, occupying a diversified territory‖ (Tainter 1988, 190). 
Initially, ―Outlier communities were incorporated from the high diversity, high productivity 
Basin edge. In time, though, communities came to be added that increasingly duplicated the 
resource bases of existing members [and] were situated in poorer, less productive areas… The 
result was that, as the ratio of communities/diversity deteriorated, so also did the effectiveness of 
the network‖ in terms of buffering productivity downturns (Tainter 1988, 190). A construction 
boom coincided with diminishing returns from complexity, and a prolonged drought from 1134-81 
AD was enough to trigger civil war and economic catastrophe. Because of deforestation and 
especially depletion of groundwater, ―When the Chaco society did collapse, its inhabitants could 
no longer reconstruct their society in the way that the first farmers of the Chaco area had‖ 
(Diamond 2005, 156). 
 
2.4.3  Rome 
 
The fall of the Western Roman empire has probably been the most analyzed collapse ever, with 




series of converging stresses placed simultaneous strain on the Empire, but once again 
environmental mismanagement and the underlying structure of the economy were probably most 
important. Barbarians were always waiting at Rome‘s frontiers, but they could not hope to 
successfully invade until Rome was weakened due to environmental and economic problems 
(Diamond 2005, 14). 
Like our current global economy, Rome was obsessed with economic growth. Its Empire 
was built on the monetary, labour and land subsidies of captured territory and with each new 
conquest, Rome‘s bureaucracy, army, cities and economy became more complex (Aldrete and 
Mattingly 1999, 203). But after the first century AD, further expansion failed to pay for its own 
costs since the only enemies left to invade were strong eastern opponents (leading typically to 
pyrrhic victories) or northern barbarians living in marginally productive lands. To maintain their 
legitimacy among the public, emperors overspent on extravagant monuments, spectacles and 
public works. As part of its ―progress‖, the city of Rome had deforested, drained, overgrazed and 
paved the Rhone Valley it depended on for much of its agriculture, leading to erosion and 
localized climate change that reduced available food supplies (Van der Leeuw and De Vries 
2002). It then exported its environmental degradation to North Africa and the Middle East 
(Wright 2004, 93). 
As costs of complexity progressively rose and benefits declined, the empire began to 
suffer from a thermodynamic Energy Return on Investment crisis: it was unable to generate 
enough high-quality energy to support the economic and military apparatus needed to administer, 
garrison, and defend its provinces (Homer-Dixon 2006). Indeed, its increasingly desperate efforts 
to get more energy only made its bureaucracies and taxation more onerous. Tainter (1996) 
therefore believes ―The Roman Empire provides history's best-documented example of how 
increasing complexity to resolve problems leads to higher costs, diminishing returns, alienation 
of a support population, economic weakness, and collapse. In the end it could no longer afford to 
solve the problems of its own existence‖. 
Homer-Dixon (2006, 243) explains what happened next: 
Abruptly Rome found itself overextended: the empire‘s now vast territory, much of 
it captured and till then administered using the proceeds of conquest, had to be run 
using the solar energy from its annual food output, a flow barely enough to cover 
the empire‘s normal needs. Emperors and their administrators soon found they had 
no buffer – no surge capacity – to cope with nasty surprises. The situation became 




challenges, including repeated poor harvests, savage barbarian attacks that 
penetrated as far as Italy itself, and a devastating plague that killed one-quarter to 
one-third of the population.  
 
From then on, Rome would endure near continual shocks, including fires, earthquakes 
and floods. ―Such mayhem created havoc in the region‘s agriculture, causing famines that in turn 
ripened conditions for epidemics of disease‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 60). Tainter (1996) continues: 
―To avoid oppressive civic obligations, the wealthy fled from cities to establish self-sufficient 
rural estates. Ultimately, to escape taxation, peasants voluntarily entered into feudal relationships 
with the land holders‖. Further barbarian invasions cut Rome off from its critical imports and 
were the final shocks that exposed a rotting and unresilient economic core (Tainter 1988, 188). 
Dramatic catastrophes began in 363 AD when the Empire could no longer govern itself 
and was forced to split into Eastern and Western states. Catastrophes like the sacking of Rome 
and Battle of Adrianople followed. Urban decay and rampant inflation set in, trade and economic 
interactions rapidly declined, and the population of Rome dropped precipitously, only recovering 
to Imperial levels in the 20
th
 century. By 476 AD, when the last Western Emperor was deposed, 
the Western Roman Empire was little more than a collection of Germanic kingdoms that, 
ironically, ―were more successful at resisting invasions, and did so at lower levels of size, 
complexity, permanent military apparatus, and costliness‖ (Tainter 1988, 188). These resilient 
kingdoms would form the basis of modern Europe. 
 
2.4.4  Sumeria 
 
Much like the Mayans and Easter Islanders (with their Moai statue cult), the ancient Sumerian 
Empire of Ur was controlled by a top-heavy priesthood elite who increasingly squandered its 
economic surplus on massive building projects at the expense of the environment and Sumer‘s 
slave-labour underclass (Wright 2004, 79). As deforestation led to severe flooding shocks, 
Sumer unwisely chose to invest in supposedly efficient mass irrigation projects to help support 
its growing population and standing army. However, these had the unintended consequence of 
bringing salt-laden river and groundwater onto their arid fields, creating barren salt pans and 
resulting catastrophe. Collapse followed in 2000 BC from which the Mesopotamian landscape 





2.4.5  Norse Greenland 
 
The Norse colony that once occupied Greenland collapsed due to three of Diamond‘s (2005) 
factors: environmental resource stresses, their exports and imports being cut off by their principal 
trading partner (Norway), and a failure to adapt to new circumstances. When they arrived in 
1000 AD, the Norse set about their accustomed practice of deforesting and overgrazing the 
landscape. But when the demand for their primary export, walrus ivory, dropped dramatically 
following the rediscovery of African ivory during the Crusades, the Norse colony was cut off. 
Their lack of alternative food sources and refusal to learn from Inuit knowledge led to their 
collapse around 1300 AD (Diamond 2005, 267).  
  
All of the previous examples were of environmental resource shocks which contributed to 
economic breakdowns and catastrophes and in turn societal collapses. Running out of resources 
and facing environmental disruptions is fundamentally an economic problem (economics being 
the study of how to provide society's scarce resources). People may have difficulty imagining 
civilizations that preceded the formal introduction of market theory (around 1700) as having 
economies, but like today their societies depended on their economy which depended on the 
environment. Trying to draw artificial disciplinary lines between economy, ecology and society 
is not compatible with the ecological economic perspective. 
 
2.5  Modern Collapses 
 
Turning to the present day, several authors, including Diamond (2005) and Homer-Dixon (2006), 
point to Rwanda, Haiti and to a lesser degree Somalia and Sudan as leading modern examples of 
societies that have partially collapsed due in part to environmental resource catastrophes partly 
of their own making. These miniature collapses are not great examples of Tainter‘s complexity 
theory but can serve as lessons of what might happen in richer countries if self-created 
environmental shocks disrupt fundamental societal linkages.  
Diamond (2005) also believes the Soviet Union suffered collapse. Certainly, as a political 
institution the USSR no longer exists, and the complex Soviet command system greatly 




half and birth rates and life expectancy decreased. Yet it may be too early to tell for certain, as 
Russia‘s economic and political power is again on the upswing. Many citizens of former Warsaw 
bloc countries would say their welfare has actually increased now that they are independent (of 
course, this would still be consistent with Tainter‘s theory that the collapse of central authority 
can sometimes benefit a population). Homer-Dixon (2006, 126) likewise believes that the British 
and French empires collapsed, at least in terms of area occupied. 
Heinberg (2004, 113) argues that ―North Korea is probably the most dramatic existing 
example of a modern industrial society falling into an energy-led collapse‖. With the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990, North Korea was cut off from its main energy 
supplier. The resulting chronic shortages of oil, coal and electricity, the relatively poor quality of 
North Korean agricultural land, and the imposition of U.S. sanctions have left North Korea 
especially vulnerable to natural disasters. Multiple floods, droughts, tsunamis and typhoons have 
repeatedly destroyed vital crops and infrastructure. As a result of these converging economic 
catastrophes, millions have died and much of the population is malnourished. Like Norse 
Greenland, the North Korean case illustrates how vulnerable a society can become if it is cut off 
from key imports.  
One of the best examples of a recent environmental and resource shock leading to a 
catastrophe and isolated collapse in a modern industrial nation is Hurricane Katrina‘s impact on 
New Orleans (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6). The city is projected to have permanently 
lost as much as 40% of its population (L. Gunderson, March 27 2008 presentation at University 
of Waterloo), which meets Diamond‘s definition of collapse. This decline has been compounded 
by the subsequent Gulf oil spill catastrophe in 2010.  
It is debateable whether other catastrophes in the last century (aside from warfare) have 
led to true collapses as defined by Diamond (2005). For example, the Great Depression was a 
sudden but medium-term, global and psychological catastrophe (in terms of loss of consumer and 
investor confidence) resulting in part from the 1929 stock market shock. Yet most industrialized 
countries recovered within a decade thanks to another perturbation, the Second World War 
(Levin et al. 1998, 225). The 1971 and Asian financial catastrophes were also partly 
psychological in nature, while the 1973 oil shock was a political breakdown with only an indirect 
relationship to the world‘s real depletion of non-renewable resources. None of these global 




and the 1992 Maritime cod fishery catastrophe were environmental resource shocks that led to 
medium-term but regionally contained economic breakdowns (Newfoundland‘s economy is now 
recovering thanks to rising oil and gas revenue).  
Overall, the relative absence of large-scale collapses among modern market economies 
does not necessarily reveal their inherent resilience. Tainter (1988, 216) cautions: ―However 
much we like to think of ourselves as something special in world history, in fact industrial 
societies are subject to the same principles that caused earlier societies to collapse‖. It is 
therefore disconcerting when Homer-Dixon (2006, 262) warns that: ―Today, just as in the late 
Roman empire, deep stresses are rising and system resilience is declining‖. Empires typically 
keep getting more lavish and their citizens continue seeing signs of normalcy all around them 
until their sudden collapse. The Mayans, Romans and Easter Islanders built their most 
impressive structures as their collapse was already in motion since their leaders wished to show 
off their riches and keep impressing the populace that everything was all right. The artistic and 
architectural excesses that today make these civilizations famous was in fact only made possible 
by their unsustainable drawing down of their natural capital (Gugliotta 2007, 101). Rather than 
being in their prime, these self-confident societies were living beyond their economic means, 
effectively accidents waiting to happen (Weisman 2007, 293). 
Therefore we must not mistake a lack of examples to date for proof that modern market 
economies are immune to the environmental problems that brought down previous civilizations. 
Every indicator suggests multiple large scale, converging environmental resource problems are 
festering under the surface and building to a critical mass that will finally give modern market 
economies their first true test. Climate change and peak oil threaten to hit every country at once, 
overwhelming traditional global response systems. Kousky et al. (2009, 4) additionally note: 
―There has also been significant scientific research on the effect of climate change on more 
localized disasters, such as heat-waves, flooding, droughts, and hurricanes. What has received 
significantly less attention is the possibility that a number of smaller disasters all occurring over 
a relatively short time period, especially in close proximity, could mutually reinforce each other 
in such a way that the resulting cascade of consequences becomes a global catastrophe.‖ 
Regardless of the particular stresses we face, the façade of our technologically advanced, 




country in the world, descended into complete anarchy in only four days, revealing that the 
veneer of civilization can be very thin. 
For their part, ecological economists have varying opinions on the usefulness of studying 
past civilizations. Some believe there is a vast difference between past systems and those we 
have created today (Anonymous interviewee 2007), or that the scale of present change has no 
precedent in human history (Martinez-Alier 2007 interview). Farley (2007 interview) concludes: 
Conventional economists argue that the human mind is the greatest resource and 
will find substitutes for all scarce resources. These past collapses show that this is 
not true.  Conventional economists argue that these civilizations did not have the 
magic of the market to rely on, but we are currently facing collapse of critical 
ecosystem services that send no price signals to the market. We must recognize 
however that in a globally interconnected ecological economy subject to 
unprecedented rates of change, we now confront collapse on a global scale. Lessons 
learned from the collapse of smaller civilizations and smaller ecosystems provide 
lessons, but are not perfect analogs of our current situation. 
 
It is useful to briefly explore further how conventional economists regard catastrophe and 
collapse. 
 
2.6  Breakdown and Catastrophe in Conventional Economics 
 
As we approach the era of the market economy, the study of catastrophe and collapse leaves the 
domain of anthropology and becomes a matter to be discussed in economics. The recent financial 
crisis has renewed short term interest in financial breakdowns like investment bubbles, but 
traditionally extreme events like catastrophes ―tend to escape the attention of economists, who 
are most comfortable with large data sets, well-behaved functions, and readily understood 
phenomena‖ (Zeckhauser 1996, 113). Neoclassical economic literature that does consider 
physical catastrophes usually focuses on the sharing of financial risk through instruments like 
insurance or catastrophe bonds (Jaffe and Russell 1997; Froot 2000; Niehaus 2002).  
For example, Zeckhauser (1996, 129) analyzes the ―production‖ and ―consumption‖ of 
catastrophes: ―There are two major economic problems in dealing with potential catastrophes: 
reducing their magnitude, and spreading the risk of whatever losses do result‖. Zeckhauser looks 
at liability and insurance systems and government safety regulation to see if they create the 




financial efficiency rather than designing for physical resilience, these sorts of analyses 
implicitly assume that society is never in any real danger of collapse. Indeed, because many 
neoclassical economists have an almost religious faith in technological innovation, they tend to 
deny that the possibility of collapse due to environmental resource depletion even exists (Nadeau 
2003, 82). Growth is a very familiar concept to economists but breakdowns are not. Economic 
forecasters ―do well in predicting rates of growth while on a growth plan. They do a poor job at 
times of recession, or even worse at times of looming depression‖ (Holling 2003, xv). 
As capitalism began to show chinks in its armour in the late 19
th
 century, a tradition of 
progressive economists emerged (the most influential being Marx and Keynes) who studied the 
macroeconomic factors responsible for economic breakdowns, if not so much the events that 
unfolded during the breakdowns themselves (Rosser 1991; Tisdell 2003, 40). While 
environmental resource breakdowns are a more modern problem that is largely ignored in 
Keynesian economics, volumes have been written about human-caused economic downturns like 
the Great Depression (e.g. Galbraith 1955, Rothbard 1975). By-and-large these analyses view 
catastrophes as exceptions to the economic tendency towards general-equilibrium and linear 
change (i.e. the business ―cycle‖), that could have been prevented if only the right policy 
prescriptions were followed (Rosser 1991, 97). These economists remain concerned primarily 
with the psychology of the consumer and associated levels of aggregate demand, savings and 
investments and have trouble viewing environment and resource problems as fundamentally 
being economic scarcity issues that can lead to much more severe and long-lasting physical 
economic disruptions. 
 Indeed, ―Viewing the world as fundamentally continuous contrasts sharply with viewing 
the world as fundamentally discontinuous. A smooth world represents the Newtonian-Victorian 
dream of a gradual and steady upward movement of reality through a gentle, Darwinian, 
evolutionary process…By and large, neoclassical economics has emphasized continuity over 
discontinuity as a fundamental phenomenon‖ (Rosser 1991, 1). Zeeman (1974) was the first to 
apply nonlinear catastrophe theory to economics in his investigation of the crashes of speculative 
bubbles. More recently, Sachs and Radelet (1998) have argued that international financial crises 
are unforeseeable because they result from self-fulfilling prophecies. Some like Lorenz (1989) 








But overall, the implications of catastrophe and chaos theory for the way that economies 
are designed remains largely unexplored, including in ecological economics. The simple fact that 
human behaviour alone can be highly unpredictable (as demonstrated by the various financial 
crises this century) eluded most economic models until recently. Research on the potential for 
sudden, unpredictable events has appeared in non-economic journals, such as Yasutomi‘s (1995) 
model of the autonomous emergence and collapse of money as a unit of exchange. But even in 
resilience theory literature dealing with economies (e.g. Carpenter et al. 2002), the focus remains 
on the collapse of local natural systems and stocks rather than entire macroeconomic systems. 




Chapter 3: Resilience in Concept and Theory 
   
The last chapter explored some of the warnings from history that societies can collapse when their 
internal design leaves them with insufficient resources to cope with simultaneous shocks, often 
of their own making. Given that economies throughout history have suffered breakdowns due to 
human induced environmental resource problems, resilience is clearly an important consideration 
in their design, since vulnerability to shocks is ―influenced by build-up or erosion of resilience 
both before and after disasters occur‖ (Adger et al. 2005, 1036). But what exactly do we mean by 
resilience? This chapter will start by defining the two major types of conceptual resilience used in 
the literature and then explain the notion of safe-fail which is important to understanding resilience 
thinking. This will be followed by a discussion of resilience as a more elaborate theory explaining 
how complex systems tend to undergo cycles of growth, catastrophe and renewal. The chapter will 
end with a brief discussion about the resilience of past civilizations and how the concept of 
resilience has been used in conventional economics. 
 
3.1  Defining Resilience: Ecological vs. Engineering 
 
Resilience is the capacity to successfully buffer and adapt to change. It can be thought of as 
elasticity or the ability to bend but not break: ―Resilience provides the capacity to absorb shocks 
while maintaining function‖ (Colding et al. 2002, 13). Perrings (2001, 323) notes resilience is 
simply the conservation of future opportunity. Resilience is commonly defined in two ways in 
the literature: engineering resilience and ecological resilience. Engineering resilience, the more 
common definition, is the ability to return to an existing steady state following a perturbation. 
Engineering resilience assumes that systems ―exist close to a stable steady-state…. This idea of 
disturbance away from and return to a stable state is at the center of economic theory as well‖ 
(Pritchard et al., 2002, 530).  
In contrast, ecological resilience assumes systems are characterized by multiple potential 
equilibria (Perrings 1998, 504). As first described by C.S. Holling in 1973, ecological resilience 
is ―the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as 




2004, 6). Ecological resilience ―is measured by the magnitude of disturbance that can be 
absorbed before the system redefines its structure by changing the variables and processes that 
control behaviour‖ (Pritchard et al. 2002, 530). Hence ecological resilience focuses on the size of 
the stability domain which determines how easy it is to shift a system out of one particular stable 
state and into another one (the often used metaphor of a system as a marble being moved from 
one bowl to another).  
Thus the difference comes down to ―a focus on maintaining efficiency of function 
(engineering resilience) versus a focus on maintaining existence of function (ecological 
resilience)‖ (Pritchard et al. 2002 530).  The engineering definition assumes systems exhibit only 
one stable state and that all others should be avoided. It tends to use more simplified models 
designed to manipulate and gain control over systems. Ecological resilience looks at multiple 
functional stable states and the flipping between them that occurs. Ecological resilience does not 
require continued functioning in exactly the same way (Common and Stagl 2005). Indeed, Adger 
et al. (2005, 1036) tweak the standard Holling definition to read ―retain essential structures, 
processes and feedbacks‖, rather than the same ones. The question of how much change is 
allowed before a system is considered so altered that its resilience has been compromised is, in 
some respects, a metaphysical one with no clear answer in the literature. What is agreed is that 
enough of the system must be preserved at any one time to prevent its terminal collapse. 
Both definitions can be useful under different circumstances (Batabyal 1998, 237). While 
perhaps influenced by the assumptions of the disciplines in which they originated, the terms 
―engineering‖ and ―ecological‖ do not mean these definitions of resilience are applied only to 
engineering or ecological problems. Theses terms have now simply become part of the general 
lexicon used throughout resilience literature. Overall though, because complex systems theory 
disagrees with seeing the world as near a single equilibrium, ecological resilience is the more 
sophisticated and accurate definition when examining natural and social systems, and the one 
that will be used more often in this thesis (Colding et al. 2002, 15). 
 
3.2  Ecosystem Resilience and Sustainability 
 
The first proposed application of resilience was to ecosystems and the majority of resilience 




theory. Indeed, the largest number of articles written on resilience can be found in the journal 
Ecology and Society (Janssen 2007). Henceforth the term ―ecosystem resilience‖ will be used in 
this thesis to refer specifically to the resilience of natural systems as distinct from ―ecological 
resilience‖, one of the general definitions of resilience.  
When describing ecosystems, some thinkers like Kay and Schneider (1994) have defined 
resilience as the capacity for an ecological system to stay within the basin of the attractor (avoid 
catastrophe) and used another term like self-organizing capacity to describe a system‘s capacity 
to re-organize after crossing a system threshold. This thesis will adopt the Resilience Alliance 
understanding of the term to mean incorporating both aspects, and thus define ecosystem 
resilience as the capacity of an ecological system to endure, adapt to and successfully recover 
from shocks in order to both prevent breakdowns from cascading into catastrophes (stay in the 
same basin of attraction), and avoid collapses following a catastrophe if the system crosses a 
threshold, preferably while retaining or regenerating desired system characteristics and functions. 
Ecological systems attain resilience through the mutual nonlinear interactions of 
organisms which allow novel structures and behaviour to emerge in far-from-equilibrium states 
(Nadeau 2003, 182). The concept of resilience has improved formerly simplistic understandings 
of why diversity is so important for ecosystems: by preserving its genetic library, biodiversity 
enhances not the ―stability‖ of an ecosystem in an equilibrium sense, but rather its long term 
resilience and self-organizing capacity (Kay and Schneider 1994, 36). At a smaller scale, 
―Biological systems have the resilient learning and corrective process built in, centered not on 
ability to predict or avoid stress but on ability to cope with stress. This provides the adaptability 
that has carried these systems through several billion years in which environmental stresses were 
so great that all designs lacking resilience were recalled by the Manufacturer and are therefore no 
longer around to be studied‖ (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 182). Indeed, geologically we have 
evidence of meta system stable states (periods and epochs) that saw the same types of organisms 
persist for millions of years until shocks like meteor impacts or climate change led to 
catastrophic extinctions, with the most resilient species becoming the new dominant life forms.  
Twentieth century resource and environmental science and management techniques 
focused on conquering and controlling nature‘s variability because fluctuations pose problems 
for meeting production goals. These measures (founded in assumptions of human superiority and 




the short term but have also negatively simplified ecosystems through the introduction of 
techniques such as monocultures, reducing their diversity and resilience: ―The insurance for 
dealing with the unexpected has been driven down by suppressing disturbance and reducing the 
diversity of the environment‖ (Folke et al. 2003, 353).  
Resilience thinking has provided an increasingly powerful alternative to these outdated 
views on environmental management. Most resilience studies have been based on specific social-
ecological system (SES) regions and their particular environmental management issues, 
especially the collapse of resource stocks (Holling 2004, 5; Perrings 1998, 504). When 
discussion of resilience does cross into the social sciences, it is primarily only in the analysis of 
small-scale decision-making institutions such as the Gunderson et al. (2002) discussion of 
Florida Everglades management institutions. 
One possible reason why the concept of resilience has not been as influential outside of 
ecology is because of the failure to agree in environmental and social science circles on how it 
differs from other popular catch-all terms like ecosystem health or sustainability. This may stem 
from confusion over when resilience truly matters to a system (namely, in the face of an 
emerging potential catastrophe) and hence which aspects of environmentalism do and do not fall 
under it (Lele 1998, 252). 
One way to view the difference between sustainability and resilience is to think of 
sustainability as focusing on preventing environmental resource shocks from occurring whereas 
resilience is about preparing systems to survive them when they do occur. Berkes et al. (2003, 
15) however believe the terms are synonymous: ―The concept of resilience… provides a way for 
analyzing how to maintain stability in the face of change. A resilient social-ecological system, 
which can buffer a great deal of change or disturbance, is synonymous with ecological, economic 
and social sustainability‖. Moreover, Abel et al. (2006, 21) and King (1995, 979) advocate that 
regions and nations should replace sustainability with resilience as the concept underpinning 
their environmental policy.  
However, this author largely agrees with Lele (1998, 252) who thinks dynamic stability, 
health and resilience are probably attributes within the larger meta-objective of sustainability. 
Resilience does not replace sustainability as an overarching concept, but the long run 
sustainability of a system depends on the resilience of that system: ―increased resiliency leads to 




(Petak 2002, 1). The relationship between resilience and sustainable scale will be explored 
further in Chapter 5.  
 
3.3  Safe-Fail versus Fail-Safe 
 
The concept of safe-fail, while not a central one in the resilience literature, is nevertheless very 
helpful in enhancing our understanding of what differentiates resilience from other strategies for 
mitigating shocks and stresses. Safe-fail is an approach to design and planning that advises 
taking the lowest risk path in order to minimize maximum losses in the event of unforeseen 
disasters, stresses or developments (i.e. you‘re safe if the system, or some part of it, should fail). 
A safe-fail system is designed to survive and recover from nearly any failure. Failure can be 
precipitated by anything from small scale localized perturbations all the way up to large scale 
shocks.  
Safe-fail is a feature of most resilient systems, which exhibit ―reduced consequences 
from failures, in terms of lives lost, damage, and negative economic and social consequences; 
and reduced time to recover‖ (Tierney 2003). Indeed resilience has been defined as ―the 
capability of a system… to degrade gracefully when it must‖ (Allenby and Fink 2005, 1034). 
Safe-fail systems do not pose a threat to valued components of socio-economic systems in the 
event of failure (Gibson 1992, 166). As a concept safe-fail is broader in scope than the individual 
resilience principles discussed in the next chapter but not broad enough to be a synonym for 
resilience.  
On the other hand, a fail-safe system is one designed to predict and prevent or evade all 
foreseeable failures. This approach has more in common with the engineering definition of 
resilience, and is also the dominant mitigation strategy used in the world today. Politicians, 
economists and even environmentalists simply do not see failure as a real possibility and so 
focus on preventing environmental and resource shocks in order to make our economy and 
society fail-safe (Rees 2007 interview). Fail-safe systems are highly engineered and protected to 
ensure failure is very unlikely, but tend to be more dangerous or suffer more damage if they do 
fail.  
In systems which depend on not failing, safeguards must be thought of in advance and 




room to come up with buffering solutions and adaptations. Homer-Dixon (2006, 290) argues: ―In 
our organizations, social and political systems, and individual lives, we need to create the 
possibility for what computer programmers and disaster planners call ‗graceful‘ failure. When a 
system fails gracefully, damage is limited, and options for recovery preserved. Also, the part of 
the system that has been damaged recovers by drawing resources and information from 
undamaged parts‖. Safe-fail is more consistent with the resilience idea of cushioning damage or 
loss and this represents a very different approach than trying to forecast and prevent all problems. 
Highlighting the difference between safe-fail and fail-safe helps to show the difference 
between considering resilience in design and largely ignoring the concept. Lovins and Lovins 
(2001, 185) contrast resilience with traditional notions of reliability: 
the engineering-for-safety approach ‗emphasize a fail-safe design at the price of a 
safe-fail one.‘ If the inner workings of a system are not perfectly understood and 
predictable, efforts to remain within its domain of stability may fail, leading not to 
safety but to collapse. And if, as is inevitable, the full range of potential hazards is 
not foreseen, but simple precautions nonetheless give an illusion of security by 
controlling the most obvious and frequent risks, then the ability to cope with major, 
unexpected risks may well decrease.  
 
The technological fixes and safety mechanisms which fail-safe designs typically depend 
on often increase complexity and coupling by increasing hidden interactions: ―We have produced 
designs so complicated that we cannot anticipate all the possible interactions of the inevitable 
failures; we add safety devices that are deceived or avoided or defeated by hidden paths in the 
system‖ (Perrow 1999, 11). For example, in the 2010 Louisiana oil disaster, the blowout 
preventer, in the words of British Petroleum CEO Tony Hayward, was a "fail-safe mechanism 
that clearly has failed" (UPI 2010). The failure to contain the oil spill revealed how unprepared 
and unresilient the BP operation was once their prevention strategy had failed. Safety devices 
also often fail to work because the extra margin of safety they provide just encourages people to 
push the system harder and faster to increase production and profit i.e. ―efficiency‖, leading to no 
net reduction in risk (Perrow 1999, 180).  
Of particular concern to systems is the cascade effect of synchronous failures, where 
small breakdowns cross to higher system scales: ―If some form of synchronous failure does 
occur, it‘s likely to be in a way that we‘ve never anticipated, because the range of permutations 




catastrophes are inevitable in complex, tightly coupled systems with lethal possibilities‖ (Perrow 
1999, 354).  As chaos theory warns, even tiny flaws can become magnified across systems. It is 
the interaction of multiple failures that often leads to catastrophe and collapse (Perrow 1999, 7).  
Indeed, complex systems inevitably suffer from unexpected interactions and failures 
which cannot be prevented, hence Perrow (1999, 5) calls the problems afflicting such systems 
Normal Accidents. His Normal Accident theory holds that multiple failures coming together in 
unexpected ways can defeat safety devices and cascade through a system: ―The fundamental 
difference between Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory is that HRT believes 
that if only we try harder we will have virtually accident-free systems even if they are complexly 
interactive and tightly coupled, while NAT believes that no matter how hard we try we will still 
have accidents because of intrinsic characteristics of complex/coupled systems‖ (Perrow 1999, 
369). Fiksel (2003, 5330) notes that ―Engineered systems cannot be designed to anticipate all 
future possibilities, as evidenced most recently by the Columbia shuttle disaster and the 
Northeast electrical power blackout of 2003‖.  
 The Titanic provides another excellent example. Its water-tight compartments were a 
highly advanced engineering safeguard against predicted catastrophes. The idea to isolate 
failures by sealing off bulkheads had some safe-fail logic, but was still not fundamentally 
resilient because if too many compartments failed (i.e. a threshold was crossed), the ship was still 
doomed: ―Over 1500 perished in the Titanic disaster in 1912, partly as a result of an 
overconfident captain imperturbably sailing into a field of icebergs at night, thinking he had an 
unsinkable ship. An iceberg sliced open five watertight compartments; the designers had 
assumed that no more than three could ever be damaged at once‖ (Perrow 1999, 178).  
―Thus in the case of the Titanic, the new ability to control most kinds of leaks led to the 
understocking of lifeboats, the abandonment of safety drills, and the disregard of reasonable 
caution in navigation‖ (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 185). Having more lifeboats and training drills 
would have made the Titanic more resilient and safe-fail no matter what went wrong, and thus 
would have been the superior design strategy. Rather than trying to save the whole ship, it would 
have been more sensible to distil the problem down to what needed to be preserved most (lives in 





The distinction between engineering/fail-safe and ecological resilience/safe-fail is 
fundamental to challenging the newest argument by environmental sceptics: that we can simply 
adapt to whatever climate change occurs. For example, trying to build walls around every major 
coastal city to hold back rising sea levels is likely a losing proposition (as seen by the failure of 
Japanese sea walls to hold back the March 2011 tsunami). Aside from issues of cost feasibility, 
investments in flood and coastal protection often encourage development in flood prone zones. 
Thus ―The net effect is that the resilience of the system (its capacity to recover from major 
storms) falls at the same time as its capacity to withstand minor storm damage rises‖ (Perrings 
1998, 516). Likewise, in trying to prevent the worst impacts of climate change, geoengineering 
proposals (e.g. solar shields, sulphate injections into the atmosphere) are fail-safe measures that 
introduce tremendous risks in light of human ignorance about the long term effects of 
manipulating large scale environmental systems (Kousky et al. 2009, 11).  
Another concept related to this discussion is robustness. Robustness and resilience are 
often confused and used interchangeably, but robustness shares much more in common with the 
fail-safe strategy, in that it focuses on maintaining all the parts of a system so that they will not 
suffer damage or  breakdown even when hit with a shock (Tierney 2003). In contrast, resilience 
focuses on maintaining the critical function of the whole system to ensure its survival, even when 
individual parts might fail. The origin of the word resilience is from the Latin resilire, ―to jump 
back‖, whereas robustness comes from the Latin robustus meaning ―hard and firm‖. Robustness 
is the ability to rigidly resist changing, whereas resilience is the ability to flexibly respond to 
change. A large robust tree stands firm to regular winds but risks being snapped and broken by a 
fierce wind, while a more slender resilient tree can bend with the wind and snap back. In the 
basin of attraction analogy used for complex systems, a robust marble would rather disintegrate 
than move, whereas a resilient marble could move up the side of the bowl and roll back, or roll 
into an entirely new equilibrium bowl if required to ensure its survival. 
Even though robustness recognizes that some stresses cannot be predicted, it is still 
fundamentally a fail-safe strategy based on trying to predict and prevent all possible breakdowns. 
Is it even possible to design a system which can shrug off every shock, when the tiniest failures 
can lead to magnified disruptions? Janssen and Osnas (2005, 99) for example note that robust 




of disturbance. Perhaps, there is a trade-off between specialized adaptation and adaptive capacity 
to regime changes‖. Fiksel (2006, 16) explains furthers: 
Engineering resilience has emphasized resilience or robustness as recovery from 
perturbations, but ecological resilience also emphasizes adaptive capacity, which 
may lead to new equilibria. Resilient systems, including biological and 
socioeconomic entities, are able to survive, adapt and grow in the face of 
uncertainty and unforeseen disruptions…. Traditional systems-engineering 
practices have tried to anticipate and resist disruptions, but may be vulnerable to 
unforeseen factors. 
 
For these reasons, robustness will not be covered further as a principle of resilience in this thesis, 
though a case could be made for doing so, as Anderies et al. (2004) argue. 
Pritchard et al. (2002, 530) summarize: ―Resilience has been defined in two different 
ways in the ecological literature, each reflecting different aspects of stability. One definition 
focuses on efficiency, constancy and predictability – all attributes of engineers‘ desire for failsafe 
design. The other focuses on persistence, change and unpredictability – all attributes embraced 
and celebrated by evolutionary biologists and by those who search for safefail designs‖. Thus, 
―The concept of resilience is a profound shift in traditional perspectives, which attempt to control 
changes in systems that are assumed to be stable, to a more realistic viewpoint aimed at 
sustaining and enhancing the capacity of socialecological systems to adapt to uncertainty and 
surprise‖ (Adger et al. 2005, 1036). A safe-fail, rather than fail-safe, approach is advisable given 
perpetual human ignorance of the environment and the less than perfect historical track record of 
the ―great experiment‖ we call civilization (Wright 2004). 
 
3.4  Resilience (Adaptive Cycle) Theory 
 
“The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity.  
The optimist sees opportunity in every difficulty.” 
Winston Churchill 
 
Holling and others from the Resilience Alliance have also expanded the concepts of ecological 
resilience and catastrophe into the adaptive cycle theory of complex system change. This theory 
asserts that all complex systems go through a continuous loop of growth and decline that 




and towards the system‘s capacity to respond to short-run shocks and stresses in a constructive 
and creative way‖ (Perrings 1998, 517). Resilience theory, however, often focuses on the very 
long term. This model asserts that ―change is neither continuous and gradual nor consistently 
chaotic. Rather, it is episodic‖ (Redman and Kinzig 2003, 1).  
Each of the figure-8s operating at different scales and speeds within a system is 
embedded within an overarching figure-8 (in the case of national economies, this would be a 
figure-8 representing global civilization itself, that might in turn be part of an even larger figure-
8 representing say global climate). Redman and Kinzig (2003, 1) explain: 
Resilience theory seeks to understand the source and role of change, particularly 
the kinds of change that are transforming, in adaptive systems. It is a theory of 
dynamic cycles…. Individual adaptive cycles are nested in a hierarchy across time 
and space. These nested hierarchies may have a stabilizing effect due to the fact 
that they provide the memory of the past and of the distant to allow recovery after 
change occurs. They may also have a destabilizing effect when dynamics across 
scales become ‗overconnected‘ or ‗brittle,‘ allowing small-scale transformations to 
‗revolt‘ and explode into larger-scale crises. Taken together this theoretical 
framework is called ‗panarchy‘.  
 
Figure 1 in this thesis is based on the traditional figure-8 diagram commonly found in 
resilience theory literature. It illustrates simplistically how a system‘s attributes evolve as it goes 
through this cycle. It is useful to think of the cycle as a roller coaster in constant motion, going 
down loops faster than up them. In fact, the figure-8 itself is an optical illusion – the track of the 
roller coaster is actually more of a u-shape (imagine the outline of a horse saddle) that does not 
physically cross itself but instead runs parallel at points.  
A given system state begins in the exploitation phase (r) in the bottom left corner of the 
diagram. Here pioneers, entrepreneurs and opportunists dominate (Gunderson et al. 2002, 323). 
During this phase the system enjoys rapid growth as it slowly travels up the front of the loop. 
This growth is achieved by the system becoming more and more efficient, integrated and 
connected, but at the same time available resources are used up, the system locks itself into 
familiar patterns of behaviour, and resilience is lost (Peterson 2000, 326).  
Once it reaches the conservation (K) phase at the top right corner of the loop, a system 
has grown to its maximum size. Conservation of its few remaining untapped resources has 
become its primary concern and so it has become extremely organized, controlled and connected 




remaining resilience and is stable only under a decreasing range of conditions (Holling et al. 
2004, 6). Opportunities for innovation are largely non-existent. Those that can best compete or 




   
 Resilience and Innovation 
 
 
Figure 1: Figure-8 adaptive cycle from resilience theory 
 
 
The extreme lack of resilience in the system means that external shocks that could have 
been buffered in other phases instead lead to system breakdowns triggering the catastrophic 
release phase (Ω). During this phase the system descends quickly to the bottom right portion of 
the diagram and then wraps around on itself so it eventually ends up in the back left corner of the 
diagram. Most accumulated system organization is lost in the resulting chaos. 
The resulting loss of control leads to the release of the accumulated capital 
(nutrients and organized carbon in ecosystems; money, skills, contacts, and 
experience in organizations) and to its decay or dissociation into constituent 































loosely coupled… High risks are matched by great opportunity. In human systems, 
it is the stage where the individual, for good or ill, has the greatest potential for 
influencing the future. (Gunderson et al., 2002, 326) 
 
In this reorganization (α) phase, efficiency has been lost but system resilience is restored. 
Connectedness and control are weak and confused allowing for the greatest innovation and novel 
combinations between variables. Figure 1 is a stylized symmetrical figure-8 rendered in the 
interests of simplicity and visual elegance: while the reorganization phase appears to be at the 
same relative height as the conservation phase, in reality the system cannot grow and become 
organized again until after it has freed up and mobilized enough available energy to loop around 
and re-enter the exploitation phase. There growth will start again but likely with different 
resources and new characteristics, potentially creating a new basin of attraction.  
Overall, the point of panarchy theory is not so much that downturns are predetermined, 
but that breakdowns are just as likely as upward growth over the long run in a world where 
unpredictability and entropy are the norm. System actors use the release and reorganization 
phases to explore for better alternatives and the exploitation and conservation phases to take 
advantage of what they already know. To have material growth you need deterioration, and vice 
versa. Therefore a major insight of resilience theory is that the breakdown (release) phase is 
simply a normal part of any complex adaptive system and constrained breakdown is entirely 
compatible with resilience. Thomas Homer-Dixon (2007 interview) notes ―Resilient systems 
themselves actually go through these periods of great difficulty and breakdown‖.  
The key however is to make sure that breakdowns do not cascade into catastrophes, and if 
they do, that those do not lead to terminal collapses. The resilience of the system before the point 
of collapse is key to determining how steep the decline phase is. Catastrophes present systems 
with a bifurcation point (i.e. a fork in the road): with sufficient resilience, a system is able to loop 
back and enter the reorganization phase to start anew. With insufficient resilience, there is the 
potential for deep collapse where the curve drops off completely, never to recover or reach the 
reorganization phase (see Figure 2). 
The adaptive cycle is thought to characterize all systems, though human systems may 
have greater potential for both unresilient rigidity and creative novelty, leading to cycles that are 
faster or more extreme (Gunderson et al., 2002, 327). In economic systems, this cycle implies 




capital is freed up and novel use of it can occur. Periodic restructuring is thus necessary to create 
opportunities for renewal and innovation. The adaptive cycle can be differentiated from other 
seemingly similar theories like Kondratieff‘s ―long wave cycle‖ of economic behaviour because 
long wave theory has no provision for breakdown, reorganization or fundamental system change 
– it follows the classical ideal of continual forward progress and growth, even though there might 
be dips along the way. The figure-8 is actually one full Kondratieff wave turned back on itself to 






Figure 2: Terminal collapse of system with insufficient resilience 
 
 
3.5  Resilience of Historical Civilizations 
 
Holling's adaptive cycle occurs within and between all scales but in human systems it may be 
easiest to witness at the macro scale of civilizations, which is where this thesis will confine most 
of its consideration of panarchy. The figure-8 theory of resilience complements Tainter‘s 
argument for why civilizations collapse (Chapter 2): in both theories, growth leads to increasing 
complexity and less and less resilience until the system eventually breaks down. The examples in 








continuous cycle of catastrophe and revival has occurred where learning has been incorporated into 
succeeding cultures.  
Unfortunately we have not found enough evidence from the few civilizations that 
apparently did not collapse to know whether they persisted because their economies were resilient 
to stress and/or effective at reorganizing after catastrophe to avoid collapse, or because they were 
simply very good at preventing shocks and catastrophes by maintaining their socio-ecological 
system health over long periods of time. Wright (2004) notes the Egyptians and Chinese are the 
only civilizations in history that have persisted for millennia, but he believes this is because they 
were simply blessed with especially fertile soils. More likely, China and Egypt may have been 
able to manage the scale of their activities sufficiently well relative to their natural endowments 
that they did not suffer subsystem breakdowns of the same magnitude as other civilizations. 
Certainly they would have had many localized shocks resulting from droughts, wars and other 
such phenomena, but perhaps due to luck these were not of the scale necessary to cause their 
collapse. The ability of their central governments to ensure redundant stockpiles of key supplies 
including food may have helped them weather these storms. Many of the cultural changes that 
Egypt and China did go through were due to internal political and religious upheaval or the 
influence of outside cultures rather than due to exceeding their own environmental or resource 
limits. These two particular civilizations may have simply been lucky that their economic 
resilience was never deeply tested (again limiting their usefulness as examples).  
Viewing historical civilizations through the lens of resilience theory also entails 
examining their passage through the reorganization phase of the adaptive cycle. Redman and 
Kinzig (2003, 12) point out that ―many historical studies see the collapse of a civilization as the 
end of the discussion, because the period, dynasty, or even society appears to be at an end. 
Happily, resilience theory recognizes that collapse, release, and reorganization are just as integral 
as the exploitation/growth phase‖. Indeed a new area of archaeological research studies how 
smaller scale urban societies reappeared from the ashes of collapsed civilizations (Schwartz and 
Nichols 2006). Their case-studies of earlier cultures illustrate how institutions, ideologies, and 
political/social resilience from the pre-collapse periods can heavily influence the regeneration of 
social complexity.  
For example, Kolata (2006, 217) believes the apparent ability of the Chinese civilization 




regeneration‖: empires that are able to reappear after disintegration with essentially the same 
structure, following a historically ingrained model of social and political organization. They can 
achieve this in part because their literacy and bureaucracy (detailed record keeping) allows them 
to faithfully recreate former government and culture and there is a long-term persistence in 
ideology held in common by the population. Greer (2006) is similarly prepared to ascribe their 
longevity in part to their resilience: ―Civilizations such as ancient Egypt and imperial China, 
which were based on sustainable resources, cycled through this process many times, from 
expansion through overshoot to a self-limiting collapse that bottomed out when capital stocks got 
low enough to be supported by the steady resource base.‖ 
In other cases, the archaeological record shows an aversion to returning to prior 
authoritarian or centralized regimes: ―The deliberate rejection of previous ideologies and 
institutions may also have played a significant part in the process of regeneration‖ (Schwartz and 
Nichols 2006, 11). Kolata (2006, 219) explains: ―So, rather than the regeneration of similar 
institutions of power, governance and sociocultural practices, we may in postcollapse scenarios 
see the emergence of new forms of socially complex institutions – new class relations, new 
patterns of production, new forms of the circulation of wealth, and a pluralizaing of ideology‖. 
Indeed regeneration of complexity can follow any number of structural pathways depending on 
externalities present during the process and is also contingent on unique local conditions, making 
cross comparison to develop a theory of regeneration more difficult (Kolata 2006, 208).  
Overall, while hunter gatherer societies may be a different story, it is possible that no 
large civilization has ever specifically designed itself to be resilient to both breakdowns and 
catastrophes. Perhaps then the best lesson we can take from them is that relying on luck alone is 
not sufficient given the high odds of previous civilization failure. We are quite likely to lose if 
we gamble with resilience. 
 
3.6  Desirable and Undesirable Resilience 
 
In socio-ecological systems, a catastrophe or even collapse is only regrettable if the relevant 
systems were desirable and their post flip replacements are worse. It is important to recognize 
that resilience is not always a good thing to have. In certain cases resilience can actually be 




to the long term health and integrity of the system. Such undesirable components or attributes 
can be stubbornly resistant to change. In ecosystem management for example, efforts to remove 
invasive species can prove very difficult. Moreover, system characteristics that were beneficial at 
earlier phases in the adaptive cycle, such as a focus on growth, can later turn harmful as the 
system‘s environmental situation changes: ―To adapt too well, too fully, and too effectively to 
present conditions may be to restrict the flexibility of response available to cope with a future 
change in those conditions‖ (Renfrew 1979, 487).  
An example of this type of undesirable resilience at work in a civilization is the pre-
Mayan city of Teotihuacan that collapsed in part due to drought, where ―The price paid for 
political continuity may have been the suppression of the potential for radical internal change 
and transformation‖ (Millon 1988, 158). Similarly, on one hand the central autocratic 
governments of China and Egypt might have played some role in their success by providing an 
important organizational and stabilizing effect during catastrophes, one that could quickly 
institute powerful measures to aid adaptability. On the other hand, the inequitable nature of their 
governments and their tendency to resist fundamental change may have just as likely made them 
a liability to long term resilience.  
In more recent times, dictatorships like Stalin‘s regime have of course been very resilient 
and very undesirable. More broadly, current dominant economic systems and other institutions at 
many scales are undesirable simply because they are unsustainable. Heinberg (2004, 140) writes: 
The managers in charge of the world‘s economic, political and military regimes are 
immensely powerful within the context of the present world system, but they may 
be utterly incapable of preventing the disintegration of that system, since the only 
actions they can take that will be significantly effective toward that end will also 
tend to undermine their own power and authority vis-à-vis competing regimes and 
managers. Thus, the system actively discourages steps towards its own 
preservation.  
 
In our modern society we see how environmentally damaging consumer habits such as 
high energy consumption have proven both very resistant to change and quite adaptable to small 
short run stresses: ―It‘s one thing for society to be resilient to exogenous shocks, it is another to 
be resilient to any attempt by members of society to alter its course should they believe it to be 
potentially catastrophic‖ (Lawn 2007 interview). Indeed, systems that seek to resist change by 




they have short term adaptability. Long term resilience is by definition desirable because it 
means the economy of civilization must be doing something right to avoid collapse as it goes 
through successive iterations of the adaptive cycle. 
Therefore, when seeking to build resilience into society we want to preserve some of the 
structures and functions (and delivered benefits) of the current system, but begin preparing to 
eliminate or adjust other aspects whose trajectory has no future. From the perspective of 
everyone currently alive on earth, enhancing the current system‘s short term resilience is 
necessary to ensure, for example, we all have something to eat and a home to sleep in after a 
breakdown occurs. As Keynes famously stated, in the long term we‘re all dead. Future 
generations likewise require that our civilization survives long enough to inherit it. Yet, we 
should not let the need for short term resilience prevent us from keeping our other eye on longer 
term resilience and the profound changes we must make in our present system to achieve it. After 
a catastrophe and release phase, we do not want to simply return to doing the same things that 
precipitated the breakdowns in the first place. 
The key challenge is to maintain or prop up enough of the current system‘s attributes to 
provide short term resilience to shocks and breakdowns, without locking down structures and 
behaviours so much that they compromise the system‘s overall ability to make desired and 
necessary transformations: ―Because human social and economic systems are essentially self-
organizing in the face of circumstance, the big questions are how much disorder must we endure 
as things change, and how hard will we struggle to continue a particular way of life with no 
future?‖ (Kunstler 2006, 239). Resilience therefore demands continually thinking about both the 
short and the long term. Both aspects are equally important: short term resilience is required to 
preserve the capacity of the economy and broader civilization to transform following catastrophe 
into something more sustainable over the longer term.  
Thinking about desirable resilience challenges us to tackle profoundly difficult value 
questions such as what system characteristics we wish to preserve, which we would be better off 
without, and what system characteristics we wish to foster: ―we have to reflect on what precisely 
it is that is being made resilient, in the face of which specific dynamics, for whom (and by what 
criteria) this is good or bad, and whether such resilience is consequently problematic or not‖ 
(Stirling and Smith 2008, 21). This is an exercise outside the scope of this thesis (though future 




society should look like to the forefront). For now, the broad focus herein on building resilience 
to shocks that threaten all of civilization skirts around the problem to some degree in that 
everyone can probably at least agree that civilization itself is a project worth preserving and 
making resilient. This is probably a good, albeit simplistic starting point for introducing 
resilience into ecological economics. From this point forward, it is therefore assumed we are 
only talking about desirable resilience unless otherwise stated. 
 
3.7  Resilience in Conventional Economics 
 
A number of the ideas generated about resilience are also potentially applicable to social systems 
including economics: ―it has been argued that the concept of resilience offers a useful way of 
thinking about the sustainability of non-environmental dynamical systems‖ (Perrings 1998, 504). 
For example resilience ideas have been applied on a limited scale in natural disaster (particularly 
earthquake) management literature (Tierney 2003, Liao and Rose 2005). 
Yet very little existing literature addresses resilience in conventional economics, which 
tends to ignore most complex system concepts. Writing in the journal of Environmental and 
Resource Economics, Perrings (1998, 517) notes: ―The concept of resilience provides a different 
perspective on economic dynamics than that normally adopted by economists…. Instead of 
focusing on the system equilibria and the properties of the system at equilibrium it focuses on the 
basins of attraction around those equilibria, and the susceptibility of the joint system to change at 
different points in the basin‖. 
Offut (2005, 1) from the United States Department of Agriculture looks at the resilience 
of the U.S. food and agriculture sector to shocks, primarily bioterrorism: ―resilience relates to the 
ability of an economy to bounce back from adversity, essentially on its own. This is 
fundamentally an economist‘s view that individual actors in the economy, if permitted or 
encouraged, will be able to make choices that moderate the impacts of a surprise, adverse event.‖ 
She tries to add a spatial dimension to a traditional market equilibrium model: ―Where something 
happens is now very important because it affects the range of substitution possibilities. 
Traditional economic models have no spatial dimension [and] don‘t need it to find market 
equilibrium. If there‘s a drought in Kansas, the supply curve for corn shifts inward, and we get a 




 Briguglio et al. (undated) at the University of Malta have examined how to enhance the 
resilience of countries trading in the global economy. They believe countries have inherent 
vulnerability arising from intrinsic features of their economy, but that resilience can be enhanced 
through good governance, sound macroeconomic management, microeconomic market 
efficiency, social cohesion and sound environmental management. They have come up with a 
resilience index ranking countries. Sample ratings include: Singapore 0.903 (highest), United 
States 0.791, Canada 0.778, U.K. 0.614, Japan 0.568, Mexico 0.464, China 0.350, Madagascar 
0.078 and Pakistan 0.013 (lowest). However, these scores are all in terms of the capacity of these 
economies to keep growing their GDP in spite of disruptions in global demand for their products 
– not environmental disruptions or disruptions of basic societal services.  
Some non-economist system theorists have also briefly explored aspects of resilience 
relevant to economics. For example Rosser (1991, 323) discusses some possible implications of 
resilience for macroeconomic design:  
Certainly central socialist planning may create a falsely stable order that proves to 
be catastrophically unresilient [as demonstrated by the economies of Eastern 
Europe]. On the other hand while the Austrian [laissez-faire economic] solution 
promises spontaneous order and creativity, there remains the danger of a profound 
instability that can lead to disastrous results…. In the face of potential catastrophe 
and chaos, every economic system faces difficult challenges that cannot be resolved 
by mere rhetoric, sloganeering, or blind ideological faith. 
 
On the other hand, in the book Frontiers of Environmental Economics, Perrings (2001) as usual 
only applies resilience to ecosystems, not to the economic system as a whole, a pattern repeated 
by Brock et al. (2002) in their empirical microeconomic model of resource stocks. 
In the journal Econometrica, Hommes and Brock (1997) try to explain the logic behind 
the adaptive cycle using game theory (a popular tool in economics for understanding human 
decision making). They suggest that at first, a resilient equilibrium is exploited by agents 
pursuing a more profitable (yet ultimately naïve) strategy that sacrifices resilience. Increasingly 
all agents shift to this cheaper model to compete until the equilibrium starts to become unstable 
and fluctuate wildly. It is ultimately stabilized by agents again adopting the expensive, resilient 
model. 
Yet overall, since resilience lacks any sort of formal theoretical underpinning in 




superficially at that, such as in the 2003 paper by Hamel and Valikangas in Harvard Business 
Review. Following the global 2008 downturn, economic articles in the mainstream media have 
often informally used resilience as a popular buzzword to refer to the capacity of the economy 
and consumer spending to return to their historical levels of growth in order to continue pursuing 
maximum economic gain. Yet true economic resilience is not simply about restarting the engine 
of economic growth once more. As the Resilience Alliance has discovered in complex systems 
and incorporated into their adaptive cycle, growth is one of the factors that can actually cause a 
system to lose resilience by weakening its built-in coping mechanisms and accelerating the onset 
and severity of environmental shocks that will test those mechanisms.  
Because conventional economists believe the world is largely made up of single 
equilibria, if they do consider resilience at all, it is usually from the engineering perspective of 
returning to a steady state, since this agrees most readily with their own simple equilibrium 
models. There is thus a fundamental theoretical disconnect between the ecological definition of 
resilience and the assumptions of neoclassical economics. This reveals why an emerging field 
such as ecological economics that is not weighed down by such increasingly outdated 
assumptions is more readily able to incorporate a truly sophisticated understanding of resilience 









Chapter 4: Resilience in Ecological Economics 
 
Clearly, resilience is a well developed concept and theory that has been applied successfully in 
several fields of study other than ecological economics. The previous chapter explored some of the 
different understandings of resilience and this chapter will now set about synthesizing from these 
options a definition appropriate for ecological economics. Incorporating resilience into ecological 
economics is vital to keeping ecological economics relevant in a rapidly changing world: because 
we have already overshot the sustainable scale of planet earth, economic resilience becomes 
paramount to softening the worst of the breakdowns we are almost certain to experience yet cannot 
reliably predict due to catastrophe and chaos theory. As the historical record of many unsuccessful 
previous civilizations demonstrates, a base level of resilience will need to be consciously built into 
the structure of the economy to avoid collapse. This chapter will look at principles that other 
authors and disciplines have identified as being fundamental to resilience and will then choose six 
principles of economic resilience (not necessarily from those) to create a new framework for 
analyzing resilience from the perspective of economics and ecological economics more 
specifically.  
 
4.1  Absence to Date 
  
In spite of Joseph Tainter being an honorary ecological economist, and the writings of William 
Rees and some others, most ecological economists have not spent much time looking at the 
processes that underlie the collapse of civilizations (Lawn and Victor 2007 interviews). Rees 
(2007 interview) observes that Panarchy may not have yet entered the lexicon of ecological 
economics because Holling‘s idea of collapse and renewal cycles may apply more readily to 
ecosystems than economies. Rees worries that modern human civilization may be a one-off cycle 
(e.g. there may be no recovery from a collapse caused by nuclear war). Yet Lawn (2007 
interview) notes: ―I think we [ecological economists] can learn from the collapse of past 
civilizations, particularly in terms of the role that belief systems and institutions (or lack of 




Likewise, resilience as an economic concept remains largely unexplored in ecological 
economics. While ecological economics purports to take major concepts from ecology, it tends 
to look only at thermodynamic energy flow. The precautionary principle and adaptive 
management advocated by ecological economists can be thought of as following the safe-fail 
approach (Farley 2007 interview), yet ecological economists still focus overwhelmingly on the 
prevention of environmental resource shocks rather than the survival and recovery of global 
economic systems that have suffered major breakdowns. However Farley (2007 interview) 
readily acknowledges that the design of an economy would be key to containing breakdown. The 
question is whether any existing branch of literature in ecological economics is paying much 
attention to such concerns. 
The textbook by Common and Stagl (2005, 53) is one of the few ecological economic 
books to cover the concept of resilience, but except for one brief mention of trade, only discusses 
it in the context of the resilience of ecosystems, not economies. The same applies to the chapter 
on ecological economics in Goodstein (2008). Rosser (2001) considers the implications of chaos 
and catastrophe theory for fishery management in the journal Ecological Economics, but again 
this examination remains isolated to ecological rather than economic problems. Similarly 
resilience articles in ecological economic publications focus primarily on ecosystem resilience 
and associated management issues. 
Indeed, ecological economists still have a ways to go in divorcing ecological economics 
from neoclassical economics, if that is their sincere objective: most papers published in the 
journal of Ecological Economics do not even mention the laws of thermodynamics (Victor, Rees 
and Lawn 2007 interviews). If some like Colding et al. (2002, 15) are willing to claim that 
complex systems thinking underpins ecological economics, then ecological economics needs to 
live up to this billing. Ecological economists already use the uncertainty of information and 
irrationality of humans as arguments for not having blind faith in markets, but they need to go 
further and consider the implications of uncertainty for human faith in the construct of 
civilization itself and what we can do as economists to help bolster it: ―Ecological economics 
needs to go the extra step and make human ignorance a central feature of ecological economic 
theory and practice‖ (Lawn 2007 interview). Tisdell (2003, 46) agrees: ―It is clear that ecological 




‗jumps‘ and chaos – in order to model and analyse our economic and ecological prospects 
effectively‖. Resilience is one of these much needed paradigms. 
On the other side of the gulf, the promised synthesis of social-ecological systems in the 
work of groups like the Resilience Alliance is largely illusionary – as noted in the last chapter, 
the great body of existing resilience literature focuses mostly on attempting to manage ecological 
systems while failing to examine the design of human economies at the root of ecological 
degradation. Even joint articles fail to bridge this gap. For example, the article ―Economic 
Growth, Carrying Capacity and the Environment‖ authored in part by the father of resilience 
thinking (Holling), one of the founders of ecological economics (Costanza), and a famous 
conventional economist (Arrow), provides little more than a one line mention of the link between 
resilience and economics in terms of natural systems: ―If human activities are to be sustainable, 
we need to ensure that the ecological systems on which our economies depend are resilient‖ 
(Arrow et al. 1998, 37).  
While studying the resilience of ecological systems and natural resource management 
systems is certainly of value to ecological economic theory, the fact that it has been the main 
focus to date, and furthermore can likely be subsumed in many ways under the existing goal of 
sustainable scale, provides justification for the remainder of this thesis focusing on a potentially 
more profound, largely unexplored concept: the resilience of economic systems. In a future 
likely to be defined by environmental resource shocks that threaten aging human systems, 
ecological economics stands to gain in prestige and credibility among competing economic 
disciplines if it is better prepared theoretically and analytically to address these threats.  
Hanley (1998, 244) critiquing Levin et al. (1998), notes that even in the limited number 
of cases where resilience is applied to socioeconomic systems, the concept and its implications 
are often poorly defined and seem to add nothing new to the debate. A lack of common 
definitions has led to resilience being watered down and pulled in all directions between 
disciplines until it starts to lose its original, powerful meaning. A more rigorous definition, at 








4.2  Defining Economic Resilience 
 
According to Tierney (2003), resilience in human systems consists of four interrelated 
dimensions: technical, organizational, social and economic: 
  
The technical dimension of resilience refers to the ability of physical systems (e.g., 
structures, lifelines, other engineered systems) to perform to desired levels when 
subject to disaster forces. The organizational dimension of resilience refers to the 
capacity of organizations (e.g., emergency management organizations, utilities, 
hospitals, governmental organizations) to make decisions and take actions to reduce 
disaster vulnerability and impacts. The social dimension of resilience consists of 
factors that lessen the negative social or community consequences of disasters, 
while economic resilience refers to the capacity of firms and local, regional, and 
national economies to absorb, contain, or reduce both direct and indirect economic 
losses resulting from disasters.  
 
Given how interlinked they are, both this thesis and ecological economics need to consider all 
four dimensions, but especially the last.  
Homer-Dixon (2007 interview) agrees: ―Resilience is definitely an economic issue‖.  
Economics is about the production and consumption of goods and services and the provision of 
well-being and welfare. Under either definition, resilience is certainly therefore ―a critical 
concern of economics‖ (Homer-Dixon 2007 interview). Every time one makes a decision about 
resilience, one is also making an economic decision. There is potentially a cost to make 
technologies or institutions more resilient which may involve tradeoffs and opportunity costs.  
To successfully incorporate resilience into ecological economics, what is needed then is a 
new definition for economic system resilience (the resilience of the human economy), as 
differentiated from ecosystem resilience (the resilience of nature‘s economy), or ecological 
resilience (the definition/type of resilience explained in the last chapter). The goal of a steady-
state economy in Daly‘s vision of ecological economics might seem to favour an engineering 
definition of resilience yet the tendency in ecological economics to prefer ideas from ecology 
would suggest the ecological definition would be more favoured. Because of its complexity, 
debate over definitions also afflicts the resilience literature in general: ―One paradox of this 
concept is that a more resilient system implies more flexibility and hence less tight controls, but 
resilient systems are also defined as those able to maintain their controls and structure‖ (Redman 




Offut (2005, 1) suggests the following narrow definition: ―Economic resilience is the 
availability of substitutes in production and consumption‖, but this fails to encompass more 
advanced understandings of system breakdown or adaptive change. Studying earthquake 
resilience, Rose (2004, 41) offers a better, though still not quite adequate definition for economic 
resilience: ―the inherent and adaptive responses to hazards that enable individuals and 
communities to avoid some potential losses. It can take place at the level of the firm, household, 
market, or macroeconomy. In contrast to the pre-event character of mitigation, economic 
resilience emphasizes ingenuity and resourcefulness applied during and after the event‖. Finally, 
Briguglio et al. (undated, 1) define economic resilience as the ―nurtured ability of an economy to 
recover from or adjust to the effects of adverse shocks to which it may be inherently exposed‖. 
Returning to the basics from Chapter 3 for a moment, a useful general definition of the 
concept of resilience is provided by Redman and Kinzig (2003, 5): ―the ability of a system to 
remain functionally stable in the face of stress and to recover following a disturbance.‖ Colding 
et al. (2002, 71) offer a similar definition, but this time narrowed to social systems: ―Social 
Resilience – The ability of human communities to withstand external shocks or perturbations to 
their infrastructure, such as environmental variability or social, economic or political upheaval, 
and to recover from such perturbations‖. With some modification these two definitions can be 
adapted for economics by incorporating one of the key economic measuring sticks for success: 
the maintenance and enhancement of utility, or more generally, welfare. Both of these essentially 
mean ‗happiness‘. 
This thesis will henceforth define economic resilience as: the capacity of an economy to 
endure, adapt to and successfully recover from shocks in order to maintain a base level of 
welfare for all people at least equal to that enjoyed before the shock occurred. It encompasses 
both preventing breakdowns from cascading into catastrophes, and avoiding collapse following a 
catastrophe, preferably while retaining or regenerating desired system characteristics and 
functions. 
This definition shifts the focus of measuring resilience from the amount of stress a system 
is able to endure before essentially collapsing (ecological resilience) or the amount of time it 
takes to recover (engineering), to instead focus on the amount of welfare loss endured. Economic 
resilience is therefore about minimizing maximum losses so that the economy can continue to 




focuses on resilience to large scale shocks and catastrophes, this definition does not exclude 
resilience to smaller scale economic perturbations as well. 
 
4.3  Potential Principles of Resilience 
 
Developing general principles of resilience is vitally important because we cannot predict with 
certainty the type, time or location of shocks that may befall us nor the exact way in which our 
system might break down. It is literally impossible for us to plan in detail for every possible 
emergency so we need more generic principles to help guide us. Resilience measures need to be 
flexible so they can be replaced, adjusted and scaled up and down easily. In pursuing principles 
of economic resilience, it is useful first to examine other general principles of resilience 
proposed by authors in the literature. 
Tinch (1998) discusses different measures of the capacity of systems to absorb shock 
including: stability, persistence, resistance, non-vulnerability, stochastic return time and 
resilience. Lovins‘ and Lovins‘ (2001) many and varied principles include early detection of 
failure, functional redundancy, diversity, dispersion of components in space, simplicity, loose 
coupling of components and lengthening the time it takes a system to fail (make it more 
forgiving). 
Tierney (2003) believes ―Resilience can further be conceptualized as consisting of four 
dimensions: robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity”. Greer (2008, 170-71): 
discusses four features of a resilient technology: it must be durable, independent, replicable (if 
you have one, it does not take advanced technology to make another), and transparent (it‘s easy 
to work out how it functions just from the device itself). He suggests a slide ruler meets this 
criteria: compared to a calculator it is simple to construct and clearly shows the user how the 
relationship between numbers leads to an answer rather than having the answer hidden in the 
circuitry. 
According to Berkes et al. (2003, 15), operationalizing resilience ―means not pushing the 
system to its limits but maintaining diversity and variability, leaving some slack and flexibility, 
and not trying to optimize some parts of the system but maintaining redundancy. It also means 
learning how to maintain and enhance adaptability‖. Hamel and Valikangas (2003, 12) 




build business resilience. Janssen and Osnas (2005, 95), when answering what makes systems 
able to cope with change, identify three factors: redundancy, modularity and diversity. Hopkins 
(2008, 55) names diversity, modularity and tightness of feedback (in the sense of improved 
monitoring capability) as his three ingredients of a local resilient community. 
Overall, a synthesis of the literature reveals the following six principles to be the most 
fundamental ones for determining the resilience of a system, in particular socioeconomic ones. 
These principles are not strict, nor absolutely defined, for to do so would entail trying to replicate 
the arcane laws of conventional mechanistic science which ecological economics is trying to 
diverge from. Fundamentally, each principle is intended to act as a circuit breaker or shock 
absorber to prevent synchronous failures from cascading (Kousky et al. 2009).  
 
4.4  (Functional) Redundancy 
 
“Two are better than one... For if one falls, the other will lift up their companion.  
Woe to the solitary! For if they should fall, they have no one to lift them up.” 
 Ecclesiastes 4:9 
 
Functional redundancy refers to duplication of function or functional substitutability of one 
system element for another. The intention is that backup parts (of the same or different type) can 
take over the function of failed system components (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 196; Low et al. 
2003, 97). Redundancy certainly exists in biological and ecological systems, for example 
duplicate genes in DNA. Many of us have come to think of redundancy as it relates to the space 
age, e.g. duplication of mechanical or engineering components to enable space craft to continue 
to function should one component break down: ―In engineering systems, redundancy is designed 
in, typically as a risk-reduction strategy, for the sake of the whole system‖ (Low et al. 2003, 
106). In technological systems lacking redundancy, ―failed equipment entails a shutdown 
because the temporary substitution of other equipment is not possible‖ (Perrow 1999, 94). 
  Yet redundancy can also cover the duplication of industries, products, labour, techniques, 
data, knowledge, links, and management and governance structures in the economy. Redundancy 
as a component of resilience is basic: ―In most studies, redundancy has been mentioned as a key 
factor for making systems cope with changes: redundancy of components, information, tasks, 




lost, and the redundant component takes over the function‖ (Janssen and Osnas 2005, 95). In 
economic terms, this could include stockpiling a readily accessible reserve supply of a particular 
resource, part or skill.  
Lovins and Lovins (2001, 193) identify functional redundancy as one of their various 
design principles for isolating breakdowns: ―Individual modules, nodes, or links can fail without 
serious consequences if other components are available to take over their function right away. 
This requires redundant, substitutable units‖. Systems with redundancy make it possible for 
something to be done twice if not done correctly the first time (Perrow 1999, 94). Functional 
redundancy can also relate to ease of replication where a component or institution is designed so 
it can be reproduced with limited local resources and simple technology even under the most 
adverse conditions (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 206). A good example of this was the Russian 
PPS42 submachine gun designed and manufactured during the harsh siege of Leningrad in 
World War II. System components resulting from this design philosophy are typically quite 
robust and easily repaired as well.  
While we are all too familiar with the consequences of failing to backup our computer 
data, functional redundancy should also encompass cultural information. Resilient economies 
must not only preserve the basic infrastructure necessary to survive in a modern, largely urban 
society, it must also be capable of preserving the cultural infrastructure (practical knowledge, 
philosophy, religion, art) ―that enables us to understand our world and communicate across time 
and space‖ (Heinberg 2004, 141). Folke et al. (2003, 369) note that ―institutional and social 
redundancy may serve functions similar to the overlapping functions of ecological redundancy 
for reorganization and renewal after disturbance, recognizing that redundancy implies similar but 
not identical functional roles‖. 
The current global medical isotope shortage shows what can happen when an economic 
sector lack redundancy. Redundancy should ideally be built into the original design of a system. 
If added after problems are recognized, it can create ―unanticipated interactions with distant parts 








4.5  Diversity 
 
“Variety’s the very spice of life” 
William Cowper 
 
Diversity refers to the degree of variance in the type and characteristics of components that make 
up a system. The greater variety, the higher the probability that at least some system parts will be 
resilient to any given shock: diversity helps prevent common-cause failures (Lovins and Lovins 
2001, 195). Authors such as Levin et al. (1998, 229) and Holling et al. (2002, 397) note the 
significance of maintaining diversity to resilience. Even traditional neoclassical microeconomics 
recognizes that consuming too much of any one thing is not good because it leads to diminishing, 
and eventually negative, utility. 
In nature, diversity is key to the resilience of ecosystems. A mix of genes and species is 
vital to ―assimilating and/or permitting recovery from perturbations‖ (Gale 2000,  287). When an 
ecosystem is disturbed, the degree to which species loss affects critical processes depends on 
both the number of alternative species that can take over a particular function as well as the 
number of connections between the species (Perrings 1998, 514; Hopkins 2008, 55). Thus, ―It is 
a serious error to assume that minor species are indeed ‗passenger‘ species that can afford to be 
lost…The importance of such species may be detected only when they are needed, following a 
disruption‖ (Holling et al. 2002, 408).  
Non-resilient economies and industries only have one way to reach production goals 
whereas diverse economies are flexible and can do it many ways, and interchange one process or 
resource for another (Perrow 1999, 94). In this respect there is some conceptual overlap with 
functional redundancy, however redundancy focuses on duplicating essentially the same function 
(the means to an end) whereas diversity implies substitutability in a much broader sense 
(achieving the same end but through various alternative means, allowing for more opportunity to 
deal with new stresses and/or take advantage of new opportunities). Both redundancy and 
diversity allow the part of a system that has been damaged to recover by drawing on undamaged 
parts (Homer-Dixon 2006, 290).  
Historically in the Euphrates Valley civilization, Schwartz and Nichols (2006, 13) notes 
―the relatively marginal environment of the region gave its inhabitants an edge over people in 




for flexibility and resilience‖. In contrast the Mayans and other built-up civilizations often lacked 
diversity in their crops and economy. Perhaps diversifying production may be able to help stave 
off the threat of decreasing returns on investing in complexity which Tainter (1988) blames for 
civilization collapse – in other words, economies should not invest too much in any one thing. 
New environmental, social and economic downsides of existing technologies and resource 
practices are being discovered all the time, so in order to distribute risk it would be wise for 
society to continually diversify the technologies, techniques and resources we depend on. 
Otherwise, we are likely to become locked into one increasingly unfeasible mode of operation 
such as our utter dependence on fossil fuels, to devastating results. On a smaller scale, the 
vulnerabilities introduced by trading nations becoming dependent on one specialized commodity 
export are well known (Hopkins 2008, 55). 
Diversity can be applied not just to infrastructure and production decisions but also to 
culture, ideas, information and social organization: ―Diversity of memories provides the potential 
for alternative ways to maintain functioning when faced with change. Diversity provides 
insurance to cope with change. It also provides the potential for reorganizing following change‖ 
(Folke et al. 2003, 376). In this sense we should diversify our knowledge, our worldview, and 
our experiences as much as possible to be better prepared for the shocks ahead. This will provide 
a diversity of potential responses to challenges (Hopkins 2008, 55). While they may not be 
popular at the moment, it is important that a wide diversity of intellectual ideas and value 
systems, like those advanced by ecological economists, always remain waiting in the wings for 
when society may need them most (Gunderson et al., 2002, 327).  
 
4.6  Dispersity 
 
Don’t put all your eggs in one basket 
 
While diversity encompasses variances in type, dispersity refers to the distribution of important 
system components and functions over space, scale, and time. When system parts are 
concentrated or centralized they function well together but are also highly vulnerable to 
disruption. Increasing the geographic, temporal or hierarchal separation between components 
(known as decentralization) can reduce the chance they will be affected by any single shock 




―Geographic dispersion means that if a mishap occurs in a particular place, it is more 
likely that some units will be there but less likely that they will all be there. The greatest possible 
simultaneous loss is thus reduced‖ (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 198). Allenby and Fink (2005, 
1035) note: ―It is elementary that physical dispersion of assets makes them less subject to point 
attack or localized disaster such as a tornado or earthquake. A decentralized workforce is also 
more resilient against a number of other disruptions, including disease (employees who are able 
to work from home run less risk of infection and help reduce the velocity with which infectious 
diseases can spread)‖. We should be especially careful not to make systems utterly dependent on 
central network hubs (e.g. supply points) that can be disrupted to the point where they bring the 
entire system down (Homer-Dixon 2006).  
Dispersity can also refer to the distribution of administrative and economic decision 
making bodies, powers and processes between scales to improve their resilience and capacity to 
respond more effectively to breakdowns. Problem solving, especially in disaster situations, is 
often best done at more decentralized local scales that involve as many system actors as possible, 
except in those cases where entrenched local systems are part of the problem. In other cases, 
delegating some system functions to a higher scale can provide a backup in case there is a local 
breakdown. Embedding components across a dispersed hierarchy with rich interconnections can 
help buffer failures that afflict any single scale (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 210). An example is a 
food averaging system used by agricultural societies to provide smaller member regions with a 
fallback if they experience local crop failure. 
Temporal dispersity involves lengthening the amount of time between the key events in a 
system‘s operation so an interference occurring at a single time will disrupt as few major system 
functions as possible. Stretching out the time separating the phases of a system‘s operation can 
allow more time for backups to come online and provide more opportunities for experimentation, 
repairs and course corrections in response to new feedback information. Safe-fail design criteria 
also suggests attempting to increase the time a component takes to fail so it will coast down more 
gradually rather than crashing suddenly, and thus provide more time for a soft landing to be 








4.7  Autarky 
 
“Can anything be so elegant as to have few wants, and to serve them one's self?” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
System components that are disperse may still rely heavily on other parts of the system for their 
functioning and these linkages can make them vulnerable. The term autarky is used mainly in 
economics and refers to a state of affairs where there is an absence of trade, and trading partners 
consume only what they themselves produce (Common and Stagl 2005, 263). In this paper it will 
be used to denote a general state of self-reliance in which a system component has the ability to 
survive or continue functioning even when cut off from other systems (to varying degrees). It can 
meet its needs even in the absence of travel (Hopkins 2008, 55). Autarky focuses special 
attention on shortening linkages and loosening the couplings and connectivity in systems so there 
is increased slack and flexibility. This will help reduce dependency on outside help and resources 
in a breakdown situation: ―So as a rough and ready rule, boosting the ability of each part to take 
care of itself in a crisis boosts overall resilience‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 284). 
The cost of neglecting autarky is that damages or shock in one part of a system can 
cascade to other parts, especially when links are short and tightly coupled. In economic systems, 
―Tightly coupled systems have more time-dependent processes: they cannot wait or stand by 
until attended to… Storage rooms may not be available, so products must move through 
continuously… In loosely coupled systems, delays are possible; processes can remain in standby 
mode; partially finished products will not change much while waiting‖ (Perrow 1999, 93). The 
sequence of steps is also more important in interconnected systems (A must be done before B) 
versus loose coupling where delays and interruptions are tolerable (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 
200). Autarky means one can get by with fewer or lower quality supplies in the production line if 
necessary (Perrow 1999, 94). 
Historically, Adams (1988, 21) believes ―there was a degree of local autarky and 
geographic buffering throughout the millennia of our technically less-advanced past. 
Interdependencies were correspondingly less dominant, finely tuned, and disastrous in their 
consequences when allowed to slip out of balance‖. In the 20th century, Homer-Dixon (2006, 




1906 earthquake. In response, stand-alone cisterns were built at intersections across the city so 
each block would have its own water supply to fight fires. 
High connectivity in systems typically arises as a result of the tendency in systems (both 
natural and human) to become specialized as they move up the growth curve of the figure-8 
adaptive cycle, leading to increasing interdependencies. However, ―This growing connectedness 
leads to increasing rigidity in its goal to retain control, and the system becomes ever more tightly 
bound together. This reduces resilience and the capacity of the system to absorb change, thus 
increasing the threat of abrupt change‖ (Holling 2004, 6). Low et al. (2003) contend that 
ecological systems must have some autarky built in, because if they were all very tightly coupled 
we would have seen greater ecological collapses by now. 
On the other hand, the increasingly tight coupling within human socioeconomic systems 
means shocks and synchronous failures could spread much faster than at any previous time in 
history, increasing the risk of deep collapse (Homer-Dixon 2006, 231). Hopkins (2008, 56) 
writes that ―the over-networked nature of modern, highly connected systems allow shock to 
travel rapidly through them, with potentially disastrous effects‖. Indeed, ―supply-chain 
disruptions can have a major impact upon advanced, industrialised economies‖ (Chapman et al. 
2002, 61). Galtung (1986, 97) now believes the global economy is characterized by a 
―debilitating dependency: of peripheries on centres, of some countries on other countries, of 
people on ‗the system‘‖.  
Almost all modern technologies are deeply interlinked and dependent on each other and 
will only function with a continuous supply of fossil fuel or electricity inputs. ―Connectivity 
harbours other risks too. As we create links among the nodes of our technological and social 
networks, these networks sometimes developed unexpected patterns of connections that make 
breakdowns more likely‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 115). Hence Homer-Dixon (2006, 284) advises 
―loosening some of the coupling inside our economies and societies and among our technologies. 
For instance, we can promote the distributed supply of vital goods like energy and food‖. Indeed 
the autarky principle would be better satisfied by technologies that are human or solar powered, 
have multiple interconnections between components, or are not so prone to synchronous failure. 
Designing structures to be modular so they can continue working autonomously in 
isolation or until reconnected is another tactic to boost autarky (Orr 1992, 34). Modularity allows 




disruptions in wider networks (Hopkins 2008). Failures in turn can be isolated and corrected at 
the level at which they occur (Lovins and Lovins 2001). In loosely coupled systems, spur-of-the-
moment recovery solutions can be found such as jury-rigging and patching that were not planned 
for ahead of time. In tightly coupled systems, recovery aids ―are largely limited to deliberate, 
designed-in aids‖ (Perrow 1999, 95). 
Yet as implied by the dispersity principle, there may also sometimes be benefits to 
greater connectivity: as long as the system linkages stay intact, they can ―often make economies 
and societies more resilient to shock because they can respond faster and draw from their larger 
networks a wider range of skills, resources, capital, and goods and services‖ (Homer-Dixon 
2006, 113). Likewise, some system interdependences simply cannot be avoided and trade 
remains desirable in many instances. This is why the term autarky was chosen for this principle 
rather than outright ―self-sufficiency‖ or ―autonomy‖; an alternative term might be ―self-
reliance‖ (Galtung 1986, 102). 
 
4.8  Adaptability 
 
“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives.  
It is the one that is the most adaptable to change.” 
Charles Darwin 
 
Society may be vulnerable to various shocks but we are not entirely helpless once breakdown has 
occurred thanks to our marvellous ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Adaptability (or 
adaptive capacity) is one of the better defined concepts in the existing (largely ecologically 
focused) resilience literature. It is about building the capacity among parts of a system (in this 
case economic actors) to be flexible and effective at adapting to change: ―Adaptive capacity is 
the ability of a social-ecological system to cope with novel situations without losing options for 
the future… Systems with high adaptive capacity are able to re-configure themselves without 
significant declines in crucial functions‖ (Colding et al. 2002, 17-18). 
Holling et al. (2004, 7) note that ―adaptability of the system is mainly a function of the 
social component—the individuals and groups acting to manage the system. Their actions 
influence resilience, either intentionally or unintentionally. Their collective capacity to manage 




undesirable system regime, or succeed in crossing back into a desirable one‖. Truly, since 
breakdowns are likely to disrupt our traditional coping mechanisms including technological 
change, social capital is key to adaptive capacity: ―Much attention has been focused on the 
hardware of sustainability but relatively little on the software: on the kind of people necessary 
for the trials of building a sustainable global civilization‖ (Orr 1992, 139). Those societies that 
demonstrated adaptive capacity and hence were resilient in the face of environmental resource 
shocks include the Highland New Guinea, Tikopia and Tongan, Greenland Inuit and Icelandic 
societies (Wright 2004, Diamond 2005). 
The International Panel on Climate Change defines adaptation as ―actual adjustments, or 
changes in decision environments, which might ultimately enhance resilience or reduce 
vulnerability to observed or expected changes in climate‖ (Kousky et al. 2009, 11). They observe 
that ―Adaptation options have previously been divided into reactive adaptations, which are 
undertaken in response to changes as they occur, and anticipatory adaptations, which are 
undertaken in advance of impacts‖ (Kousky et al. 2009, 11). Rose (2004, 52) also notes a post-
breakdown aspect to adaptability: ―Adaptation consists of two components: an active effect to 
reduce losses after an event has taken place (e.g., migration) and a passive absorption 
(‗suffering‘) of the loss‖. 
Certainly, adaptive capacity can be enhanced beforehand: ―Resilience in social systems is 
different in one very important respect from that in ecosystems – i.e. the ability (adaptive 
capacity) of humans to imagine the future, the capacity for forward planning. The extent and 
elaboration of human forward-looking or anticipatory behaviour greatly exceeds anything found 
in the natural world‖ (Walker and Holling 2003, 2). Regarding preventative adaptive capacity, 
Redman and Kinzig (2003, 1) contend that ―The key to enhancing system resilience is for 
individuals, their institutions, and society at large to develop ways to learn from past 
experiences, and to accept that some uncertainties must inevitably be faced‖. This can include 
plans at various levels of government to restore order and ration resources if necessary. 
Indeed, an important part of resilience is being able to expect the unexpected and then 
absorb or withstand it (Folke et al. 2003, 362). To increase adaptive capacity, Homer-Dixon 
(2006) calls for society to have a ―prospective mind‖, which means accepting that surprise and 
rapid change are an inevitable element of reality (i.e. ―don‘t be surprised by surprise‖). This 




dramatically reduce the time it takes to go from ‗that can‘t be true‘ to ‗we must face the world as 
it is‘‖ (Hamel and Valikangas 2003, 3). Businesses and people in all sectors of the economy, not 
just in emergency management professions, need to better prepare themselves psychologically to 
deal with the full range of possible breakdown scenarios and eventualities we face in the coming 
century. Better education can help in this regard.  
However, adaptability truly comes into play in the disorganization that follows a 
breakdown or catastrophe. In this sense, adaptive capacity ―reflects a learning aspect of system 
behaviour in response to disturbance‖ (Walker and Holling 2003, 1). Economic actors need to 
become more knowledgeable about what is necessary for the survival of themselves and their 
communities in the face of disruption. For example, ―Mass migration such as occurred after the 
devastation of Hurricane Katrina and Rita suggests that part of the natural adaptation to major 
change is to resettle in more hospitable locations‖ (Gilbert and Perl 2008, 284). 
Furthermore, ―Novelty is key to dealing with surprises or crises‖ (Gunderson 2003, 41). 
Among open-minded and creative people, innovation can flourish in breakdown situations since 
necessity is often the mother of invention (Tierney 2003). For example, the ―Street Use‖ website 
documents how people have practically adapted commercial products and technologies for 
improvised uses entirely different from what their makers intended (Kelly 2011). Salvaging 
useful items from the detritus of industrial society may become a very important skill in a 
breakdown (Greer 2008, 160). 
Altruism, trust and reciprocity are also key values given how important it is for citizens to 
share resources and knowledge such as survival skills with their neighbours (Levin et al. 1998, 
231). Disasters historically have (at least initially) engendered high levels of cooperation among 
communities as conflicts and disagreements are suspended in the interest of meeting shared 
needs and coping with collective loss (Tierney 2003). Often the artificial divide between the 
public and private sectors of the economy has melted away for the common good.  
Adaptability during a breakdown can be enhanced significantly by the leadership of great 
people, as exemplified by Winston Churchill (Holling 2004, 8). Institutions must also be 
prepared and able to rapidly mobilize and coordinate collective action in the face of shocks, 
sometimes at the expense of individual freedom (Adger et al 2005, 1038; King 1995, 979). An 
interesting question is whether a society that relies on central governance with great coordinating 




businesses, volunteer and neighbourhood organizations that is harder to coordinate but features 
greater autarky and thanks to its diversity has a lower chance of making a single large mistake 
(Davidson-Hunt and Berkes 2003, 66-7). 
In terms of ecological economics, Daly and Farley (2004, 362) declare as one of their six 
policy design principles that ―policies must be able to adapt to changed conditions‖ (i.e. adaptive 
management). However, they do not mention that the entire economy may need to be adaptable 
to change as well. This requires enhancing our capacity to recognize problems early and develop 
timely responses, such as by refining monitoring systems, institutional preparedness, and 
information feedback loops. It also entails developing preparedness measures such as fall-back 
options, resource reserves and established emergency procedures. 
However with so few major disruptions, current generations in developed nations have 
had insufficient opportunities to practice adapting (Van der Leeuw and De Vries 2002, 240). The 
type of innovations generated by recurring small-scale disturbances may be insufficient for 
building adaptive capacity against major catastrophes (Carpenter et al., 2002, 192). An argument 
can therefore be made that ―Small perturbations should be utilized to build resilience rather than 
be suppressed in order to reduce variability…. For instance, it is better to leave mild illnesses 
untreated so as to build immunity rather than ingest antibiotics at the mildest sneeze‖ (Lele 1998, 
251). In natural systems the same thinking now applies to forest fire management. Resilient 
societies should consider incorporating non-linear negative feedback: when perturbations are 
small no action is taken, but when they are large and the system teeters on the edge of its stability 
domain, the response is overwhelming. 
Thus, ―In our communities, towns and cities we can use small-scale-experiments to see 
what kinds of technologies, organizations, and procedures work best under different breakdown 
scenarios‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 292). The potential for improvisation depends partly on the level 
of diversity in the economy: ―In systems with low diversity, there is less chance of creating new 
ideas, components, or connections‖ (Janssen and Osnas 2005, 95). Similarly, if systems enjoy 
autarky, experimentations can be tested by one system component without affecting the others. 
For their part, redundancy and dispersity ensure more resources are available after breakdown to 
work with.  
However, there always remains the possibility of maladaption (people are made worse off 




―emergency adaptations‖ like deficit financing by the government during depressions are often 
―damaging except in times of crisis‖ (Jacobs 2000, 116). Interestingly the British people voted 
Churchill out after their crisis was over, a decision which makes more sense in this light. 
Moreover, some adaptation measures ―provide benefits under the circumstances for which they 
designed, but not if impacts are significantly different…. regulations and protection programs 
designed for more modest scale disasters can become at best ineffective and at worst 
counterproductive when addressing larger-scale events‖ (Kousky et al. 2009, 16). Likewise, 
people and institutions can adapt without necessarily learning how to be more sustainable so the 
next concept, transformability, is also needed. 
 
4.9  Transformability 
 
"Change your thoughts, and you change your world." 
Norman Vincent Peale 
 
Associated with adaptive capacity is the concept of transformability – the capacity of systems to 
use catastrophes as an opportunity to start over with new characteristics when existing conditions 
become untenable. Transformability is a different concept from adaptability because the latter is 
focused mainly on shorter term system survival and does not allow a system to shape its own 
basin of attraction. It is really only possible for a system to adapt back to the same basin of 
attraction as before, or a different one not of its choosing. As discussed in Chapter 3, adaptive 
capacity, and by extension resilience itself, is not always a good thing. Some undesirable system 
states ―can be very resilient, and they can have high adaptive capacity in the sense of re-
configuring to retain the same controls‖ (Walker and Holling 2003, 1).  
Transformability however allows a system to evolve slightly or fundamentally in ways of 
its own choosing, purging existing characteristics that are undesirable in the process: ―the aim of 
transition management is to achieve structural (socio-technical) transformations that improve 
performance in the desired sustainability functions. The aim is thus resilience with respect to 
these functions and those socio-technical structures that are judged best to deliver them – and 
emphatically not with the countervailing incumbent structures themselves‖ (Stirling and Smith 




proactively creating an entirely new stability landscape, possibly at a different scale (Holling et 
al. 2004, 5). 
In terms of economic resilience this would imply changing in a way that has a net lasting 
increase of welfare for actors in the economy: ―For any economy there are many possible states, 
each delivering different levels of welfare to society‖ (Brock et al. 2002, 270). Also, while 
adaptability matters most in the release phase of the adaptive cycle, transformability comes into 
play more in the later reorganization phase. Here innovation is the highest and novel system 
properties and interactions emerge that can be good or bad for the long term. Lawn (2007 
interview) draws the analogy to biology where organisms can adapt to change in the short run, 
but actually mutate in response to change in the longer run.  
  As hinted above, transformability raises an interesting paradox which has yet to be 
resolved fully in the literature: if by definition a resilient system needs to be able to maintain its 
structure and function (not leave its basin of attraction), how then can transformability be a 
principle if it requires the ability to change shape and go to a new basin? Which functions should 
be kept from the old social system and which should be abandoned (Hanley 1998, 247)? To be 
considered resilient and transformative, a change in a system should probably meet some of the 
following criteria: 
 
1) It should remove at least some of the conditions which created the breakdown in the first 
place (e.g. become more sustainable in resource use), and start society down at the 
bottom of a cycle. Shifting to a basin which requires greater resource consumption, or 
starting higher up the cycle, would be self-defeating.  
2) It should be purposeful/deliberate/conscious change (ideally planned for somewhat 
before the shock) rather than the obvious changes that would naturally follow the 
complete breakdown of the existing economic or social order (e.g. the dissolution of the 
Roman Empire), such as disorganized and knee-jerk change in the panic following a 
shock. 
3) It should be bottom-up change, agreed to by the majority of citizens rather than change 
imposed rigidly by the top-down on people who resist it. Some top-down guidance is 




Transformability requires the vast majority of society to agree (at least in principle) on 
where they are going next. 
 
The definition of economic resilience proposed at the start of this chapter incorporates the 
understanding that economic systems may need to change structure to adapt to breakdowns and 
catastrophes. Hence it focuses on maintaining the more flexible ―function‖ of welfare 
(happiness) as its definition of resilience. Abel et al. (2006, 1) explain that ―When the aim is to 
recover without changing the system fundamentally, the focus should be upon conserving or 
investing in the elements of capital critical for this. If the current system is not viable, it is 
necessary to invest in forms of capital that will enable fundamental change.‖  
In both ecosystems and human societies experiencing catastrophic change, remnants or 
―memory‖ of the former system ―supplies the experience of previous self-organizations and the 
ingredients for new self-organization embedded in a historical and evolutionary context‖ (Folke 
et al. 2003, 376). For example, ―following a fire in a forested ecosystem, the reorganization 
phase draws upon the seed bank, physical structures, and surviving species that had accumulated 
during the previous cycle of growth of the forest, plus those from outside. Thus, renewal and 
reorganization are framed by the memory of the system‖ (Berkes et al. 2003, 19). Indeed, 
―change, renewal and variation by themselves will seldom lead to success and survival. To be 
effective, a context of experience, history, remembrance, and trust, to act within, is required‖ 
(Folke et al. 2003, 352). Social memory is represented by the diversity of knowledge, faiths, 
values and worldviews that can be drawn on, and since chaotic systems are inherently sensitive 
to initial conditions, it is also influenced by what institutions remain after the breakdown. 
Therefore, we need to ―Protect and preserve the accumulated experience on which 
change will be based‖ (Holling 2003, xx). Education is key, as is experimenting with alternatives 
ahead of time. Homer-Dixon (2006, 290) notes that ―we need to lay down plans and organize 
ourselves so that we‘re prepared to take advantage of the opportunities that various types of 
breakdown might offer to build a better world. For instance, depending on the scenario, we might 
plan to aggressively disseminate information through the Internet, mass media, and various 
social networks to frame the rapidly changing situation‖. After a catastrophe, society must also 
act quickly to recover information in danger of being permanently lost, since lessons from the 




When it comes to socioeconomic transformability, ―the influence of extraordinary leaders 
and other agents in the implementation of new institutions and ideologies should not be 
overlooked‖ (Schwartz and Nichols 2006, 12). However, ―While the Great Depression gave 
Roosevelt the impetus and opportunity to reform American capitalism, it also gave Hitler the 
chance to establish one of history‘s most evil regimes‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 24). Klein (2007) 
similarly contends that radical free market reformers have consistently exploited shocks to 
advance their ideological and personal profit interests. Homer-Dixon (2006, 292) hence cautions 
against letting extremists of any type hijack the agenda when people are scared, frustrated and 
angry following breakdown. Identifying ―extremists‖ or ―radicals‖ depends on one‘s point of 
view (ecological economists are currently classified as such by some), but presumably this would 
mean those who believe in ideologies rather than evidence, or who are clouded by anger and fear 
and single out other people as enemies rather than undertake a rational appraisal of a situation.  
Truly, ―In the aftermath of disaster, the very legitimacy of government is at stake” (Vale 
and Campanella 2005, 340). Nothing is likely to motivate apathetic populaces to political action 
quite as quickly as the scarcity and ballooning prices of formerly plentiful commodity or the 
unexpected termination of basic services they have long taken for granted. Civil unrest on a scale 
unseen in the West for decades is to be expected, placing enormous pressure on existing, failing 
economic and governance systems to change or be discarded outright (Gallopin 2002, 373).  
Heinberg (2004) notes that Cuba is a good example of a country that was able to survive 
being cut off from exports thanks to the success of its moral authority, the Communist Party, in 
coordinating necessary economic transformations. However, Heinberg (2004, 110) worries that 
in other modern nations like the United States, polls confirm that citizens largely distrust their 
political and corporate leaders: ―when the crunch came Cubans pulled together and carried their 
nation through a painful economic transformation. But would another country have responded to 
similar circumstances so successfully? It is relatively easy to think of ones that have met 
economic challenges with cultural disintegration, deepening corruption or authoritarianism, or 
internal violence. Recall Germany in the 1920s, or Zimbabwe in recent years‖.  
Yet because deeply entrenched ideologies, values and paradigms will often only shift 
when they are shaken up by a jarring shock, the opportunities for new positive beginnings that 
open only in the aftermath of catastrophe should give us more reasons to be hopeful than afraid 




new institutions, new social practices, and new forms of historical consciousness‖ (Kolata 2006, 
219). For example it may be the only time when ecological economics has a chance to 
implement its ideas on the way to becoming the new mainstream economic paradigm. In Cuba, 
―a small group of agronomists had been advocating ecological agriculture for years previously, 
with no success; but when oil imports fell and the Cuban economy teetered, the nation‘s political 
leaders called on these marginalized ecological agronomists to redesign the country‘s food 
system. Something similar could happen globally in the years ahead‖ (Heinberg 2004, 184).  
Transformation is like rebooting a computer after a system crash and starting over with 
some of the same components but the opportunity to make a fresh start. So we need to make sure 
that while we have the luxury to do so, we discuss and assess to the extent feasible a diversity of 
alternative models (economic, social, or otherwise) to bequeath to people in periods following 
breakdown. Funding and economic incentives for developing these long range economic models, 
theories and policy options for a post-catastrophe world would be very helpful. 
Homer-Dixon (2006, 268) uses the term catagenesis to mean essentially the same thing as 
transformability – seizing the opportunity for ―creative renewal of our technologies, institutions, 
and societies in the aftermath of breakdown‖. He equates this with Austrian economist Joseph 
Schumpter‘s idea of creative destruction. He notes that while breakdown is essential to long-run 
adaptation and renewal, it must be constrained so it is not too severe if catagenesis is to happen 
successfully (Homer-Dixon 2006, 23). This is in part why thinking about resilience long before 




In summary, redundancy and adaptability refer to properties of the individual units or 
components within a system, while diversity, dispersity, autarky and transformability are largely 
properties of the entire system (i.e. it can be difficult to look at an individual component and 
judge it to be diverse or disperse). This is somewhat of an issue of semantics: when looking at 
the whole system, an argument could be made that adaptability and resilience are synonymous 
(Homer-Dixon 2007 interview). Some readers may also wonder why safe-fail was not one of the 




six principles: to achieve resilience or a safe-fail system (essentially the same thing), one needs 
redundancy, diversity and so on. 
The first four of the principles discussed in this chapter (redundancy, diversity, dispersity 
and autarky) deal with the design of the physical economy while the latter two (adaptability and 
transformability) deal with the knowledge, attitudes and values of people making up the 
economy. Likewise the first four technically prevent the worst collapse of the system while the 
last two are more about people responding to and making the best of what remains:  
Hence there is a dynamic interplay between reducing the impacts of change and at 
the same time taking advantage of the opportunities created by change. Systems 
where change is not allowed will almost certainly generate surprise and crisis. 
Systems that allow too much change and novelty will suffer loss of memory… The 
dynamic process requires social-ecological memory with functional diversity 
(including redundancy) for turning disturbance into options for renewal and 
novelty. (Folke et al. 2003, 376) 
 
Meeting one of these principles does not automatically mean satisfying the others. For 
example, a system could be redundant but centralized and hence lack dispersity, or a region 
could be geographically isolated (dispersed) from its neighbours and supplied with a diverse 
supply of goods from different trading partners but still be heavily dependent on outside linkages 
staying intact and so lack autarky (e.g. North America is separated from Asia by an ocean yet 
relies on it for most manufactured goods). It is possible that a socioeconomic system may adapt to 
a catastrophe and survive it without collapsing, yet lack the ability to transform and so just 
continue on with unsustainable practices, or worse be left in a shattered system state not of its 
choosing. Ideally, each of these six principles should be pursued simultaneously when building 
resilient economic systems, in order to minimize risk in case one or more principles proves 
ineffective in a particular case and since there are diminishing marginal returns to expenditures 
on each individual principle. 
This thesis represents the first time that all six of these principles have been brought 
together into one framework to analyze what constitutes a resilient system (economic or 
otherwise). Certainly some authors have used one or more of these concepts together in the past, 
such as Colding et al. (2002, 19): ―Diversity and an apparent redundancy of institutions (in the 
sense of overlapping functions) appears to play a central role in absorbing disturbances, 
spreading risks, creating novelty and reorganizing following disturbances‖. Low et al. (2003, 97) 




ways… yet persist relatively well‖. Likewise Holling et al. (2004, 6) observe that diversity of 
built, natural and human capital (in terms of education, expertise and occupations) are key to 
promoting adaptability and transformability. Yet overall the literature still grapples with any sort 
of unified framework of what properties make for resilient systems. Hopefully the above 
framework for identifying the core elements of economic resilience will help to advance the 
general understanding of resilience as consisting of both the technical aspects of how a system is 




Chapter 5: The Interplay between Primary Goals 
 
The last chapter defined economic resilience and developed a theoretical six principle framework 
to allow us to finally apply this useful concept and theory to ecological economics proper to see 
what is revealed. There is no better place to start than a theoretical examination of how the 
pursuit of resilience compares as an objective to the other three existing ecological economic 
goals of sustainable scale, just distribution and efficient allocation. These three goals are a very 
logical and useful way for ecological economists to break down, simplify and analyze the major 
interrelated problems we face in the modern world, yet there is one critical attribute of the 
system they do not cover. 
The evolutionary economist Underwood (1998) argues that human systems, like all other 
living systems, must solve two fundamental problems. The first is provisioning, the quest for the 
continuous supply of want-satisfying throughput. This is the primary focus of all economics. 
Underwood‘s second problem is adaptability, the requirement that solutions to the provisioning 
problem also be able to respond to unpredictable changes in the environment. This facet of the 
human story is essentially the problem of resilience. 
In formulating their three policy objectives, ecological economists have likewise focused 
largely on the concerns associated with the first of Underwood‘s problems while neglecting the 
second (even in Underwood‘s article it is given short-shrift). The three existing goals of 
ecological economics are inarguably key to a sustainable society, yet they are based on the 
assumption that there is still time and the political willpower to stop major environmental 
resource shocks from occurring. Unfortunately, the modern human mindset is biased towards 
optimism and assumes that progress will continue indefinitely, unlike for example Dark Age 
European society which was concerned with simply preserving what remained of Greco-Roman 
culture and knowledge. So long as we wake every day surrounded by the social stability and 
reassuring comforts of civilization, most people simply cannot imagine anything worse than 
small isolated breakdowns (Perrow 1999, 389). But it is also becoming increasingly difficult to 
ignore the warning signs all around that we soon face a dangerous convergence of environmental 
challenges on a scale never before faced by civilization, and that it is high time for economic 




The key question remains however: would consideration of resilience in ecological 
economics be at odds with the three existing goals of scale, distribution and efficiency? How do 
they overlap or diverge and are these goals mutually reinforcing or irreconcilable? Does pursuing 
one goal necessitate a cost or tradeoff of another? Answering these questions will ultimately 
reveal the extent to which resilience is fundamentally compatible with the theory of ecological 
economics. This chapter will analyze each goal relative to the concept of resilience in individual 
subsections, and then compare how the goals fit into overall resilience theory in a single 
concluding section. Note that while ecological economics traditionally ranks scale first, 
distribution second and efficiency last in their hierarchy of policy action priority, it is more 
logical to discuss efficiency after scale in this chapter because resilience theory insights about 
efficiency follow directly from its analysis of the effects of growth. The relationship between 
resilience and distribution is more uncertain so it will be discussed last. 
 
5.1 Resilience and Sustainable Scale 
 
The ecological economic critique of economic growth is the primary factor separating it from all 
conventional economic disciplines, including environmental economics with which it is often 
confused. Ecological economists define economic growth as the physical (material and energy) 
expansion of the economy, as distinct from economic development, which is the qualitative 
expansion of economic welfare/wellbeing/potential that can be theoretically decoupled from 
material and energy use. 
Ecological economists believe that because of environmental constraints there is a 
maximum sustainable scale of the global economy, and if we keep growing beyond this limit 
there will be in their own words ―catastrophe‖ (Daly and Farley 2004, 20). However, many 
ecological economic diagrams depicting scale simply end at the point where maximum 
sustainable scale is exceeded, as though this automatically triggers the end of the world. It is time 
for ecological economists to explore the region beyond the point where maximum sustainable 
scale is exceeded, when economic resilience becomes most important. Simply crossing a line 
does not lead to society‘s automatic collapse – instead there is a continuum of  breakdown 





Since by definition, environmental resource shocks only occur if scale is exceeded, 
staying within sustainable scale is fundamentally all about preventing shocks by limiting 
economic production to the assimilative and regenerative carrying capacity of the global 
ecosystem. It is not about building economic resilience to breakdowns which only occur when 
scale has already been exceeded. However, as noted repeatedly in this paper, we have already 
exceeded the shrinking capacity of many local environments and likely the entire planet, putting 
gears into motion like global warming that are impossible to predict. Since we can no longer 
hope to prevent all shocks and breakdowns by constraining scale, consideration of economic 
resilience becomes extremely important as a policy goal distinct from scale. By and large 
proposals to address the scale issue attempt to manage natural and social systems and keep them 
from exceeding some parameters (Lawn 2007 interview). However it is profoundly difficult to 
run the economy within evolving limits that are contextual and interactive and so resilience is 
necessary as a safeguard (Anonymous interviewee 2007). The imperative of economic resilience 
explicitly recognizes that some breakdowns will inevitably occur, which is the most fundamental 
difference between it and the objective of sustainable scale. Some like Hanley (1998, 248) in turn 
wonder whether increasing socioeconomic scale harms or helps resilience. 
 
5.1.1  Does the pursuit of sustainable scale enhance or undermine resilience? 
 
As this thesis has previously pondered, it is debateable whether sustainable scale is even a 
feasible, attainable objective in the near future. Heinberg (2004, 10) writes: ―we have already 
advanced so far in certain directions as to have foreclosed possibilities that we would all prefer 
were available. I take it as a given that we have already overshot Earth‘s long-term carrying 
capacity for humans – and have drawn down essential resources – to such an extent that some 
form of societal collapse is now inevitable‖. 
Klein (2007, 513) agrees: ―An economic system that requires constant growth, while 
bucking almost all serious attempts at environmental regulation, generates a steady stream of 
disasters all on its own, whether military, ecological, or financial‖. While it simply may no 
longer be possible to attain a green utopia before the coming shocks hit perhaps sometime mid-





The work of the Resilience Alliance has taught us that as a system grows it typically 
becomes less resilient. As natural systems approach their climax state/carrying capacity, they 
become accidents waiting to happen (Holling 1973). Likewise as societies ―try to deal with their 
immediate problems, they develop inexorable momentum toward greater complexity, and this 
complexity brings with it long-term unintended costs‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 221). As we learned 
in Chapter 2, diminishing returns from complexity can increase a society‘s likelihood of collapse 
(Tainter 1988). Growth can directly cause loss of resilience because of increased brittleness, 
crowdedness and less natural resources per person in the economy available to fall back on. The 
complexity/organization of the global economy is in defiance of the law of entropy (the 
universe‘s progression towards disorder) and its current position far from its natural equilibrium 
demands constant inputs of high quality energy to maintain order (swimming upstream). In turn, 
―Complexity breeds weird failure modes which cannot be foreseen, understood even in 
hindsight, or fixed‖ (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 202). 
Moreover, to increase scale often requires raising efficiency, another major driver of 
lower resilience: ―The growth imperative worsens instability in other ways too. It tends to cause 
ever tighter connectivity among economies, financial institutions, corporations, and investors‖ 
(Homer-Dixon 2006, 200). A system that grows rapidly also does not have the chance to 
accumulate experience about how to respond to failure (Perrow 1999, 371). For all of these 
reasons, helping to keep scale in check through the ecological economic goal of sustainable scale 
also helps preserve system resilience. 
Ecological economists similarly argue that increasing scale is subject to diminishing 
returns (increasing costs, decreasing benefits). Beyond a point, growth becomes uneconomic. 
This coincides nicely with the resilience critique of growth and Tainter‘s (1988) warning about 
diminishing returns from complexity. Ecological economists believe we should stop growing 
before we reach maximum sustainable scale at the point called optimum desirable scale, when 
the diminishing marginal utility of growth equals the increasing marginal harm each unit of 
growth causes through greater pollution and resource depletion. This is the point where the 
benefits of economic growth balance the environmental costs and where the happiness/utility of 
society is maximized.  
In spite of these theoretical agreements, it is not clear cut whether increasing growth and 




examples of failed (collapsed) states are in the third world suggests that the technological 
advancement and wealth bestowed by growth, as well as the better relations with the 
international community and support network this provides, do confer up to a certain point some 
element of added resilience missing from the poorest nations of the world. However, it could 
very well be that the inequity that characterizes nations like Sudan and Somalia, and their 
historical lack of well established economic, legal, environmental and governance institutions, 
has as much to do with their vulnerability to shocks and lack of coping capacity as their relative 
lack of material growth compared to the current global mean. Examples such as Cuba show that 
a nation can be resilient even with below average wealth. 
Indeed, civilizations like Egypt and China that persisted for millennia managed to do so 
without modern levels of economic growth or complexity. At the same time, civilizations like 
Rome that collapsed in Tainter‘s (1988) view due to overinvestment in complexity were actually 
much less technologically complex than our own global civilization, which has yet to collapse. 
This suggests that better technology can perhaps push back the boundaries of diminishing 
returns, although Tainter (1988, 215) warns: ―Technological innovation and increasing 
productivity can forestall declining marginal returns only so long. A new energy subsidy will at 
some point be essential‖. This raises the question of whether long term sustainability is ever truly 
achievable. 
Redman and Kinzig (2003, 6) wonder:  
has the long-term, worldwide growth of complex society come at a significant cost 
to the overall resilience of society? Although theoretical considerations would 
answer that question in the affirmative, 10,000 years of history say that increasing 
social and political complexity demonstrate the ‗success,‘ or at least the popularity, 
of such a trajectory. Are our theoretical formulations incorrect? Can one substitute 
one reservoir of resilience (flexibility) for another (efficiency)? Or are we 
mistaking longevity for resilience? 
 
Homer-Dixon (2010 Manion lecture) believes that complexity and diversity (and by 
extension resilience) can be positively linked: ―Complexity is also often a source of innovation. 
Because a lot of innovation occurs when you bring together things that would not otherwise be 
combined. And you get novel combinations that are unexpected.‖ The relationship between the 
complexity, diversity, stability and resilience of natural systems has long been a debate in 




evolved to provide stability through complexity. Complexity serves to provide redundancies so 
that perturbations are corrected by successive buffers‖. This understanding seems to contradict 
Tainter‘s correlation between over-investing in complexity and collapse in human systems. 
The analogy of the climax forest (a highly complex system in the conservation phase of 
the adaptive cycle) provides evidence to support both hypotheses on the relationship between 
complexity and diversity. The dominant organisms, especially the trees themselves, are certainly 
no longer diverse in such complex systems: in a maple beech forest, two species have become 
skilled at using up most available energy and pushing out competitors. The lack of tree diversity 
has in turn left the whole ecosystem more vulnerable to a single disease, insect or fire. On the 
other hand, the proliferation of highly complex animals and plants at smaller scales of a climax 
ecosystem provide seeds of novelty and future diversity that the system can draw on later during 
its reorganization phase.  
In the same way, the technological and information complexity of the modern world may 
provide a diversity of ideas that are important seeds for future economic transformation. Thus, 
Redman and Kinzig (2003) conclude that because systems are continually changing, resilience 
must include some capacity for learning and restructuring that requires increased organizational 
complexity. Yet, ―This points to a second paradox, which is that resorting to increased social 
complexity to resolve problems seems to work in the short run while sometimes undermining the 
ability to solve them in the long term‖ (Redman and Kinzig 2003, 5). Since complexity is also a 
function of efficiency as well as scale, section 5.2.1 further discusses the relationship between 
resilience, complexity and diversity.  
Some like Bjorn Lomborg who initially denied the severity of the problem of climate 
change and environmental limits are now using the more subtle argument that we cannot afford 
to scale back economic growth because we need as much wealth as possible to adapt to coming 
climate change. This would imply a tension between staying within sustainable scale and having 
the wealth available to build economic resilience. This line of reasoning is flawed however, 
because as scale increases, ―it just keeps gettin‘ hotter‖. In other words there may be no point 
where we have unleashed as much climate change as possible – the more growth and 
consumption, the more severe the environmental resource stresses we may face. In fact, society 




much, leading to harmful forms of complexity, a lack of dispersity and autarky and depletion of 
scarce resources and environmental services.  
―In general, the greater the number and severity of stresses affecting a society – and the 
more they combine synergistically – the greater the chance of social breakdown‖ (Homer-Dixon 
2006, 111). Limiting the degree to which we overshoot maximum sustainable scale will thus aid 
resilience by limiting the number and magnitude of converging shocks we will face and 
simultaneously have to recover from. This is not about 100% prevention which is impossible, but 
instead minimizing the worst of the inevitable impacts we must adapt to: ―complex systems are 
not confined to historical experience. Events of any size are possible, and limited only by the 
scale of the system itself. Since we have scaled the system to unprecedented size, we should 
expect catastrophes of unprecedented size as well‖ (Rickards 2008).  
Likewise the longer breakdowns continue, the more society‘s resilience will degrade as 
resources run out and economic relationships and social norms fall apart: ―A society overloaded 
with stresses breaks down‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 110). Indeed, ―If the growth phase goes on for 
too long, ‗deep collapse‘ – something like synchronous failure – eventually occurs. Collapse in 
this case is so catastrophic and cascades across so many physical and social boundaries that the 
system‘s ability to regenerate itself is lost‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 253). A system may even lose 
its memory and ability to transform.  
We must therefore be wary of having the climate change agenda hijacked by 
adaptationists like Lomborg (2009), because ―Reliance on adaptation alone could eventually lead 
to a magnitude of climate change to which effective adaptation is not possible, or will only be 
available at very high social, environmental and economic costs‖ (IPCC 2007, 4). Lele (1998, 
251) summarizes this relationship between scale and resilience: 
if the perturbation is anthropogenic (such as net CO2 emissions) and clearly of 
significant magnitude, then, regardless of the exact nature of the system and one‘s 
distance from equilibrium or the edge of the stability domain, reducing the 
perturbing force (stopping the burning of fossil fuels) is clearly one (and probably 
the best) means of reducing the chances of a disastrous domain shift (say in the 
climate system), even though this does not really constitute an increase in system 
resilience.  
 
Even countries that have not exceeded their local maximum sustainable scale can 




climate change may put sudden pressures on the carrying capacity of their own environment such 
that they are suddenly at or exceeding maximum sustainable scale even though their economy 
has not grown. As ecological economists advocate, seeking to reduce human consumption and 
population will open up slack. 
Heinberg (2003, 32) argues that a great deal of the earth‘s population growth in the 
modern era has been possible only because we have been unsustainably drawing down our fossil 
fuel supply, and that ―When the flow of fuels begins to diminish, everyone might actually be 
worse off than they would have been had those fuels never been discovered because our pre-
industrial survival skills will have been lost and there will be an intense competition for food and 
water among members of the now-unsupportable population‖. In this sense, ecological 
economists‘ desire to control population growth would help resilience by reducing the number of 
individual actors competing (possibly lethally) for limited resources during a breakdown 
situation. The downside is there would also be fewer minds available to think up innovative 
adaptation solutions and less hands to put them into practice. 
Sustainable scale is also compatible with resilience insofar as preserving natural features 
can help provide redundant backups to human infrastructure. For example the depletion of 
wetlands around New Orleans reduced local capacity to buffer flooding. Protecting natural areas 
is also important to adaptability: Folke et al. (2003, 361) note the possibility of ―Conserving 
patches in the landscape to serve as emergency resource supply in the face of change‖. The more 
resilience we have in some ecological systems, the more natural capital we will have to draw 
upon during a breakdown or catastrophe. More ecologically sound bioregions means greater 
availability of clean air, water, and soil to grow food locally if necessary, enhancing autarky and 
dispersity. Lastly, the quality of the natural environment can aid long term transformability: ―if 
anthropogenic environmental degradation was a causal factor in collapse, then environmental 
recovery during periods of decentralization could also be instrumental to regeneration, given the 
reappearance of natural resources important for the reestablishment of societal complexity‖ 
(Schwartz and Nichols 2006, 11). 
Interestingly, the actual tools that ecological economists recommend using to achieve 
optimum desirable scale may be somewhat theoretically inconsistent with resilience. Staying 
within scale based on traditional incremental management approaches to solving environmental 




economy expands relative to the size of the Earth‘s resource base and biosphere, we have to use 
resources and energy far more efficiently and manage our interactions with nature with ever 
greater care – and this means progressively more elaborate technologies, procedures, regulations, 
and institutions‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 251). Accordingly, otherwise excellent policies proposed 
by ecological economists to control scale, including efficient market-based cap and trade systems 
and Pigouvian taxes, may simply add another burdensome layer of complexity to an already 
brittle socioeconomic system (Tainter 1996). We should still go ahead with such measures 
because just as internalizing prices would help resolve the efficiency/resilience tension (see next 
section), efforts to make market prices reflect scale can help resolve the now common tradeoff 
between profit and environmental protection. We must just be aware there is also a hidden 
resilience cost to adding still further complexity to our system, even for legitimate environmental 
ends. Another implication is response options should be expanded beyond regulatory and market 
mechanisms to include a broader set of governance tools to engage more players and mobilize 
social change. 
Likewise, pursuing sustainable scale too rigorously could cause problems for our 
civilization because of the way our economy is structurally reliant on growth: ―For some human 
societies, stability (in the sense of peace and prosperity) is assured only by continued growth. 
Zero growth does not then represent a stable state, and negative growth can accelerate to 
disintegration‖ (Renfrew 1979, 489). This raises a troubling question: if our economy stops 
growing like Rome‘s did, will we too implode? Renfrew (1979, 489) suggests that ―If a society is 
to adjust to zero growth after a prolonged period of positive growth, it must disconnect the 
positive feedback loops which made that growth possible‖. Otherwise, these same feedback 
loops can just as easily turn minor negative growth events into economic catastrophes. This 
entails decoupling material and energy growth from economic development. 
Certainly economic growth can give us wealth and technological capacity that can help us to 
buffer change, but it also simultaneously makes us more vulnerable. This leads to an arms race 
where growth-oriented economies struggle to develop more elaborate and more effective 
knowledge and capital to deal with the increasing shocks and breakdowns that afflict such a 
society positioned far from thermodynamic equilibrium and high on the adaptive cycle. Past a 
certain point, diminishing returns from growth and complexity make it a losing long term 




that would rather violently explode than deliberately contract‖ (Heinberg 2004, 171). Because 
we are entering a period of extreme, unfamiliar uncertainty where environmental resource shocks 
seem inevitable, we cannot prevent or manage them through scale alone, and so must start 
designing for economic resilience as well: ―if we want to thrive, we need to move from a growth 
imperative to a resilience imperative‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 308). This leads to the next related 
question. 
 
5.1.2  Does the pursuit of resilience enhance or undermine sustainable scale? 
 
Again, the answer is complex, and depends on whether one is considering a pre-breakdown or 
post-breakdown world. On one hand, Homer-Dixon (2007 interview) thinks resilience comes 
more at the cost of scale than efficiency, implying we are going to have to purchase resilience at 
the cost of scale. This would hold true if resilience and efficiency are not compatible as well. To 
start building resilience principles such as redundancy and diversity into our economy will 
require new goods to be produced. This could have the net effect of increasing scale, 
paradoxically hastening the number and severity of environmental resource shocks we will face, 
unless we are willing to stop producing other, less resilient goods. This for example will mean 
manufacturing more basic durable goods like human powered hand tools and less luxury 
consumer goods like automobiles (Heinberg 2007, 177).  
In this sense, pursuing economic resilience could undermine sustainable scale in that it 
either requires that scale be increased, or that a much greater proportion of society‘s existing 
scale be set aside for resilience measures. The latter would face significant political challenges, 
making ecological economist‘s goal of reducing scale on other fronts that much harder to 
achieve. Hence the aggressive pursuit of economic resilience will demand sacrifice in our 
traditional consumer lifestyle if we are to also meet the sustainable scale goal. The more 
resilience we want, the smaller scale we may be allowed for a given level of throughput based 
welfare. This is because having to build resilience principles such as redundancy into the 
economy would increase the marginal costs of all growth such that desirable/optimum scale 
(where marginal benefit equals marginal cost) would move even further to the left of maximum 
sustainable scale (i.e. at optimum scale we‘d enjoy less benefit from consumption than if we had 




This raises the difficult question: if we are right now exceeding the planet‘s sustainable 
scale despite having little resilience built into our economy, is it better to exceed scale a lot and 
build in resilience, or should we try to stay within scale and forsake resilience? Or should we try 
to both stay within scale and build in significant resilience (asking major demands of the 
consumer public that may make such an approach politically unfeasible, despite increasing 
leverage as breakdowns get worse)? The third option seems like the most prudent approach: 
despite the political challenges, building in any amount of economic resilience would be 
preferable to almost no resilience, no matter the cost, especially since many shocks like global 
warming are now virtually inevitable anyway. Resilience measures that have low material or 
energy demands would be a good place to start.  
The flip side of the question is whether building in resilience will be good for 
environmental sustainability in a post-breakdown world. The answer is most certainly yes. What 
would be the impact of breakdowns on sustainable scale in our society? On one hand they would 
dramatically alter our consumer lifestyle and business-as-usual energy habits which are 
destroying ecosystems around the world. An economic catastrophe could be good for the natural 
environment in many ways: pollution levels for example might dramatically fall (i.e. witness the 
clear skies seen on satellite imagery following great blackout of 2003). On the other hand, an 
unresilient economic system in breakdown mode could also be profoundly damaging to the 
earth‘s biosphere. Without electricity for example, many chemical factories would be unable to 
keep gases cooled in liquid form and tanks would start venting by the thousands into the 
environment (Weisman 2007).  
A global economic crash would also wreck havoc on world ecosystems as billions of 
people try to sustain themselves on local fauna and refugees strip the countryside as they move 
(Anonymous interviewee 2007).  Indeed, Heinberg (2003, 181) predicts that ―As the global food 
system struggles to come to terms with the decline in available net energy for agriculture, 
transportation and food storage, people who have the capacity to fish or to hunt wild animals will 
be motivated to do so at increasing rates‖. What remains of conservation agencies would be 
hard-pressed to stop this, so ―Endangered species will have fewer protections available and 
extinction rates will likely climb‖ (Heinberg 2003, 181). Freezing, starving people would likely 




dumps (releasing PCBs, dioxins and heavy metals). So preventing a complete societal breakdown 
is necessary if we want to preserve what‘s left of our wild environment.  
Indeed Heinberg sees catastrophes as periods where sustainable scale is no longer 
necessarily maintained in systems: ―While population levels among species in climax 
ecosystems are relatively balanced and stable, populations in disturbed or colonized ecosystems 
go through dramatic swings‖ (Heinberg 2003, 18). When considering the effect on human 
population growth of a breakdown, a power blackout might result in a spike in the conception of 
new children (people with nothing else to do resort to biological urges). So in this case, keeping 
the lights on through economic resilience can actually be good for the environment. Ultimately, 
in a post-catastrophe situation, society may need to scale down quickly in order for people to 
survive on the fewer remaining resources (i.e. rationing would need to be instituted), in which 
case pursuing the resilience and scale goals almost become one and the same. 
Even smaller scale economic breakdowns can work against initiatives to control scale. In 
Australia, some of the federal government programs cut to help pay for cleanup of their 2011 
earthquake were environmental initiatives for greener cars and carbon capture and storage. By 
reducing the economic costs from breakdowns, resilience can help ensure that funding for other 
important environmental programs is preserved. 
Consideration of resilience could also help ecological economists win their academic and 
political battle against unrestrained economic growth by giving them a new argument in their 
arsenal. Not only can growth not continue forever due to environmental limits as ecological 
economics has long recognized, economic resilience adds the key insight that it cannot continue 
because it makes the system increasingly susceptible to destabilizing breakdowns. As we grow 
we generally lose redundancy, diversity, dispersity, autarky, adaptive capacity and 
transformability in favour of efficiency, homogeneity, centralization, interconnectivity, 
complacency, and undesirable rigidity (entrenched practices and beliefs that resist rational 
change). Resilience thus provides ecological economists with a fresh new complimentary 
critique of growth, and for this reason most of all it is compatible with the sustainable scale goal. 
Including economic resilience alongside sustainable scale in a joint unified explanation of why 
excessive growth is bad will strengthen the validity, and hopefully political impact, of the overall 




Global society presently believes economic growth is the solution to nearly all of its 
problems, even environmental ones (i.e. the Kuznet‘s curve hypothesis). Our utter addiction to 
economic growth (exceeding our addiction to oil) is the main reason we find it so profoundly 
difficult to stay within sustainable scale and fight climate change: ―As long as modern societies 
need economic growth in order to stave off collapse (as is clearly the case today, given existing 
debt-and-interest-based national currencies), we will continue to require ever more resources on 
a yearly basis from our already overtaxed earthly environment‖ (Heinberg 2004, 132).  
However, if society could be persuaded to adopt resilience principles and use them as an 
alternative guide to confronting its imminent challenges, economic growth might cease to be so 
deathly important, making sustainable scale easier to achieve for ecological economists. 
Philosophically, adopting resilience provides an alternative frame of mind and direction for 
society that will help us to get over our obsession with growth: ―Growth, even in already 
obscenely rich societies, is sacrosanct. This central value won‘t really change until it‘s 
discredited by some kind of major shock, which probably means some kind of system 
breakdown. Then, alternative values that are centred on the idea of resilience might flower, not 
just at the fringes of our societies, but also at their core‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 305). 
One final dynamic worth noting is that unsustainable behaviours such as capitalism‘s 
pursuit of exponential growth and the consumption and production habits that underlie it, can 
themselves be resilient to change. In these instances of undesirable resilience we may actually 
wish for a catastrophe (hopefully only a political or moral one) to help flip attitudes, behaviours 
and industrial practices onto a new, more sustainable trajectory. 
 
5.2  Resilience and Efficient Allocation 
 
The potential tradeoffs implied by the relationship between resilience and efficiency is one of the 
key issues addressed in this paper. Ecological economists carry over the efficiency goal from 
conventional (neoclassical) economics. Herman Daly and others are often critical of the single-
minded importance efficiency receives in that discipline and so for their purposes rank it third 
priority after scale and distribution. Nevertheless they still seek to achieve these other two goals 




interview). Market-based policies like cap and trade and Pigouvian environmental taxes are some 
ways this could be achieved.  
What exactly do we mean by efficiency? Efficient means are assumed to lead to ends in 
which some or all are better off with no one being worse off, a state called Pareto optimality 
(Commons and Stagl 2005, 310). Efficiency is an umbrella term for several concepts which are 
not always clearly spelled out in economic literature. One type of efficiency is technical 
efficiency which is about maximizing the amount of physical output from a given amount of 
resource input, for example more efficient car engines (Perman et al. 2003, 3). The second major 
type is allocative (economic) efficiency, which strives to allocate society‘s resources so they 
maximize societal welfare (net benefits) as defined by their aggregated preferences. In other 
words, this means trying to meet society‘s preferences as accurately as possible by using the 
lowest cost methods, or redirecting resources from low value to high value uses (Daly 2003). 
This type of efficiency is the main concern of economists. Daly and Farley (2004) also include 
distribution efficiency, but this is not commonly recognized by other economists and so will be 
discussed in the just distribution section below.  
 
5.2.1  Does the pursuit of efficient allocation enhance or undermine resilience? 
 
Pursuing efficiency is more likely than not to undermine resilience, especially when resilience is 
absent as a criterion in economic decision making, as has been the case since the rise of modern 
economics. The great breakthrough of (neo)classical economics was in the use of semi-scientific 
methods to aggressively pursue allocative efficiency (the ―best‖ way of doing things) and 
thereby cut away ―wasteful‖ diversity, dispersity, redundancy and autarky: ―During periods of 
gradual or incremental change, many important sources of resilience may be unrecognized or 
dismissed as inefficient or irrelevant. Typically, therefore, components of resilience are allowed 
to decline or are deliberately eliminated because their importance is not appreciated until a crisis 
occurs‖ (Adger et al. 2005, 1037). However, ―What we‘re calling an efficient economy is one 
that is actually externalizing huge amounts of costs‖ (Homer-Dixon 2007 interview). 
The first, perhaps most basic way that efficiency has been achieved since the dawn of 
civilization is through the geographic centralization of important economic and administrative 




we concentrate expensive equipment and highly skilled people in one place, we can access and 
use them more easily and efficiently‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 120). This may lead to beneficial 
economies of scale and efficient centralized decision making and market exchange with a 
minimum of transaction costs. Homer-Dixon (2006) also warns, however, that putting so many 
critical economic components all in one place dramatically increases their vulnerability to a 
random or deliberate disruption as vividly demonstrated by the September 11 World Trade 
Center attack and other disasters. Centralization therefore undermines the dispersity principle of 
economic resilience. 
Second, as an extension of centralization, efficiency promotes connectivity in every 
aspect of the economy as we demand that our systems function with ever greater speed and 
volume: ―Markets are sensitive and highly coupled now that we have global twenty-four-hour 
trading, global product interdependency, and just-in-time supplies‖ (Perrow 1999, 403). Lovins 
and Lovins (2001, 201) note that ―Many oil refineries are in fact very ‗tightly coupled‘ because 
some narrow-minded accountant wants more ‗efficiency‘ in keeping the oil moving, rather than 
letting it sit in storage between stages. But this greatly increases technical and financial 
vulnerability to any mishap.‖ 
 Indeed our economy is now based on wringing out more and more efficiencies from a 
(supposedly) reliable and integrated system. This might not be so worrisome if we have time to 
adapt to changes. Greer (2008, 27) for example claims that ―Gradual disintegration, not sudden 
catastrophic collapse, is the way civilizations end‖. Homer-Dixon however disagrees with 
Greer‘s (2008), Diamond‘s (2005) and Kunstler‘s (2006) ―Long Emergency‖ type hypotheses: 
―by today‘s standards, almost everything happened far more slowly in Roman times…The 
underlying mechanisms may be the same – a combination of accumulated stresses, weakened 
resilience, and multiple shocks. But today our global social, technological, and ecological 
systems are so tightly linked together, and they now operate at such velocity, that the duration of 
any future breakdown or collapse is likely to be dramatically compressed‖ (2006, 124). 
This tight coupling and interdependence, encouraged by free trade policies, has hollowed 
out local economies around the world and undermined the autarky of economic units within the 
system. Multiple parallel failures have been considered too remote and expensive to plan for, so 
production pressures are leading to systems being pushed harder and safety measures and slack 




social breakdown, when it does happen, generally happens faster‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 127). 
Harmful feedback loops can reinforce instabilities, such as a stock market crash where fear leads 
to selling of shares, and even more fear. This is analogous to tightly connected food webs in 
climax ecosystems: if one species cannot adapt to environmental change it may drag all those 
dependent on it down with it.  
Nevertheless, Homer-Dixon (2010 Manion Lecture) also believes there may in fact be a 
U-shaped relationship between connectivity and resilience: up to a certain point connectivity can 
improve resilience by enhancing the diversity of connections in an economy so it can fall back 
on external support when needed. Some degree of connectivity is also necessary for dispersity of 
scale. However, after a certain mid-range point, coupling starts degrading autarky by making 
systems too reliant on one another and allowing synchronous failures to spread. Lele (1998, 252) 
argues autarky may require some slack capacity that can remain unplugged and hence unaffected 
by shocks to the larger system, but that ―Exploiting all opportunities for mutual gain may in fact 
reduce resilience by leaving no such slack‖. 
Indeed, a third way efficiency is commonly achieved is through streamlining and cutting 
away supposedly unneeded redundancies. This means dispensing with duplication, stockpiles 
and reserves in favour of just-in-time production, and replacing expert personnel with computers 
and robots (Rochlin 1997, 183). The literature has much to say about this practice: ―Of particular 
concern is the degree to which what is destroyed or discarded in the relentless pursuit of 
technical and operational efficiency is not waste or slop, but ―slack,‖ the human and material 
buffering capacity that allows organizations and social systems to absorb unpredicted, and often 
unpredictable, shocks‖ (Rochlin 1997, 213).  
In fact, ―Systems that are highly efficient are not necessarily also effective—they often 
reduce redundancies for purposes of cost savings, and as a consequence become brittle and 
unstable and may collapse when faced by unanticipated changes in their environment‖ (Ruth 
2006, 337). Removal of redundancies has also extended to the merging of companies themselves. 
Homer-Dixon (2010 Manion Lecutre) observes: ―Two companies make all large jet liners. Three 
companies make all jet engines. Four companies make 95% of microprocessors in the world. 
Three companies sell 60% of all tires. Two manufacturers in the world press 66% of all the 
world's glass bottles. One company in Germany produces the machines that are used to make 




networks during recent years has resulted in these networks becoming more vulnerable to 
disruption. In particular, there often tends to be very little inventory in the system to ‗buffer‘ 
interruptions in supply and, therefore, any disruptions can have a rapid impact across the supply 
networks‖ (Chapman 2002, 59). 
Lovins and Lovins (2001) argue that having buffer storage allows failures to occur 
gradually rather than abruptly. They observe that in the name of efficiency the British car 
industry holds such small buffer stocks of steel that it frequently suffers shut downs: ―This is as 
false an economy as it would be for a hibernating bear to store exactly enough fat to see it 
through to the average date on which its spring food supply would become available‖ (Lovins 
and Lovins 2001, 201).  
Christopher and Peck (2004, 16) believe there is a need for businesses to: 
Re-examine the ‗efficiency vs. redundancy‘ trade off. Conventionally surplus 
capacity and inventory have been seen only as ‗waste‘ and are therefore 
undesirable. However, the strategic disposition of additional capacity and/or 
inventory at potential ‗pinch points‘ can be extremely beneficial in the creation of 
resilience within the supply chain. The trade-offs inevitably involve the 
judgemental balancing of the cost handicap involved in maintaining slack ‗just-in-
case‘, against the probability and likely impact of a negative event. 
 
A fourth way to pursue economic efficiencies is through specialization, particularly of the 
labour supply: ―It is the fact that agents are limited both in their physical and in their mental 
abilities that leads to the need for specialization: specialization in turn leads to the need for 
organization, that is, the co-ordination of agents‘ activities‖ (Magill and Quinzii 1996, 9). Indeed 
a high level of job specialization is the hallmark of a complex civilization. Built up social 
institutions like money allow for increasingly specialised occupations ranging from merchants to 
artisans to priests who are in turn entirely dependent on others for their essential livelihood. A 
civilization that comes to rely on the specialization of crops and labour is very effective at 
increasing yields and population under a small range of conditions, ―but in the face of sustained 
changes it may simply collapse‖ because each family or village can no longer support itself 
(Renfrew 1979, 488).  
Similarly, citizens in industrialized economies have certainly been able to attain a 
tremendous standard of living thanks to Adam Smith‘s idea of the efficient division of labour. 
Our economy is like an ecosystem in the sense that we, as specialized actors, have chosen to 




finances and for the overall economy (Heinberg 2003, 26). However, ―At face value, there is at 
least a significant tension between the ecosystem principle of diversification and the economic 
principle of specialization‖ (Gale 2000, 289).  
Because of our inextricable interdependency we have lost our individual autarky, the 
ability to look after ourselves at a fundamental level: ―With a lifelong division of labour, many 
members of society became cut off from basic subsistence activities and processes; rather than 
enjoying a direct relationship with the natural world, they became, for their material existence, 
dependent upon the society‘s economic distribution system‖ (Heinberg 2003, 27). Specialization 
in our increasingly service/information based economy has led to most people being trained only 
as white collar workers with no practical skills (carpentry etc.) needed for survival, which 
compromises both individual‘s and society‘s adaptive capacity. 
 Moreover, extreme specialization of entire societies, as particularly advocated for in 
economic theories about trade, also violates diversity by reducing the opportunity for each 
individual to become experienced in a wide variety of occupational activities. Nicolescu (1999, 
5) therefore believes that ―in our tumultuous world… any life which is frozen into one and the 
same occupation can be dangerous, because it risks leading to unemployment, to exclusion, to a 
debilitating alienation. Excessive specialization should be outlawed in a world that is in rapid 
change‖. 
Fifth, in part through the combined processes of centralization, connectivity, and 
specialization, efficiency is also an enabler and driver of complexity in civilizations. Tainter 
(1996) notes that investments in complexity require increasing the per capita supply of energy - 
either by increasing the physical supply of energy (scale) or technical, political and economic 
innovations that lower the energy cost of living (efficiency). Therefore, complexity is likely a 
function of both scale and efficiency. Redman and Kinzig (2003, 5) agree that: 
Efficient behaviors, such as specialization, reduction of redundancy, and 
streamlining of connectivity, allow a system to produce more at a lower cost of 
labor, materials, and energy and... allow a system to create and accumulate a 
surplus beyond its direct consumption needs and hence enable the concentration of 
power or the storage of capital... It is this ability to accumulate a productive surplus 
that is a necessary, although not always sufficient, condition for the emergence of 
complex society. 
  
While at first, a storehouse of reserves can increase resilience, ―As systems become more 




inefficiencies or redundancies in the process. This requires the system to maximize power 
(energy) output to support the emergent complex organization, but it does so by giving up 
significant adaptive capacity in other aspects of the system‖ (Redman and Kinzig 2003, 6). 
Matutinovic (2001, 241) likewise observes that: ―More complex societies necessarily imply 
higher per capita energy consumption than organically simpler societies, and consequently put 
more strain on resources and environmental sinks‖. This is partly because of the rebound effect 
(Jevon‘s paradox): efficiencies can actually encourage greater overall net consumption. As our 
technology becomes more complex, the odds of breakdown increase (Perrow 1999). 
Lovins and Lovins (2001, 202) do hint that efficiency measures like streamlining can 
sometimes reduce complexity: ―Some designs achieve ‗forgivingness‘ through simplicity—the 
elegantly economical use of limited means‖. They note though that the downside of 
simplification through standardization is it ―foregoes the benefits of diversity‖ (Lovins and 
Lovins 2001, 198). Thus while efficiency can reduce the complexity of one element in a system, 
the same measure may increase the complexity of the overall system. Indeed, while complexity 
can provide opportunities for diversity as discussed in section 5.1.1, it can also indirectly 
threaten it. Part of what compels complexity to exist in the first place in the economy is 
efficiency (e.g.. specialization increases the number of system interactions and dependencies), 
but as discussed efficiency also frequently tries to trim diversity in both human and natural 
systems (e.g. by homogenizing production methods). Therefore the evolution of efficiency, 
complexity and diversity in the modern economy seems a bit like a competitive game of rock, 
paper scissors where the final impact on resilience remains quite uncertain.  
 Finally, pursuing efficiency too far can weaken society‘s adaptive capacity and 
transformability. King (1995, 979) argues that ―institutional analysis should not unduly 
emphasize efficiency as the criteria for institutional selection. Perhaps efficient institutions, like 
efficient species, may create critical instability, which in turn raises their vulnerability to 
destruction‖. In terms of their governance structures, ―Complex societies are often characterized 
by overcentralization and organizational rigidity, which may render them vulnerable in times of 
social or environmental stress‖ (Schwartz and Nichols 2006, 11). 
Efficiency can also hurt adaptive capacity by reducing intellectual creativity, as 
demonstrated by economists, business leaders and policymakers who stick too closely to 




says is efficient: ―Strict adherence to apparently optimal policies suppresses experimentation by 
preventing potentially informative probing‖ (Carpenter et al, 2002, 193). Indeed, ―accumulated 
increases in wealth and efficiency also combine with an increased narrowness of view and a 
rigidity that make it difficult to agree on how to respond differently to new challenges‖ (Holling 
2004, 6). This may explain the slow pace at which society has responded to our increasingly 
precarious environmental situation. Likewise rigid pursuit of efficiency can be bad for the 
diversity of ideas and cultures needed for future transformability after a catastrophe. In the name 
of homogenous efficiency, ―The industrial interval has shredded traditional cultures and replaced 
them with a global consumer spectacle. Once the latter is gone, the survivors of its demise will 
run the risk of becoming cultureless wraiths condemned to subsist on decaying memories of what 
life was like before the great crash, but with few living traditions to guide them‖ (Heinberg 2004, 
141).  
Homer-Dixon (2006, 252) summarizes some of the primary hidden resilience costs of an 
efficiency-first agenda: ―Capitalism‘s constant pressure on companies to maximize efficiency 
tightens links between producers and suppliers; reduces slack, buffering, and redundancy; and so 
makes cascading failures more likely and damaging. As well, capitalism‘s pressure on people to 
be more productive and efficient drives them to acquire hyperspecialized skills and knowledge, 
which means they becomes less autonomous, more dependent on other specialized people and 
technologies, and ultimately more vulnerable to shocks‖. Rees (2007 interview) concludes that 
efficiency and resilience are ―absolutely opposed‖. 
 Yet, Redman and Kinzig (2003, 5) remind us that historically, ―Individual cities, 
societies, and civilizations may have disappeared, but the longevity of the human experiment 
with efficiency, complexification, and stratification suggests that this is a strategy with 
significant staying power.‖ Indeed there is additional evidence that the drive for efficiency is not 
completely at odds with economic resilience. The key efficiency criteria of markets, their ability 
to self-adjust to change independent of information known to any single actors, helps to increase 
their dispersity and adaptive capacity relative to more centralized institutions like governments 
(Rose 2004, 52). At the firm level, improving efficiency by preventing an inefficient firm from 
persisting may improve overall economic resilience because it opens up new opportunities for 
transformation (i.e. Schumpter‘s creative destruction) (Farley 2007 interview). Levin et al. 




Companies that live in a very stable, protected environment will not have 
incentives to develop the flexibility and competitiveness that would be needed if a 
major shock were to hit the market. Companies that always have to fight for 
survival develop resilience much more fully, partly by the necessity to increase 
productivity. It is striking the degree to which such theories of economic resilience 
parallel concepts in evolutionary biology, in which similar tradeoffs have been 
deeply explored. 
 
Likewise, cutting economic subsidies to certain sectors can be good for both efficiency 
and adaptive capacity: ―The capacity to self-organize emerged from our studies as a critical 
source of resilience. Although rebuilding this capacity at times requires access to external 
resources, excessive subsidization can reduce the capacity to self-organize‖ (Abel et al, 2006, 1). 
Technical efficiency is also certainly compatible with economic resilience: if we are more 
efficient with our natural resources, we will have more to work with (more natural capacity) 
when shocks hit. Technically efficient technologies like hybrid cars or more efficient microchips 
can be considered resilient so long as redundancies in the technology are not removed to achieve 
this efficiency. Technical and allocation efficiency can also provide us with more built capital 
giving us a greater material capacity to respond to breakdowns when they occur (Holling et al. 
2004, 11). This is examined further in section 6.6 on the Emergency Response System. Of course 
more built capital also increases complexity, and during a breakdown situation the usefulness of 
built capital will degrade due to lack of maintenance. As explored in the scale section, efficient 
uses of nature‘s resources also helps to keep us within sustainable scale, either preventing or 
delaying shocks or limiting their severity.  
Daly and Farley (2004) argue for a Comprehensive Efficiency Identity, which is the ratio 
of the psychic services (in other words, welfare) gained from human made capital to the services 
sacrificed from natural capital. Unfortunately economic resilience is incompatible with this 
definition of efficiency (and also with a definition focused on satisfying consumer preferences) if 
people do not get any perceived short term satisfaction (or even long term peace of mind) from 
added resilience. So long as the public remains ignorant about the need for economic resilience 
(and is unwilling to pay for it) and/or we define welfare narrowly over the short term, according 
to this criterion we would be sacrificing natural capital for no perceived increase in welfare. Of 
course, once a shock hits, the consumer public may change its mind very quickly about the 
benefits of resilience (all of a sudden, simply having a litre of potable water and a good meal will 




people would need to start including the long term survival of their civilization in their daily 
level of psychic satisfaction/welfare so that it becomes efficient to build in resilience. Homer-
Dixon‘s (2006) idea of developing a prospective mind might be of help here.  
The most striking aspect of neoclassical economics is the degree to which it prioritizes a 
narrowly defined understanding of efficiency over all other goals. Tightly connected trade, 
streamlining, and specialization are all part and parcel of the creation of the modern consumer 
economy, with its focus on short term wealth maximization. Maximizing efficiency does not 
directly cause environmental resource shocks (exceeding sustainable scale is to blame for this), 
but efficiency may make any resulting breakdowns in our economy more severe. Renfrew (1979, 
489) notes that when the strategy of efficiency and specialization seems to be failing in the face 
of change, human civilizations have tended to respond by working even more intensively at 
becoming efficient. This amounts to running on an out of control treadmill rather than attempting 
to get off. If we hope to have any resilience left in our economy, it is time to re-evaluate our 
understanding of the proper balance of efficiency with other goals.  
Lovins and Lovins (2001, 183, 188) for example conclude that ecosystems: 
do not attain the absolute pinnacle of biological efficiency in capturing the energy 
available from their environment. But by avoiding the extreme specialization this 
would require, they also avoid the risk of reducing their margin of adaptability to 
environmental change… Imitating the strategy of successfully resilient ecosystems, 
then, may not wring out the last ounce of "efficiency" or attain the acme of 
specialization that might be optimal in a surprise-free world. But in a world of 
uncertainty, imperfect knowledge, and constant change, such ‗efficiency,‘ with no 
slack for adaptations, can be deadly. 
 
Similarly, in their modelling of ecosystems, Kristensen et al. (2003, 70) found that organisms in 
nature do not maximize their individual efficiency, but instead may sacrifice some to boost the 
resilience of the whole system. 
Because of the complex dynamics inherent in systems, optimal management (i.e. for 
efficiency) is nearly impossible in any event (Colding et al. 2002, 17). Farley (2007 interview) 
believes ―striving to ‗optimize‘ for one objective is absurd‖. Likewise Ehrlich (2008, 5) writes: 
―In short, there is no reason to assume that economic plans should always attempt to maximize 
either efficiency or production as usually conceived. There is nothing wrong with the notion of 
maximization (or efficiency) per se, but the problem is that in practice too often critical variables 




could not rely on long-distance aid in times of crisis, ―social groupings of any size or character 
had to give greater attention to preserving resilience and to keeping options open than to 
maximizing their advantages or well being at a given moment‖ (Adams 1988, 21). 
 Unfortunately, ―Few organizations question the doctrine of optimization. But optimizing 
a business model that is slowly becoming irrelevant can‘t secure a company‘s future‖ (Hamel 
and Valikangas 2003, 3). In the same way, it does no good to optimize an economic system that 
is fundamentally unresilient because it ultimately has no long term future. Homer-Dixon (2006, 
284) concludes: ―in an increasingly uncertain and dangerous world, we should sometimes give 
up extra efficiency and productivity in order to gain resilience – especially to improve our ability 
to prevent foreshocks from triggering synchronous failure‖. This ties in nicely with ecological 
economist‘s inherent wariness of the neoclassical pursuit of growth at the expense of all other 
considerations.  
Next we will examine the inverse question: is it possible to make an economy founded on 
specialization, trade, efficiency, and the removal of redundancy, resilient? If we start investing in 
economic resilience, will this begin reducing the beneficial efficiency we have achieved up to 
this point?  
 
5.2.2  Does the pursuit of resilience enhance or undermine efficient allocation? 
 
In short, it has the potential to do both, depending on whether efficiency is defined narrowly or 
more holistically: ―The tradeoff between efficiency and resilience is not straightforward by any 
means‖ (Homer-Dixon 2007 interview). On one hand, building in redundancies reduces 
opportunities for streamlining, pursuing dispersity reduces opportunities for economies of scale, 
striving for autarky reduces opportunities for trade and pursuing diversity reduces opportunities 
for specialization. This implies less consumer utility derived per unit of natural resource. Since 
there is a potential cost to resilience, trying to build in resilience while maintaining current levels 
of consumption and associated utility would require the economy to scale up, hastening or 
increasing environmental resource shocks.  
Indeed, markets themselves are a pillar of robustness in that our civilization has become 
totally dependent on them as the mechanism for distributing goods. We could not simply get rid 




to crumble. Some environmental literature promotes diversity, resilience and localism in social 
systems with seemingly little consideration for the consequences of foregoing the benefits of 
efficiency and trade. For example, Jacobs (2000, 106) claims that Smith ―led himself and others 
astray by declaring that economic specialization of regions and nations was more efficient than 
economic diversification‖. She believes specialization undermines the creation of co-
development webs which lead to innovation.  
And yet, if ecological economists could successfully internalize environmental costs into 
the prices of goods and services, it is possible that the market could take care of the economic 
resilience problem itself and the tradeoff between efficiency and resilience would effectively 
disappear. For example, increasing the price of oil would boost autarky by making long distance 
trade more expensive while also encouraging a diversification of alternative technologies. ―If 
you get the prices right and the market clears efficiently in terms of supply and demand reaching 
some kind of equilibrium, you might be able to have your efficiency and your resilience at the 
same time‖ (Homer-Dixon 2007 interview). 
Perrow (1999, 341) notes that high risks to society can rightly be thought of as an 
externality. The benefits conferred by economic resilience are therefore positive externalities and 
because it has non-rival and non-excludable characteristics, resilience is fundamentally a public 
good. This means the market will not naturally provide resilience without government 
intervention in some form. Therefore, perhaps ―In our efforts to build resilience into the system, 
it looks like we‘re creating inefficiencies, but actually what we are doing is adjusting for external 
costs that haven‘t been incorporated into the prices of the goods and services‖ (Homer-Dixon 
2007 interview). Intervening in the market to provide a positive externality like economic 
resilience thus increases the efficiency of the whole system. 
However, the bureaucracy required to administer cost internalization programs represents 
a form of lost efficiency, as does the act of intervening in the market itself, just as government 
wealth redistribution efforts like the minimum wage are currently contrary to the neoclassical 
definition of efficiency. Also, following the internalization of resilience into prices, the economy 
would become less specialized, streamlined etc. than it might otherwise have been, so some 
amount of maximum potential economic efficiency (narrowly defined) is still lost. Some of these 
root efficiency tradeoffs would still exist, they would simply be obscured or overridden by prices 




internalization of economic resilience into prices is an excellent idea, it does not fully resolve all 
theoretical tensions.  
Daly and Farley (2004, 360) also note that a basic principle of policy design in ecological 
economics is that ―each independent policy goal requires an independent policy instrument‖. 
They explain the price mechanism alone cannot increase efficiency, reduce poverty and curtail 
scale all at the same time. In the same way, it may be difficult or impossible to subsume 
resilience entirely under the mechanism of price so as to amalgamate four separate policy goals 
into one value. 
There are still other instances where pursuing economic resilience is likely compatible 
with efficiency. The goals of diversity and economic efficiency (in terms of meeting societal 
preferences) are complementary insofar as both subscribe to the idea that pursuing the same 
thing over and over will eventually do more harm than good because of diminishing marginal 
returns/diminishing marginal utility. Diversification can thus increase utility. Homer-Dixon 
(2006) believes part of the reason economic growth is so important to our economy is because 
we need it to compensate for those disemployed by technological change and automation. If we 
applied the principle of diversity to the labour supply and despecialized, we might lose 
significant efficiency gains but greatly increase the demand for labour and thereby reduce the 
need for growth. Reducing dependence on technology would also help economic resilience since 
powered technology is often the first to fail in a breakdown. 
Levin et al. (1998, 233) write that ―resilience requires a competitive economy, effective 
government, and trust‖. It is interesting they suggest that competition, and hence efficiency, is 
important for economic resilience. In turn, Low et al. (2003, 84) argue the traditional economic 
belief that redundancy in government is inefficient is incorrect: ―empirical studies of redundancy 
in public services found that redundancy did not have the adverse consequences frequently 
attributed to it and that improvements (rather than reductions) in performance were frequently 
associated with redundant arrangements‖.  
Overall, Victor (2007 interview) argues that ―Efficiency doesn‘t make sense except in 
relation to ends. We can think of more or less efficient means for increasing resilience which 
illustrates the fact that they need not be in conflict at all‖. Perhaps one way to proceed therefore 
is to create a new concept called ―efficient resilience‖. This would entail identifying and building 




welfare. The focus would be on seeing where economic resilience could be enhanced the most at 
the least cost to traditional efficiency (as well as scale and distribution). One would not try to 
build resilience into goods where enormous effort and expenditure would only lead to marginal 
gains in resilience.  
Consider for example building redundancy into the economy. A Boeing 777 has 150,000 
subsystems but can still fly even when many become inoperative: ―This redundancy is built in 
since the ability of the Boeing 777 to continue to function when modules fail is crucial. This 
might not be the case for products that have less of an effect on the lives of users during failures 
such as coffee machines, which can be developed more efficiently but with less robustness‖ 
(Janssen and Osnas 2005, 95). Low et al. (2003, 86) believes redundancy is ―not always costly‖, 
nor is it always ―absolutely required‖. There are potentially diminishing returns to redundancy in 
terms of conflicting with efficiency at an increasing rate and so we may need to find optimum 
levels (Low et al. 2003, 106). Often a single or double redundancy would be sufficient protection 
against breakdowns without pursuing redundancy to ridiculous ends. 
Similarly, Homer-Dixon (2006, 286) argues for achieving a balance between autarky, 
dispersity and efficiency: 
When it comes to connectivity in its networks, a resilient system is a bit like 
Goldilock‘s favourite bowl of porridge: it has neither too much nor too little 
connectivity. In a resilient system, individual nodes – like people, companies, 
communities, and even whole countries – are able to draw on support and resources 
from elsewhere, but they‘re also self-sufficient enough to provide for their essential 
needs in an emergency. Yet in our drive to hyper-connect and globalize all the 
world‘s economic and technological networks, we‘ve forgotten the last half of this 
injunction. 
 
In this sense, dispersity (which recommends increasing distance and hierarchal connectivity) and 
autarky (which recommends shortening links and reducing connectivity) exhibit something of a 
Ying and Yang relationship (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 199, 213).  
Homer-Dixon (2007 interview) also provides another way to view the problem: ―When 
people say we‘re lowering the productivity of the economy by building resilience, we‘re only 
lowering the productivity of the economy because one of the important things we‘re producing, 
resilience, is not being priced because it‘s a public good and nobody can put a price on it‖. 
Looking at it this way, pursuing resilience might mean our economy becomes less efficient at 




This has a certain logic to it, and may work in cases where resilience principles can be enhanced 
by manufacturing infrastructure, but does not resolve all the tradeoffs. You probably cannot 
―produce‖ your way out of the efficiency tradeoff between specialization and adaptive capacity. 
Homer-Dixon (2007 interview) agrees ―there‘s no question that sometimes there‘s going to be a 
tradeoff‖. Real-life systems need to be examined on a case-by-case basis, looking at each 
individually and each component of each system individually, when deciding on resilience.  
There are not necessarily any easy overarching answers. 
Looking to the past for guidance, Redman and Kinzig (2003, 5) explain that for hunter-
gatherers and early agriculturalists, resilience was likely a much greater priority than efficiency: 
societies that maintained seemingly inefficient strategies were often highly 
resilient… the introduction of apparent short-term inefficiencies to mediate risk in 
the long-term, either consciously or unconsciously, was a widespread practice. 
Although our culture retains some of these attributes of resilience today, our 
activities and alliances have shifted, and are more subject to the demands of 
immediate return on investment, and less subject to considerations of how costs 
today should be borne to mediate risks that may not appear for several generations. 
 
Thus, ―some social adaptations or cultural traditions may appear inefficient or ‗illogical‘ when 
viewed in the short term, but reduce risk and increase resilience in the long term‖ (Redman and 
Kinzig 4).  
 Farley (2007 interview) agrees: ―This all depends on the time scale over which we define 
efficiency. Certainly there is an enormous tension between resilience and short run efficiency, 
but I also see an enormous tension between short run efficiency and long run efficiency.  I would 
see system collapse (with no renewal, no resilience) as the least efficient outcome of all‖. 
Similarly, Lovins and Lovins (2001, 191) write: ―It cannot be overemphasized that the property 
being sought when one designs a system for resilience is that it be able to survive unexpected 
stress: not that it achieve the greatest possible efficiency all the time, but that it achieve the 
deeper efficiency of avoiding failures so catastrophic that afterwards there is no function left to 
be efficient‖. Thus, long term efficiency (and in turn sustainability) may ultimately depend on 
the ability of the economy to endure catastrophes while preserving enough human welfare to 
ensure successful recovery. What can be said then is that efforts to build in resilience jeopardize 





5.3 Resilience and Just Distribution 
 
The majority of ecological economists, including founder Herman Daly, believe that the fair, 
equitable and just distribution of society‘s wealth should be one of the central objectives of 
ecological economics. Unlike other branches of economics, especially neoclassical economics 
and its sub-branch environmental economics, ecological economics holds that wealth distribution 
(i.e. who gets what and how much?) is a direct theoretical concern of economics and not 
something to be left solely to politicians to sort out. In this way ecological economics openly 
acknowledges the value system underlying its theory. Broader equity issues, such as distribution 
of power and opportunity, are normally less of a focus in ecological economics. 
Ecological economists reason that since most wealth originally comes from nature, 
everyone is entitled as a citizen of earth to an equal share in that wealth. Individuals and 
corporations should not be able to capture solely for themselves the wealth that is created by 
nature or the rest of society (Daly and Farley 2004, 390). Another justification for having just 
distribution as a foundational goal of ecological economics is that wealth inequity is usually bad 
for the environment. Globally, the worst environmental damage is done by people and nations 
who are excessively poor (slash-and-burn agriculture) and excessively rich (massive 
overconsumption). If economic growth must eventually cease in a finite world, then it follows 
that we must tackle the issue of wealth distribution directly because once the economic pie 
becomes fixed we can no longer keep relying on growth (and the trickledown effect) alone to 
ameliorate poverty (Daly and Farley 2004). 
In traditional economic literature, especially welfare economics, it is generally 
acknowledged that a trade-off can exist between equity and the narrow efficiencies recognized in 
conventional economic literature (Sagoff 1988, 60, Brock et al. 2002, 264). For example, efforts 
to rebalance wealth are seen as interfering with the operation of the market. Does such a tradeoff 
also exist between equity and economic resilience?  
 
5.3.1  Does the pursuit of Just Distribution enhance or undermine resilience? 
 
Wealth distribution is likely to most heavily impact the more people-centred principles of 




economic order prior to a breakdown can greatly influence how actors behave and make 
decisions in the middle of a crisis situation. This aspect of adaptive capacity is not well explored 
in the literature. Economic equity is likely important to resilience because it pre-emptively builds 
community capacity to band together and persevere through adversity. People need to feel like 
they are valued by, and have a stake in, their community, but poverty and income disparity 
undermine this social fabric. Promoting just distribution therefore enhances the chance of a 
successful unified societal push to overcome crises. 
Some civilizations like Egypt (which probably escaped being truly tested) could persist 
for thousands of years in spite of great wealth inequality and literal slavery. Yet inequitable 
social structures may have hastened the downfall of the sample civilizations from Chapter 2 that 
did face major catastrophes. This is because shocks and breakdowns often expose weaknesses 
and bring to the surface social grievances that have long been festering in a society. As a society 
breaks down, the claim by elites that the existing societal arrangement is ―the best‖ is usually 
stripped of its authority. Most ancient governance structures depended on the people believing 
their ruler and the upper caste had a divine connection in order to justify large wealth inequities 
that existed. They often collapsed so suddenly because once the supreme ruler was exposed as 
lacking this connection, the people lost faith and their entire social model collapsed (Adams 
1988, 37). 
Historically, states and empires also maintained stability when their centre was supported 
by a periphery and the periphery regions believed the resources they provided to the centre were 
also returning a benefit to themselves (Eisenstadt 1969). This arrangement could break down if 
the centre pursued efficiency so rigorously that it neglected the fair distribution of resources: ―A 
‗maximizing‘ strategy, in which the political center tends to channel resources and services for 
its own, rather than for societal, ends in which support and legitimation from the periphery are 
eroded, can lead to collapse‖ (Yoffee 1988, 13). Breakdowns are more likely to begin in 
peripheral regions and countries and then spread to the core as seen in the collapse of the 
Western Roman Empire. The lesson is that a happy periphery of poorer nations often makes for a 
happier more resilient core, and there is no reason to think this doesn‘t apply to nations in the 
modern global economy as well.  
Unfortunately, ―Without gigantic flows of high-quality energy – almost always coming 




in the future, and when urban energy prices shoot skyward, we‘ll discover that the world‘s 
megacities, with their surging populations, are powder kegs‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 75). In this 
sense, otherwise beneficial urban intensification efforts that help scale by controlling sprawl may 
work against both distribution and resilience in a breakdown situation. Indeed Kunstler (2006, 
300) believes that societal breakdown could lead to various economic and ethnic groups 
engaging in crime and clashing with each other and authorities in guerrilla warfare: ―At their 
worst, the rap videos played on cable TV resemble the war chants of a conflict that has not yet 
been joined… In the disorders of the Long Emergency, when the poor become really poor by 
world standards, the urban ghettos may explode again‖.  
If economic growth and employment greatly decline in a resource starved world, even the 
traditionally placid middle class may rebel if enough people decide they no longer have a chance 
under the present model to work their way to a higher standard of living. Given this worrying 
situation, just distribution within rich developed nations can be seen as complementary to 
economic resilience in that societies that are more equitable are likely to have fewer angry 
disenfranchised individuals and hence less debilitating civil disorder when a breakdown occurs 
(Rees 2007 interview). Stronger social capital can enhance capacity for cooperation and 
collective creativity and in turn adaptability. 
Globally, ―At the other end of the spectrum, we find societies – including many in sub-
Saharan Africa and some in Asia and Latin America – that have much lower ability to manage or 
adapt, because of poverty, environmental damage, low education levels, chronic internal 
violence, and weak and corrupt governments. A few, like Somalia and Haiti, have completely 
succumbed to the stresses pounding away at them‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 111). From this 
perspective, redistributing income through international aid could also increase economic 
resilience by increasing the buffering capacity of poorer states.  
Homer-Dixon also worries that disenfranchised people in poorer countries are more 
likely to become terrorists which of course does nothing to help world resilience. A report on 
climate change by retired US generals similarly argues for Western country to undertake self-
interested generosity in the interests of preserving global order: ―The U.S. should commit to 
global partnerships that help less developed nations build the capacity and resiliency to better 
manage climate impacts‖ (CNA Corporation 2007, 47). Ensuring that no nation is left behind 




frequency of wars over natural resource in the coming decades. In short, a more equitable world 
will mean fewer angry people and nations once breakdowns start occurring. 
The relationship between equity and economic resilience in poorer nations is borne out 
by the example of Cuba where response to energy scarcity was made easier because of just 
distribution: ―Because the Cuban economy was directly controlled by the state, and because there 
was little economic disparity in the country by this time, the shortages were shared more or less 
equally‖ (Heinberg 2004, 106). Redistribution could also help buffer economic downturns by 
making sure working people have enough money to buy the products being made so that 
aggregate demand in the economy is sustained. Thus, Farley (2007 interview) concludes: ―I think 
inequitable systems are probably more prone to collapse, and I see little evidence that those with 
an inequitably large share of the resource base recover any better‖.  
All of this might suggest that an aggressive expansion of existing wealth distribution 
programs both within and between countries would be a solution to the world‘s resilience 
problems. But things are never so simple. The positive relationship between global wealth 
redistribution and adaptive capacity is not entirely clear cut when comparing a wider array of 
countries and cultures. A Kalahari bushman or subsistence farmer in the third world can be 
considered quite resilient to shocks because of how strongly they embody the dispersity and 
autarky principles. Therefore lifting them out of their ―poverty‖ and into urban areas could 
actually make their lives and their nation‘s economy less resilient. This provides an alternative 
justification for Garret Hardin‘s (1974) Lifeboat Ethics which warns about the ecological (scale) 
dangers of ill-considered foreign aid and unrestricted immigration. On the other hand, it could 
simply imply that poverty needs to be defined more broadly than low material throughput to take 
into consideration context. 
This raises an even more provocative question: could the economic fundamentals of 
poorer nations actually be more resilient than those of richer ones? In general many ―less 
developed‖ societies (excluding failed states such as Haiti/Somalia) may actually be more 
economically resilient in that they are less complex and have greater dispersity and autarky than 
rich developed nations, reducing their susceptibility to synchronous failures. Families in 
developing countries fortunate to still have an agrarian or indigenous lifestyle are probably much 
more economically resilient at a fundamental level than their counterparts in the West. Perhaps 




ones most subject to dysfunction and collapse – including national and state governments‖ 
(Kunstler 2006, 239). 
Compared to developing nations, ―America is already a highly developed and 
industrialized nation that is extremely dependent on automobiles, highways, shopping malls, and 
computers... Nor is the US in the same situation as Cuba: while the people of the latter nation 
have worked a half-century at building communal solidarity, America is an individualist society. 
Where Cuba has fostered a cooperative spirit among its populace, Americans are proudly 
competitive” (Heinberg 2004, 110). One only needs to contrast the effective communal response 
to disaster seen in countries hit by the 2004 Asian tsunami with the looting and rioting in New 
Orleans following Hurricane Katrina to see the effect that individualism and income and social 
inequity can have on the resilience of societies.  
In many ways like barbarians invading Rome, Hurricane Katrina simply exposed the 
heart of an already rotting and unresilient social order: ―the images of people stranded on New 
Orleans rooftops will not only be a glimpse of America‘s unresolved past of racial inequality but 
will also foreshadow a collective future of disaster apartheid in which survival is determined by 
who can afford to pay for escape… Perhaps part of the reason why so many of our elites, both 
political and corporate, are sanguine about climate change is they are confident they will be able 
to buy their way out of the worst of it‖ (Klein 2007, 504). If wealth is better distributed, more 
people around the world will be able to afford to make better preparations for shocks or 
alternatively escape them, and if the elites have less wealth relative to common people, they may 
start taking general societal resilience a little more seriously. 
Another aspect of the distribution issue is the proper balance between public and private 
wealth. With the dominance of corporations in 21
st
 century society, wealth is becoming 
concentrated in private hands to the detriment of goods and services provided by the 
government. Klein argues that the disaster of New Orleans was made far worse by relentless 
gutting of the public sphere in the name of neoliberal capitalism (2007, 492). Levees were never 
built and FEMA was understaffed and ill-equipped.  
So within rich countries, particularly urban areas, just distribution helps economic 
resilience. Redistribution of wealth to (and within) less developed countries likewise helps 
resilience but those societies and the world community must be careful how this is achieved. 




will mean replicating the same unresilient vulnerabilities that are set to give first world nations 
such great problems in the years ahead. Just as efforts are being made on the climate change 
prevention front to help poorer countries skip over the dirty industrialization phase and jump 
right to an efficient low carbon economy, these developing nations must make the direct jump to 
a resilient economy.  
Around the world, increasing the education of the poor in desirable ways could enhance 
their adaptive capacity (ability to come up with innovative solutions to new problems) and 
transformability (ability to partake in the active reimagining of their society). Also, slowing the 
rate of  productivity-enhancing technological change may improve employment and wealth 
distribution because people formally displaced by technology will need to be re-hired (Homer-
Dixon 2006, 194). Such a policy could benefit economic resilience by reducing complexity, but 
as discussed in earlier sections, would also have consequences for efficiency and scale. 
Alternatively, taxing resources and pollution and redistributing the income may allow us to 
pursue scale, efficiency, resilience and distribution goals simultaneously.  
Nevertheless it is not possible to create a resilient society solely through economic 
redistribution alone (i.e. as a nice bonus side effect of helping the poor). Heinberg (2007, 180) 
remarks that traditional left-wing ideology alone will not be enough to meet the challenges ahead 
– the problem of resilience is much bigger and requires a much greater diversity of solutions. 
Resilience must be designed for as a separate goal, which raises the counter-question of what 
impact a resilience-first agenda would have on distribution. 
 
5.3.2  Does the pursuit of resilience enhance or undermine just distribution? 
 
Catastrophic events have implications for welfare economics because changes in a system‘s state 
are likely to shift around costs and benefits between different present and future actors in a 
system (Brock et al. 2002, 272). It directly follows then that ―the provision of resilience engages 
welfare issues‖ in economics (Homer-Dixon interview 2007).  
Klein (2007, 497) notes that ―Not so long ago, disasters were periods of social-levelling, 
rare moments when atomized communities put divisions aside and pulled together‖. Now, she 
says shocks are just as likely to accelerate the divisions between wealth classes. Indeed, when 




going to be hurt the most are those who are already weak and already disadvantaged‖ (Homer-
Dixon 2007 interview). As illustrated so vividly by the New Orleans catastrophe, the costs of 
breakdowns are likely to be borne unequally (Rees 2002, 256). Many of the poorest people in the 
city were trapped in the disaster zone while the economically secure drove out of town, checked 
into hotels and called insurance companies (Klein 2007, 490).  
It follows that designing a resilient, safe-fail economy can enhance equity by reducing the 
worst impacts of breakdowns, impacts that are likely to hit the poorest and most vulnerable the 
hardest. For example, many of the 30,000 who died in the 2003 European heat wave were elderly 
persons living alone without air conditioning. As well, the physically or mentally disadvantaged, 
single parent families and the sick may be cut off from state economic support and have to fend 
for themselves in the aftermath of an environmental resource shock. Therefore building 
resilience into the economy can certainly contribute to just distribution in society over the long 
run. 
In terms of global wealth distribution, Homer-Dixon (2006, 286) observes that to avoid 
synchronous failure, we need resilience through the whole system including the weakest links, 
and so again equates building resilience with pursuing a pro-development agenda: ―In practical 
terms today, this means we must focus our attention on boosting the resilience of the world‘s 
weakest societies – those with horribly damaged environments, endemic poverty, inadequate 
skills and education, and weak and corrupt governments‖. Already there is recognition that 
developing countries are likely to be hardest hit by climate change and thus work is beginning to 
enhance their ability to adapt as an extension of development assistance.  
In Africa this has meant a shift to promoting traditional farming practices that are more 
resilient to drought and climate change. Chandler (2007) however argues that this new emphasis 
in international aid means abandoning development goals like modern agriculture and thus 
consigning people to perpetual poverty. He argues that traditional ―development provides a 
better way of dealing with climate uncertainties than does concern with the individual lifestyles 
and survival strategies of the poor‖ (Chandler 2007). Again here is a tension between the need 
for growth and distribution on the one hand and resilience on the other – yet the argument could 
be made that a subsistence farming lifestyle is still preferable to outright starvation in the 
devastating wake of climate change. Climate change is  also likely to force millions of people in 




resilience in their home country could actually result in a richer standard of living for those lucky 
enough to relocate successfully. 
There is a particular potential for adaptations implemented hastily in the aftermath of 
breakdown to violate just distribution because confusion and the need for immediate action often 
prevents a careful consideration of who will be affected. Klein (2007) also warns of ―disaster 
capitalism‖, where shocks are used as a pretext to force through ideologically driven economic 
policies that worsen distribution (among the examples she cites is the privatization of the New 
Orleans school system after Hurricane Katrina). Similarly, austerity programs currently being 
enacted in Eurozone countries to pay off government debt could be viewed as an adaptive 
response to the 2007 financial shock, however deep cuts to education and welfare will end up 
making the poor pay for the bailouts of the banks and financial elite. Whether such measures are 
truly resilient is questionable since they seem set to reduce the welfare of millions of people 
(violating our definition of economic resilience). If more resilient financial policies had been 
implemented earlier which impose efficiency costs on banks in good times but minimize 
maximum loses (see Chapter 6), the financial crisis could have been averted without harming 
income distribution. Again, preventing deep breakdowns is generally good for the poor and 
middle class since the current social order seems to be fond of making them pay to clean up the 
mistakes of the rich. 
In a broader sense, resilience could also hurt wealth distribution if a society‘s ability to 
buffer change prevents it from shifting into a different stable state that is more equitable. This 
again raises the problem of undesirable resilience. A society that is effective at meeting 
sustainable scale and some resilience goals (narrowly defined without transformability), could 
still be very unequal in terms of wealth and power distribution, for example the feudal 




 century Japan (Diamond 2005). The 
salient question then is how to take advantage of perturbations to help nudge a system toward 
more equitable distribution. 
Daly and Farley (2004) advance the ecological economic idea of distributional efficiency, 
the notion that reallocating resources to poor people will generally lead to higher societal welfare 
since rich people have diminishing marginal utility of total consumption. As discussed, building 
in economic resilience probably reallocates societal resources to the net benefit of the poor since 




existing inequities in the world. Too much resilience and no shocks would harm the economy, 
preserving the status quo and its associated wealth inequities. Too little resilience and all of 
society breaks down, to the detriment of both rich and poor. Just enough resilience, and the status 
quo gets shaken up, hopefully leading to transformation to a new stable state with greater wealth 
equity. Overall then, a truly broad look at the relationship between distribution, resilience, scale, 
and efficiency requires consideration of how these objectives relate to the adaptive cycle. 
 
5.4  Goals and the Adaptive Cycle 
 
Now that the concept of resilience has been tested against scale, efficiency and distribution, this 
final section will consider the integration of these three ecological economic goals into the 
broader theory of resilience (the figure-8 adaptive cycle) in order to reveal further new insights. 
The relationship between the concept of economic resilience and the three other primary goals 
discussed in this chapter mirrors in many ways the relationship that is predicted and implied 
(though rarely directly stated) by resilience theory. Since the panarchy cycle is so rarely applied 
to economies, some adaptation is required.  
 Figure 3 shows this author‘s adaptation of Figure 1 (from Chapter 3) to ecological 
economics. Again, the box places the figure-8 in three dimensional space to allow the assignment 
of variables along the axes that illustrate the generalized changes in system dynamics that are 
believed to occur along the cycle. This cycle can apply to any sized economy through history but 
here we will discuss in a very generalized way its application to our modern global economy.  
Like all economies, ours began humbly enough at the bottom of the figure-8 in the 
exploitation phase. Increasing growth and efficiency have been the single minded goals for 
centuries. As it proceeded to aggressively expand its scale and acquire more capital and wealth, 
the global economy moved rightwards and upwards along the front loop of the figure-8, 
becoming progressively more organized and efficient. However, it also started rapidly depleting 
its natural capital (unused resources), resilience and capacity for radical social innovation. 
Wealth inequality (not shown) often increased.  
 In the modern day, our global economy has become locked into the conservation 
phase (top right of the loop). It has become extremely large scale, efficient, orderly and 




innovate at a fundamental level. Globally, wealth inequality is worsening. Gradually, staying 
within sustainable scale is becoming a major concern as decision makers begin to realize (too 
late) that their resource base can no longer support the demands they are placing on it for 




   
Economic Resilience and Innovation 
 
 
Figure 3: Figure-8 adaptive cycle applied to ecological economics 
 
 
What follows is one likely scenario (though the future is impossible to predict). When hit 
with a large enough shock (or more likely, series of smaller converging shocks), these 
weaknesses will be exposed and the economy is likely to break down. Rapid contraction will 
lead to negative growth, decreased consumption and high unemployment. Traditional 
organizational structures will probably be abandoned and carefully nurtured economic 



































If this should occur, the economy will move quickly rightwards and downwards through 
the release phase, resembling an out of control plane pitching over. The amount of resilience left 
in our economy will determine whether the plane continues on in free fall and crashes into the 
ground (terminal civilization collapse) or whether the crew in charge is able to regain control in 
time to pull up out of the catastrophe and enter the reorganization phase. Aiding this task are the 
resources, resilience and capacity for new innovations freed up (released) by the breakdown. The 
pilots of the economy hopefully regain their senses and discover their reserve fuel tank. They 
may remember emergency training they had almost forgotten and also dream up radical new 
solutions to problems that were never in any textbook. Eventually, once survival is assured, the 
economy is likely to begin this cycle all over again, but hopefully future generations will 
remember some of the lessons learned and build society within a more sustainable basin of 
attraction. This scenario is of course radically over-simplified but it is useful from time to time to 
consider our complex world as one global whole. 
Nevertheless the real world dynamic interplay between goals does not perfectly mimic 
what would be expected in adaptive cycle theory, primarily because humans, unlike the actors in 
many other systems, can consciously design their economies for various ends which can lead to 
unexpected results in the relationships between resilience, growth and connectedness/efficiency. 
Therefore, the short answer to the research question of ―Would adding consideration of 
economic resilience enhance or undermine the three main ecological economic goals of 
sustainable scale, just distribution and efficient allocation?‖ is that  it depends. The question must 
almost be asked on a case-by case basis. But as discussed at length above, there do seem to be 
some general relationships.  
Resilience theory as advanced by Holling predicts that if the scale and complexity of the 
economy rise, resilience inexorably declines. This implies that ecological economist‘s goal of 
controlling growth is very much mutually compatible with resilience theory. In ecological 
economic terms, moving up the growth side of the adaptive cycle means moving further away 
from thermodynamic equilibrium. Maintaining this position requires more and more inputs of 
increasingly scarce high-quality (low entropy) energy to prevent breakdowns (Homer-Dixon 
(2006, 233). The adaptive cycle shows us that a system can never continue growing forever, and 




especially important. Even the outward growth of the universe is starting to slow, and it is 
predicted to eventually collapse back on itself.  
Attempting to extend the conservation phase too far only makes the fall that much worse: 
―The longer people sustain a social, economic, or ecological system in its growth phase, the 
sharper, harder, and more destructive its ultimate breakdown will be‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 232).  
Because earth has finite resources, gaining each additional unit of scale when moving up the 
cycle requires greater and greater efficiency and hence the loss of more and more resilience 
(there is usually increasing marginal costs to resilience of increasing scale). In this way the 
growth curve along which society travels looks similar to the marginal disutility of growth curve 
used in ecological economic texts (see Daly and Farley 2004, 20). Both curves warn of the 
danger of too much growth, showing the intriguing theoretical similarity between the sustainable 
scale and resilience goals even though they have approached the problem of scale from very 
different angles. 
However, if the growth is occurring due to societal efforts to enhance economic resilience 
(such as by building in redundancies or amassing stockpiles), then sometimes resilience and 
scale can both rise together. This follows from the fact that building anything, whether it is cars 
or solar panels, will require nature‘s inputs. Thus scale and resilience can be both positively and 
negatively linked: reducing scale usually leads to increased resilience, however, some efforts to 
increase economic resilience can also counter-intuitively increase scale. Whether a given 
economic investment that  increases scale will hurt or help resilience depends largely on whether 
the goods being produced have resilient characteristics themselves or will be used to achieve 
resilient ends.  
Is there a point along the growth curve where scale and resilience are both optimized? Or 
is this impossible and we are fated to go through the adaptive cycle forever? The answer is 
probably the latter, but wise use of nature‘s inputs for more resilient ends (as well as a switch in 
focus to qualitative economic development) can make the down slope of the cycle much less 
severe. Ultimately, given that economies are dynamic systems, perpetually moving along the 
adaptive cycle and between basins of attraction, Daly‘s idea that an economy could even be held 
in a ―steady-state‖ is in some ways theoretically incompatible with resilience theory. For 




cycle are important to maintain ―productivity, fixed capital, and social memory‖, destabilizing 
forces are likewise needed to maintain diversity, flexibility, and opportunity. 
Several ecological economists have in fact disagreed with the simplicity of the steady-
state idea, including Daly‘s mentor Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (Rosser 1991, 269; Anonymous 
interview 2007). But what Daly‘s idea lacks in theoretical rigour, it makes up for in practical 
usefulness in terms of communicating to policymakers the need to keep the economy within 
carrying capacity given our limited knowledge of the ecosystems on which it depends. Perhaps 
―zero growth economy‖ would be a slightly more accurate name, though that too is contestable 
given that economies like ecosystems are continually mutating and evolving. What is steady 
should not be the state of the economy itself, but instead the fact we are keeping within carrying 
capacity even as our economy remains otherwise dynamic: ―The complexity, dynamics, and 
nonlinear nature of these interdependent systems imply that the notion of ‗sustainability‘ as a 
steady-state equilibrium is not realistic. Forces of change, such as technological, geopolitical or 
climactic shifts will inevitably disrupt the cycles of material and energy flows. Therefore, 
achieving sustainability will arguably require the development of resilient, adaptive industrial 
and societal systems that mirror the dynamic attributes of ecological systems‖ (Fiksel 2006, 16). 
The ecological economic goal of efficient allocation at first seems to violate resilience 
according to panarchy theory. As economic systems gain efficiency and progress along the 
adaptive cycle, they forsake resilient principles including redundancy, diversity, dispersity and 
autarky in favour of streamlining, monoculture, centralization and interdependence leading to 
―efficiency-based competition‖ in the conservation phase (King 1995, 965). Philips (1979) also 
explains that emerging states and civilizations (in the exploitation phase) have not yet developed 
complex institutions and so use their resource base in low return ways. Over time as they expand 
(move into the conservation phase) and learn how to use their resources more fully and 
efficiently (defined as high output or return per unit of investment), they use most freely 
available resources in support of complex social and political institutions. Their complexity and 
efficiency leaves them with no reserves or flexibility to reallocate resources in emergencies, 
making them vulnerable to disruptions that an emerging state would be able to control.  
However as discussed, the relationship between efficiency and economic resilience is not 
so clear cut: ―The common perception that there‘s a tradeoff is something that holds more at the 




interview). The answer depends largely on how efficiencies are achieved and indeed how 
efficiency itself is defined. Internalizing environmental costs into the market would go a long 
way toward ensuring that the efficiency, scale and resilience goals are pulling in the same 
direction. Some initiatives that could greatly improve efficiency may have little impact on 
economic resilience and vice versa. Yet for now our society‘s focus on one particular type of 
efficiency, and the complete neglect of scale, distribution and resilience, has led to the fact that 
―The ‗winners‘ in recent decades have been corporations that could enjoy the economies of scale 
conferred by gigantism… The ‗losers‘ can be summarized generally as the future and its 
inhabitants. They stand to lose not only future wealth, but also their civilization‖ (Kunstler 2006, 
240).  
Indeed modern society dedicates its resources heavily to technological innovation, 
however the adaptive cycle reveals that these sorts of efficiencies which occur in the 
growth/conservation phase are in fact not really innovative at all: because each new technology 
locks us more and more into the current way of doing things and the need for more growth and 
more resource inputs. True innovation, in terms of radical social or spiritual transformation, often 
occurs only in the backloop after breakdown. This is in part why we suffer an ―ingenuity gap‖ in 
coming up with real systemic solutions to today‘s fundamental problems, and inventing any 
number of glitzy new high-tech gadgets will not help this. 
Truly, on one hand efficiency is a very positive attribute that can not only make society 
vastly wealthier but also allow us to do more with less, helping to control the speed that we move 
up the growth curve and in turn delaying environmental resource shocks caused by exceeding 
scale. For this reason efficiency is one of the three main objectives of ecological economics. Yet, 
an analogy can be drawn between current economic efforts to prevent shocks through rigorous 
efficiency measures and failed efforts to prevent wildfires in heavily forested areas even as 
flammable debris pile up. Both efforts may serve only to overextend the cycle‘s front loop and 
its associated growth and connectedness so the inevitable breakdown is worse than it needs to be: 
―Put simply, efforts to regulate the system – efforts undertaken apparently without much 
understanding of how they affected the system‘s resilience – produced the conditions for 
catastrophe‖ (Homer-Dixon 2006, 233).  
In the same way, efforts to make our economy fail-safe and prevent breakdowns through 




the breakdowns that much worse when they do occur. Ecological economists are already 
cognoscente of the limitations of conventional efficiency as a solution to all environmental 
problems, and so would not necessarily disagree with this analysis. Beyond this, what may be 
needed is a reconsideration of what efficiency initiatives ought to serve and, consequently, how 
they should be defined and measured. 
Just distribution is the most difficult ecological economic goal to fit into resilience 
theory. Equity cannot be directly predicted by a society‘s progress along the adaptive cycle curve 
because it is so heavily influenced by human morals. As scale increases, equity can in turn 
become better or worse within and between countries depending on political choices. 
Historically, civilizations tended to become more and more unequal as they moved up the 
adaptive cycle, culminating in deepening class divisions and the concentration of capital in a few 
self-indulgent hands during the conservation phase (Adams 1988, 25). Seeking a less complex 
society might therefore reduce the ability of certain groups and individuals to amass wealth and 
associated power. Yet in the mid 20
th
 century Western society was managing to close the 
distributional gap in spite of rapid economic and technological growth thanks to the formal 
creation of the welfare state and the spread of international aid agencies – only to have the gap 
open up again following a shift in political ideology and the spread of Reagan-style economics 
and globalization. While a perfectly equitable society is likely to have much more economic 
resilience, it may still suffer from fundamental resilience deficits associated with too much 
interconnectedness, specialization and unrealistic demands placed on the natural environment.  
Similarly, an economic breakdown (release phase) could either level the playing field and 
bring people from all walks of life together as social classes dissolve in the anarchy following a 
societal shake up (Landau and Saul 2004, 305), or lead to gated communities which make equity 
far worse. Poor societies that have not moved as far up the adaptive cycle may not have as long a 
way to fall in the release phase, mitigating the severity of their decline somewhat relative to the 
hard fall that rich nations seem headed for. However, Homer-Dixon (2007 interview) points out 
that poorer societies can be considered more resilient only by default, not because of anything 
special they have done to make themselves resilient. Neither poor nor rich nations in today‘s 
world are foundationally resilient – both are travelling through the panarchy cycle but neither 




obsessed with economic growth and aspire to stay in the growth phase of the front loop 
indefinitely which is simply not possible. 
The end effect on resilience of pursuing a more egalitarian society may depend on how it 
is achieved. Trying to raise the poor of the world up to the consumption lifestyle of the rich is 
destined to move the global economy dramatically higher on the adaptive cycle with a 
corresponding decline in resilience and environmental quality. This underscores the need to 
redistribute from rich to poor rather than just trying to raise all boats by expanding the ocean of 
economic growth. If the bottom of the social pyramid was raised at the expense of say the richest 
10% in the world, redistribution goals could be met without moving the global economy to an 
even more dangerous scale. Most importantly, poorer nations should be sure to follow their own 
unique development path and be careful not to repeat the various unresilient design flaws that 




In the end, all four societal objectives are in theory compatible at some level – certainly none are 
perpetually, diametrically opposed to any other. Relating the principles of economic resilience to 
the three goals is perhaps easiest to understand by thinking of three periods in a breakdown 
scenario: before, when you try to prevent or soften it (through scale and efficiency initiatives); 
during, when you try to weather it (when redundancy, diversity, dispersity, autarky and 
adaptability are especially important), and after, when you try to recover from it 
(transformability and possibly just distribution come into their own). All of these principles need 
to be simultaneously planned for, yet the point on the adaptive cycle when each is most critical to 
society is different. To ignore some of these principles because they seem superfluous or 
unimportant at a particular point in time is to show a grave lack of foresight. It is critical that we 
start adopting a much longer term view of the history and current position of our economy on the 
adaptive cycle, recognizing that we must start preparing for tomorrow‘s inevitable challenges 
today. 
The adaptive cycle thus provides a very useful way of synthesizing the framework of 
economic resilience from Chapter 4 with ecological economics. Placing the three existing goals 




cycle of resilience theory can shed new light on their interrelationship. It reveals that these three 
policy objectives are in part a response to challenges that naturally arise as our system, like all 
those in the universe, progresses through an evolutionary cycle. The fact we are saddled with 
today‘s complex problems was probably made inevitable the day our ancestors started down the 
path of civilization. Traditional hunter-gatherer societies were not large enough to be 
civilizations precisely because they did not have the efficiency (in terms of specialization) to 
allow them to be. When humans signed on to the project of civilization they not only got its well 
understood hallmarks like increasing growth, efficiency and organization, but also hidden costs 
including declining economic resilience, environmental quality and distributional equity. We can 
use the adaptive cycle as a chart for plotting the progress of civilization and clarifying the 
positive and negative relationships between our multiple, sometimes competing objectives. 
Clearly then we see four major dynamic forces in play in the evolution of any economy: 
scale, efficiency, distribution and resilience. In these challenging times, these four objectives 
provide a valuable framework for analyzing the tradeoffs potentially inherent in complex 
decisions affecting the environment, the economy and society and a fascinating glimpse at the 
difficult balancing act that policymakers increasingly face. By thinking through these issues 
ahead of time, ecological economists will be better equipped to help decision makers meet the 
challenge posed by looming environmental resource shocks and thereby enhance the credibility 
and relevance of ecological economics. Ultimately these goals are all valuable and interrelated: a 
great challenge for future researchers will be actively seeking out those areas where the goals are 








Chapter 6: The Challenge of Economic Resilience 
in Practice 
 
From the last chapter, we have seen that economic resilience is an important concept missing 
from ecological economics, yet one that is extremely useful for the theoretical insights it 
provides, warranting further examination. Resilience and ecological economics clearly 
complement each other overall as a way of evaluating the design and structure of socioeconomic 
systems in a comprehensive manner. This chapter will apply this framework to analyze some 
vital real life sectors in the economy in order to see what we learn about both the potential 
effectiveness of the framework (testing its usefulness) and what insights we can gain about how 
the resilience of these sectors can be improved, barring possible tradeoffs with other policy 
goals.  
Batabyal (1998, 504) notes that ―most policy makers are not interested in resilience per 
se, but in what this concept means for policy‖. This chapter therefore deals with the challenge of 
designing for resilience in practice, and the policy implications that follow. Recognizing that past 
literature has analyzed the resilience of largely natural ecological systems, the focus here will be 
on systems in the human built environment, systems which most immediately affect human 
economic welfare and over which we have the most control. Since this is primarily a theoretical 
economic paper it is most concerned with system linkages related to the allocation of society‘s 
scare resources. 
 
6.1  Choosing Key Economic Systems 
 
In the Region of Waterloo, Ontario where this author lives, regional government releases an 
annual list of potential environmental resource shocks as part of its emergency preparedness 
week. These include a smog event, power blackout, heat wave, water contamination, chemical 
outbreak, ice storm/blizzard, infectious disease and flood (Region of Waterloo, 2006). In part due 




failure (Russia in 2010), giant dust storms (Beijing in 2006), super wildfires (Australia in 2009), 
landslides (Indonesia in 2008 and Venezuela and Colombia in 2010) and fuel shortages.  
The concern is not that a single shock will cause every system to fail, but that critical 
systems might just be among those that do (Perrow 1999, 403). Homer-Dixon (2006, 284) argues 
that ―A prudent way to cope with invisible but inevitable dangers… is to build resilience into all 
systems critical to our well-being‖. Yet around the world, ―infrastructure systems face pressures 
from growing demand, and difficulties in expanding capacity. Strained during normal conditions, 
their ability to deliver services during extreme events is limited, and systems may fail‖ (Chang et 
al. 2006, 35). For example, super storms may damage systems, mass migration caused by climate 
change may strain their capacity and shortages of key resource inputs may jeopardize their 
operations. Even if infrastructure is left physically intact, systems can break down if the people 
running them simply stop going to work (i.e. trained power station or medical staff). Comfort 
(2005, 5) notes that ―aging infrastructure and growing populations moving into risky areas have 
increased the vulnerability of US cities to natural and technological hazards. The losses from 
Katrina alone, now estimated at over $250 billion, underscore the importance of maintaining 
rigorous planning and preparedness activities‖.  
An analysis of how to build resilience into key economic systems is largely missing from 
the literature, however. One of the earliest works to apply the concept of resilience to a real-
world infrastructure problem is Lovins‘ and Lovins‘ 1982 Pentagon-commissioned study, Brittle 
Power (republished in 2001). Their book, more from a technical/engineering perspective than an 
economic one, examined the implications of resilience for energy policy: ―Few engineers 
deliberately design for resilience as an end in itself. If they achieve it, they do so by accident 
while pursuing other ends….In designing an energy system for the decades ahead, that is no 
longer tolerable‖ (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 208). Indeed, ―Conventional thinking about disasters 
in the developed world revolves around seeing that people are prepared as individuals to survive 
for the short time it takes the authorities to respond to the emergency situation and restore 
normality. Almost no thought is given to changing the models for systems to make them 
substantially less brittle and more resilient‖ (Steffen 2006).  The focus of economic resilience 
should be on weathering the storm and recovering from the damage rather than trying to prevent 
what cannot be predicted. Zeckhauser (2009, 13) calls for the identification of contingency 




for ―extremely large stockpiles of basic food, water and shelter that could be dispatched quickly 
if a series of smaller disasters threatened to slide into larger-scale catastrophe‖.  
To extend the previously raised notion of efficient resilience, we should probably focus 
first on building resilience into the most critical systems where it can do the most good. Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC 2008) have identified critical infrastructure 
sectors, which they define as: ―those physical and information technology facilities, networks, 
services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, 
safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians or the effective functioning of governments 
in Canada‖. According to them, Canada‘s critical national infrastructure consists of ten sectors: 
Energy and utilities, Communications and information technology, Finance, Health care, Food, 
Water, Transportation, Safety, Government and Manufacturing. Homer-Dixon (2006) likewise 
recommends identifying the highly connected central hubs of our energy, food, information, 
transportation and financial networks and redesigning, removing or replicating them to enhance 
dispersity and redundancy.  
Due to space constraints this chapter will focus on a) the money supply, b) electricity and 
energy utilities, c) the water supply, d) the transportation network, e) the communication and 
information system and f) the emergency response system, concluding with implications of general 
urban system interrelationships. These sectors/subsystems have been chosen because they are 
critical for the basic functioning of any economy (and hence among the most important sectors to 
begin incorporating resilience). An environmental resource shock could potentially put all of 
them under stress that leaves them vulnerable: ―Vulnerability is the flip side of resilience: when a 
social or ecological system loses resilience it becomes vulnerable to change that previously could 
be absorbed‖ (Colding et al. 2002, 13). Additionally, each shows evidence of the aforementioned 
tensions between economic resilience, sustainable scale just distribution and efficient allocation. 
These systems will be examined at different scales (local, national and global) and the resulting 
analysis will usually remain broad enough that it can be generalized to many different economies 
worldwide.  
Ultimately some of the micro-scale issues related to building in resilience are better 
handled by engineers (the detailed design of infrastructure, technology and building standards), 




examples from these disciplines are included to help ground this thesis and show the practical 
applications of the resilience concept on the ground. 
 
6.2  The Money Supply 
 
Money functions as a unit of exchange and store of value in the economy (Daly and Farley 
2004). The supply of money in turn encompasses the creation and administration of currencies 
and banking. Money greases the gears of the global economy, and so the root cause of most 
financial crises is the freezing up of monetary liquidity in the system. This can occur if a large 
number of people default on their loans, causing lenders to be more cautious and the availability 
of credit to dry up. Without easy credit the system can no longer function properly or grow (as 
required by capitalism), and the whole fabric of economic relationships and hierarchies starts to 
disintegrate. 
Presently banks still have low reserve requirements, allowing them to loan out currency 
they do not actually own and thereby create most of the new money in the economy: ―the trend 
for two hundred years, since the times of John Law, had been to set credit free of its limiting 
association with bags of gold in a cellar‖ (Kunstler 2006, 207). This permits the money supply to 
remain liquid, efficiently expanding and contracting based on fluctuations in demand (Miller 
2004). Access to cheap credit has become unofficial government policy in Western countries, in 
part to compensate for worsening income inequalities (Rajan 2010). Consequently global 
industrial capitalism has come to be fuelled by the ever increasing debt of developed nations. 
Because almost all money created through loans is IOU debt that must be repaid, liquidity in our 
monetary system is structurally dependent on economic growth.  
Yet this so-called fractional reserve system may not be particularly resilient. As seen with 
the subprime mortgage crisis, when global credit dries up the whole system can grind to a halt. 
Moreover, if a shock prompts a run on the bank, a lack of physical reserves to back up virtual 
wealth may lead to panic. If psychological faith is lost in the monetary system, rapid devaluation 
and economic ruin are the likely result (Yasutomi 1995). The Roaring Twenties and subsequent 
Great Depression demonstrated that the greater the disconnect between bank reserves 
representing real wealth and the creation and lending of pseudo-money through loans, the more 




fall it will suffer if things break down. During the Great Depression, ―the loss of faith in various 
forms of credit represented by abstract instruments of finance translated into a persistent lack of 
money – that is, a means of exchange – and the institutions devised to create it stood in 
disrepute‖ (Kunstler 2006, 208). Deflation occurred in part because money loaned into existence 
disappeared when the loans were not paid back. As growth slowed, the ability to pay interest on 
credit did as well, compromising the entire banking system. 
Within ecological economics, there is a body of literature critiquing our present system of 
handling money, primarily because a fractional reserve system seems at odds with the goal of 
sustainable scale. In order to control growth of the money supply and thereby help reign in the 
scale of the economy, a number of ecological economists (e.g. Daly and Farley 2004) advocate 
that banks be required to hold higher reserve requirements. Other ecological economists 
challenge the basic idea of a fractional reserve system, arguing it is the fiscal embodiment of the 
neoclassical economic belief in unending growth (Heinberg 2007, 40). Because a debt based 
monetary system requires the money supply and the entire economy to continually grow just to 
pay back interest on existing loans, it violates thermodynamic principles that no system can grow 
in perpetuity. As a result, these ecological economists propose radical alternatives such as a 
negative interest rate to simulate entropy and force people to spend money instead of hoarding it. 
The ecological economic critique of the fractional reserve system because of the issue of 
scale flows nicely into a critique of the same system from the perspective of economic resilience. 
Bank reserves are akin to an inventory issue (Homer-Dixon 2007 interview), so a fractional 
reserve system that allows banks to make commitments far in access of their buffer inventory is 
in fundamental violation of the redundancy principle. Banks deplete overall economic system 
resilience by having thin capital reserves underlying their loans. Resilience thus should become a 
guiding principle of monetary policy. This would start with unified international regulation of the 
multinational banking sector to make sure bank loans are backed up by sufficient cash in the 
vault (Kuntz 2010), a policy that is compatible with existing ecological economic 
recommendations. If such redundancy were in place it would have helped lessen the blow of the 
current recession. Stronger banking regulations could improve just distribution as well. 
A debt based money system lacks resilience at a deeper level as well. During 
breakdowns, not only can there be a run on banks by consumers who have lost confidence in the 




money (created through loans) does as well, causing investors to lose confidence in the entire 
system (Heinberg 2003, 171). A monetary system that encourages everyone to constantly be in 
debt to one another means individuals, businesses and governments have very little financial 
autarky and thus the potential for synchronous failures is magnified. When viewed from the 
perspective of resilience theory, the fractional reserve system intrinsically extends the growth 
loop in the money supply too far, leading to financial bubbles. The money supply is revealed to 
lack resilience when that growth cycle is interrupted by shocks. High bank reserves would 
therefore greatly increase monetary resilience not only because they lessen the chance of 
currency collapse if people run on the bank, but also because they help make sure the growth of 
the money supply is kept in line with the relative strength of economic fundamentals.  
Pursuing these resilience measures however conflicts with Miller‘s (2004) ecological 
economic analysis that the money supply should be left free to evolve so it can be liquid and 
efficient. Again the tension between efficiency and resilience arises. Some still argue that an 
unregulated money supply can be resilient as well; though perhaps discredited by recent events, 
Alan Greenspan argued that ―Enhanced flexibility provides the advantage of allowing the 
economy to adjust automatically, reducing the reliance on the actions of monetary and other 
policymakers, which have often come too late or been misguided‖ (Offut 2005, 1). Rose (2004) 
also has faith in the dispersity attributes of markets: ―Prices act as the ‗invisible hand‘ that can 
guide resources to their best allocation even in the aftermath of a disaster‖. 
In a bid to prevent future financial breakdowns, world authorities met in Basel 
Switzerland in 2010 and agreed to make banks start holding 2% more capital in reserve, but for 
the time being these measures are largely voluntary on a country by country basis and are likely 
to be challenged later if the economy seems to improve. Following the meeting, Bank of Canada 
Governor Mark Carney explicitly drew attention to the above tradeoff when deciding on capital 
requirements: ―The point is not to pile up so much capital in our institutions that they are never 
heard from again, either as a source of instability or of growth. The challenge is to get the 
balance between resiliency and efficiency right‖ (McKenna 2010, B4). The lesson remains 
though that banks should never be allowed to accumulate liabilities greater than their reserves, or 
at least the capacity of governments to bail them out. 
Speaking of which, central banks have traditionally provided the first line of resilience in 




crisis of 1907 provided the original impetus for the creation of the US Central banking system in 
order to help build future resilience to shocks into the monetary system. The Federal Reserve 
was created to act as a lender of last resort that could bail out banks who do not have sufficient 
liquidity, guaranteeing all existing bank deposits and debts. It also reduced dependency on 
foreign funds, increasing system autarky (Homer-Dixon 2006). During an economic downturn, 
central banks need to keep pumping liquidity into the system because private banks cannot. In 
these ways, central banks around the world are fixtures of monetary resilience and calls by some 
political Libertarians to disband them betray a foolish ignorance of the history and rationale for 
their creation.  
This is not to say there are not legitimately debateable aspects of the current central 
banking institution: for example the recent massive bank bailouts ended up simply transferring 
private debt to public debt with little provision for paying governments back, greatly setting back 
just distribution. Likewise, the first response of central bankers to a global economic breakdown 
is to slash interest rates in order to reignite economic growth, but this can provide a perverse 
incentive for people to take on additional debt that may eventually make the system even less 
resilient. Low interest rates can also lead to dangerous inflation which perpetuates paranoia over 
a currency‘s perceived lack of value.  
By way of historical example, Rome in the 3
rd
 century AD had runaway inflation because 
it tried to pay for its army by debasing the currency used for payrolls (Tainter 1988, 143; Wright 
2004, 93). This inflation ―devastated the economy‖ as the last Roman emperors churned out 
coins and taxed the peasants in order to double the size of the Roman army and public 
bureaucracy in a vain effort to contain the chaos (Tainter 1996). Thus the usual preoccupation of 
the central bank with controlling inflation may actually make sense during a prolonged 
breakdown when employers and the government are in no place to raise wages or pensions 
commensurately. Even though a downturn should logically lead to deflation because there is no 
demand for money, a prolonged breakdown can often paradoxically lead to runaway inflation 
(e.g. Weimar Germany) if the government tries to raise the economy out of stagnation by 
printing more money, a strategy that history has proven rarely works. It will be interesting 
whether current quantitative easing schemes in the United States are successful at boosting 




This interdependence of the global monetary system has also reduced its autarky and 
made addressing global economic problems that much more complex and difficult. Experts have 
emphasized the necessity of joint coordinated global action in addressing the financial crisis 
because any country failing to act, or working out of sync with its trading partners, could actually 
make the problem worse. Unified international currencies such as the Euro which are very 
beneficial and efficient when things are going well may violate the principles of autarky, 
diversity and dispersity. It is more resilient for each country and region to have their own 
currency so they retain the flexibility to respond to breakdowns in ways most suited to their own 
economic conditions, such as inflating their way out of the debt problem as Argentina did. 
Certainly, ―national currencies are subject to inflation, deflation, and collapse as well as 
to manipulations and panics beyond the community‘s control. One solution is the promotion of 
local barter systems; another is the creation of a local currency. Both are legal (if operated within 
certain guidelines) and have long histories of success‖ (Heinberg 2003, 216). Local community 
currencies (ITHICA dollars etc.) are interest and debt-free, and their diversity, dispersity and 
autarky make them resilient if the larger system breaks down (Hopkins 2008, 62), but this is less 
efficient than having one unified national or international medium of exchange. Nevertheless, a 
breakdown of national currencies following a particularly severe environmental resource shock 
could force the creation of local currencies as an adaptive response the world over. To help build 
their adaptive capacity, communities could begin pre-emptively laying the groundwork for 
adopting a local currency if the situation ever demands. 
It may also be very efficient to move to a cashless society based on electronic payments 
using debit and credit cards, and it would also be good for the environment by saving plant 
material and minerals. However, card readers, ATMs and even cash registers will cease to 
function if the electricity fails in a deep breakdown, creating major problems for both retailers 
and consumers. Electronic payment methods can also cease to function if server connections are 
interrupted (Stein 2000).  
Indeed, any capital in the form of currency, be it paper or electronic, is of questionable 
usefulness in a crisis situation. Yasutomi (1995) and Kunstler (2006, 234) highlight the 
fundamentally arbitrary nature of money, the tenuous and abstract relations between this asset 
and what it is supposed to represent, and the ease with which it can fail as a unit of exchange 




accept money and instead turn to bartering real tangible goods needed for immediate survival 
(Heinberg 2007, 177). Those expecting retirement checks, dividends, or paychecks may have a 
long time to wait in the aftermath of a breakdown (Perrow 1999, 398). Even gold is completely 
arbitrary and only holds the value that humans attach to it, though it still might not be a bad idea 
for individuals to own a little silver or gold they could at least try to trade for necessities in an 
emergency, since these may be one of the few currencies still accepted (Lele 1998, 252). 
Ultimately, the resilience of the money supply hinges on little more than psychological 
faith in the social contract it represents (Greer 2008, 94). During the Great Depression, FDR 
reminded the shaken public about this during one of his fireside chats: ―there is an element in the 
readjustment of our financial system more important than currency, more important than gold, 
and that is the confidence of the people themselves… You people must have faith; you must not 
be stampeded by rumours or guesses. Let us unite in banishing fear‖ (Roosevelt 1933, 8). The 
key then to ultimate resilience in the money supply is improving people‘s adaptive capacity, in 
the face of breakdowns, to maintain their belief that their currency still holds value and that it is 
safe left in the bank. Adopting Homer-Dixon‘s (2006) prospective mind could help in this 
regard. Because of looming environmental resource shocks that will impose very real physical 
hardship, a future collapse of public confidence in money and the financial system ―could easily 
be worse than that of the Great Depression because we will not be living in ‗want amidst plenty‘, 
as FDR put it, but in hardship among scarcity‖ (Kunstler 2006, 234). 
 
6.3  Electricity and Energy Utilities 
 
Energy is our master resource (Homer-Dixon 2006). Human societies ―are open systems that 
depend upon the flow of energy and matter to create temporary islands of order‖ (Heinberg 2003, 
11). Without a constant supply, human civilizations quickly break down, but with enough 
energy, they can surmount nearly any difficulty. A 100% resilient energy system would have to 
be able to guarantee that society had access to all the energy it needed to respond to, mitigate and 
rebuild any breakdowns in the other sub-sectors in this chapter. But as ecological economists 
know, there is only a finite supply of low entropy energy available on planet earth. We will never 
have as much energy during good or bad times as we would like. So rather than pursuing the 




the most important for basic survival at the household level in the developed world: energy for 
heating buildings and electricity (which in a warming world is increasingly used to cool them). 
Perrow (1999, 404) explains our electricity supply is unique among major industries and 
systems in three ways that are important to its resilience, or lack thereof:  
It is the lifeblood of our modern society; without it, most things we depend upon 
would fail. The second unique aspect of power systems is that electricity is the 
original and ultimate example of the ‗just-in-time‘ system we have introduced intro 
manufacturing, increasing its tight coupling. Electricity cannot be stockpiled in 
large quantities to tide us over until we get the system fixed. A third unique feature 
is that the electric systems in North America are tightly interconnected within and 
between four major electrical interconnections known as ‗grids‘. 
 
Indeed electricity is among the most fundamental resources upon which all sectors of our 
technological economy depend (Lovelock 2006, 153). If this flow is disrupted, chaos ensues: 
―Experience data from recent disasters indicates that while virtually all infrastructure sectors are 
disrupted by electric power outage, the most significant and frequent impacts occur from 
disruptions to building support, water, food storage, hospitals, public health, and road 
transportation‖ (Chang et al., 2006, 33).  
Since the 1950‘s, electricity has been cheap, reliable and largely taken for granted 
(Patterson 1999, 136). Yet, ―in today's energy system, the great reliability of supply most of the 
time makes designers less likely to take precautions against rare, catastrophic failures which they 
have not experienced and hence do not consider credible‖ (Lovins and Lovins 2001, 185). 
However it is surprisingly easy for outages to cascade through the electricity system in a classic 
synchronous failure:  
The national electric grid is fragile and can be easily disrupted. Witness the 
Northeast Blackout of 2003, which was caused by trees falling onto power lines in 
Ohio. It affected 50 million people in eight states and Canada, took days to restore, 
and caused a financial loss in the United States estimated to be between $4 billion 
and $10 billion. People lost water supplies, transportation systems, and 
communications systems (including Internet and cell phones). Factories shut down, 
and looting occurred. As extreme weather events becomes more common, so do the 
threats to our national electricity supply. (CNA Corporation 2007, 38) 
 
This has been painfully demonstrated by the repeated storm outages in British Columbia in the 
last few years. Perhaps most worrisome, the 1998 Quebec ice storm demonstrated that a 
prolonged winter in northern climates without access to traditional electricity or heat sources 




Each major type of electrical generating technology has positive and negative resilience 
characteristics. Jurisdictions like Ontario will need to weigh these as they decide which supply 
sources to pursue in the coming decades. Again, the apparent tradeoff between resilience and 
efficiency appears. On one hand, there may be significant economy-of-scale and efficiency 
benefits to a continued reliance on centralized generation (nuclear, coal, natural gas, deep 
geothermal and hydro) and interconnected electricity production and distribution systems 
(Patterson 1999, 79). On the other hand, as the great North American blackout of summer 2003 
demonstrated, a centralized system may be less resilient than one based on many small local 
renewable sources. Centralized generation is entirely dependent on the integrity of the network 
and the Quebec ice storm abundantly showed the vulnerability of power lines (Patterson 1999, 
17). Moreover, since the 1980s the privatization of electricity has introduced difficulties in 
coordinating central system stability (Patterson 1999, 167). 
The autarky principle of economic resilience mandates that we reduce the proportion of 
our power dependent on a steady stream of fuel inputs (fossil fuels and fissionable materials). It 
also means decreasing the distance between power sources and end-users, and increasingly 
shifting to more flexible decentralized generation to enhance the dispersity of our power grid 
(Lovins and Lovins 2001). As Homer-Dixon (2006, 284) notes, ―the more power we produce 
with solar panels on our rooftops, the less vulnerable we‘ll be to power disruptions far away‖. 
Wind and especially solar power are indeed the most self-sufficient electricity sources available, 
particularly if installed at the household level. Because of their passive nature, renewables can 
keep providing power with no one around to operate them. Getting the prices right on carbon and 
ending subsidies to non-renewable resource extraction are measures that can greatly encourage 
this shift and simultaneously enhance economic efficiency (Heinberg 2003, 222).  
The redundancy principle of economic resilience suggests that at the cost of some 
efficiency, we should build extra transmission lines, transformer substations and gas pipelines in 
case some are damaged. Likewise we need redundancy in the manufacturing plants needed to 
repair power system components. Proposals to build small natural gas plants in Ontario 
communities that only operate a few hundred hours a year to handle peak demand would have 
the side benefit of enhancing redundancy year-round (Swayze 2008). Furthermore they would be 
meeting the dispersity principle: ―The geographic distribution of the so-called ―peaker‖ plants 




a fire at a transmission station‖ (McCarthy 2010). Despite their other resilient characteristics, the 
fact that solar and wind power can be interrupted by changing weather conditions renders them 
unable to meet the redundancy principle. 
Therefore, to ensure the resilience of our overall electricity supply we should diversify 
our energy sources as much as possible, which means supporting a mix of both small-scale 
renewables of all kinds and centralized generation. Ideally a city should have enough disperse, 
decentralized power sources to allow most essential utilities to operate if centralized grids fail 
(Patterson 1999, 166). Yet because of their own inefficient drawbacks like cost, dependence on 
conditions and the large land area taken up relative to their small energy output, renewables 
alone will probably never be able to meet all our daily energy needs. Nuclear and coal have 
higher fixed costs but lower operating costs, allowing them to more efficiently operate 24/7 to 
meet base load demand (Patterson 1999, 79). Environmentalists would do well to keep in mind 
the need for diversity when they lobby for the complete phase-out of nuclear power. In Ontario 
at least, nuclear is especially attractive because it is largely ―free of emissions and independent of 
imports from what will be a disturbed world‖ (Lovelock 2006, 153).  
Expansion of coal power relying on carbon capture and storage, on the other hand, would 
likely discourage diversification of our electricity supply. If the massive investment in 
complexity in carbon capture infrastructure is made, supporting coal plants will invariably be 
constructed around it to make up for the significant energy lost in the sequestration process. Just 
like the Romans, this would mean locking ourselves into an inflexible system with declining 
thermodynamic returns. Nevertheless, due to the world‘s plentiful remaining supplies, coal still 
has a place as an energy option of last resort. As it hopefully proceeds to decommission its 
remaining coal plants, Ontario should not completely dismantle them, but instead pay just 
enough to keep them in operational condition for an emergency.   
Cogeneration power plants are more resilient and efficient because they vent heat where 
it can be used productively, remove some dependence on water inputs along with the need for 
solid waste removal, and can be situated within urban areas (Patterson 1999, 114). Drought 
shocks induced by climate change may deprive traditional power plants and hydro dams of the 
water they need to power and cool themselves. Likewise, unlike fossil fuel and nuclear 




fuel of all shapes and sizes. When people are cold, the range of things they are willing to burn as 
garbage quickly multiplies. 
It should be noted that centralized generation sources tend to be less safe-fail than smaller 
disperse renewables (the repercussions of their failure are more severe) (Perrow 1999, 335). If 
society breaks down or power authorities desert their posts, there may be a heightened chance of 
a burst hydroelectric dam or nuclear meltdown which can threaten large numbers of people 
(Weisman 2007). The lack of redundant safety systems in Japan‘s Fukushima nuclear plants was 
clearly demonstrated following the March 2011 tsunami. Fortunately, Canada‘s Candu nuclear 
technology is designed more with safe-fail than robustness in mind: by locking down if 
something goes wrong it ceases to produce power (still detrimental in times of emergency), but 
also ceases to be at risk of exploding. Of greater concern are waste fuel facilities, where spent 
rods remain at risk of overheating (releasing radioactive clouds) for several years if cut off from 
the fossil fuel needed to cool them (Weisman 2007). However, the fact that the majority of the 
world‘s reactors, including those in Japan, were built using 30-40 year old technology provides 
hope that with renewed funding for nuclear research, new reactor types incorporating more 
resilient design principles (such as redundant arrays of battery powered cooling generators) and 
using fuel like thorium and depleted uranium could be developed to reduce these risks. For its 
part carbon capture and storage has the worrisome potential for gas leakages (either into the 
atmosphere or surrounding populated areas with deadly results) if not constantly monitored. 
Similarly deep geothermal power can potentially trigger earthquakes. 
The more complex a system, the more energy it requires to maintain its order far from 
thermodynamic equilibrium in a universe governed by entropy. Therefore reducing energy use 
can reduce complexity and improve resilience. When it comes to the electricity supply system, 
Lovins and Lovins (2001) argue that encouraging demand-side efficiency is key to the overall 
resilience of the grid. This makes common sense – reducing electricity demand means less 
dependency on the grid, so people will be less affected if it breaks down – a safe-fail approach. 
Here then is another case where efficiency is compatible with resilience. Demand side 
conservation can be achieved through a combination of more efficient technologies and changes 
in consumption behaviour achieved through education and especially higher electricity prices.  
Limiting our dependence on imported fossil fuels is also necessary to enhance the 




be ―providing incentives for people to install ground-heat pump systems to heat their houses‖. 
He suggests legislation to bind subsequent owners of a house to paying for the initial installation 
of these systems to amortize the cost. Moreover, buildings incorporating green architectural 
features that naturally absorb or disperse energy from the sun and retain heat through insulation 
can forgo traditional electrical and heating systems yet remain liveable in a variety of climates 
(Steffen 2006). Incentives could also be provided for citizens to purchase portable generators 
(especially hand-operated ones) and stockpile batteries, candles and firewood as fall-back energy 
sources during a power failure (Homer-Dixon 2007 interview; EMO 2006). Larger backup 
generators may also be need to power critical appliances like refrigerators and sump pumps, 
however these tend to be inefficient and polluting. Finally, skyscrapers make efficient use of our 
land area which helps sustainable scale but if the electricity required by elevators and pump 
water fails, upper storeys will quickly become unliveable (Kunstler 2006, 253). Given this, cities 
may want to consider bylaws to limit the number of storeys allowed in future development. 
The necessary actions to enhance electricity and energy resilience are summarized in a 
report commissioned by the US Department of Defence (CNA Corporation 2007, 38), which 
explains that it can improve the energy resilience of its facilities by a threefold strategy of 
deploying more efficient technologies, renewable energy sources, and ―islanding‖ installations 
from the national grid. Yet Homer-Dixon (2007 interview) notes there are not only economic but 
institutional impediments against heat pumps and all forms of small-scale local generation. 
Societal leaders are not thinking in these terms, and the civil engineering culture assumes energy 
must be centrally provided. Tainter (1996) argues that ultimately energy simplicity will be 
achieved in the future either through a collapse marked by violence, starvation and population 
loss, or a ‗soft-landing‘ made possible by the voluntary shift to solar power, green fuels, energy 
efficient technologies and less consumption. But this ―will come about only if severe, prolonged 
hardship in industrial nations makes it attractive, and if economic growth and consumerism can 
be removed from the realm of ideology‖ (Tainter 1996). Heinberg ( 2003, 222) declares that 
―even at this late date, a truly heroic national effort toward developing renewables could succeed 








6.4  The Water Supply 
 
Historically rivers were the lifeblood of civilizations. The availability of water remains critical 
for economies and is among the systems most dependent on the proper functioning of natural 
systems and in turn ecosystem resilience. Humanity has compromised this resilience by 
consuming water much faster than it can be recharged. Due to factors such as climate change, 
water systems are becoming increasingly vulnerable. Droughts now plague the south-eastern 
United States, southern Europe, parts of Africa and Pakistan where tension over water threatens 
to spiral into armed conflict with India (Dyer 2008, 121). In Australia the call has gone out to 
develop a ―resilience framework‖ for addressing the water needs of Australia‘s cities, agriculture 
and ecosystems (Cawood 2007, 48).  
Over the last few years British Columbia Canada has been hit with a succession of mild 
water shocks. The Town of Tofino experienced a water shortage caused by lack of rain that 
heavily disrupted the local economy. Water was limited to residential use and many businesses 
were forced to close while bottled water was trucked in from outside. Similarly, Vancouver‘s 
water supply was disrupted by turbidity in local dams and two million people were told to boil 
water or drink bottled water for a week. Indeed, more population centres globally are becoming 
heavily dependent on the trucking in of bottled water as the most sought after commodity on 
earth becomes increasingly privatized. Yet this violates the autarky principle of economic 
resilience: a community cannot rely on outside water always being available because pumping, 
bottling and trucking systems can all be interrupted, especially as water scarcity begins to hit 
every community simultaneously in regions like western Canada and the southern United States.  
Additionally, even municipal water supplies can be interrupted: ―water availability is 
influenced by the survival of the electric power and transportation systems. Electric power may 
be needed to drive pumps that enable the water system to function; transportation disruption can 
impede the ability of the water utility to make repairs in a timely manner‖ (Miles and Chang 
2003, 141). However, ―few communities are prepared to meet energy-based challenges to their 
ability to supply clean water to citizens‖ (Heinberg 2003, 216). If treatment plants cease 
operating human sewage may back up into rivers and lakes, contaminating natural water supplies 




Building autarky and redundancy into water infrastructure, both natural and man-made, is 
thus of paramount importance (Gunderson 2003, 45). Measures to preserve and restore water 
recharge areas like wetlands and moraines benefit both the resilience and scale imperatives and 
are the first line of defence in guaranteeing uninterrupted access to the water that human and 
animal populations need to survive. Authorities also need to begin identifying emergency water 
supplies in non-traditional areas in case droughts force mass migrations. Technical solutions like 
desalinization plants (e.g. San Diego) and cloud seeding may provide supplemental autarky but 
carry their own fail-safe risks. 
For short-term water emergencies households can maintain a stockpile of bottled tap 
water (EMO 2006). To ensure medium-term resilience they could purchase mechanical 
purification devices (available at most camping stores) which can be used over and over again: if 
society breaks down the threat of water supplies becoming contaminated by chemicals and 
disease is very high (Perrow 1999). Households can also own rain barrels to collect rainwater in 
emergencies, which the Region of Waterloo provides free-of-charge to reduce water demand, a 
scale issue (Steffen 2006). Indeed, key to achieving water resilience is controlling its scale of use 
(reducing dependency on the system). For example, rather than having a sewage system based on 
water, every home and business could be refitted with biomass toilets that will continue to work 
without water.  
 
6.5  Transportation Networks 
 
Maintaining a steady flow of goods and services is necessary for the operation of all the previous 
subsystems, especially trade. If transportation networks break down during a catastrophe, all 
levels of the economy will be cut off from key inputs (i.e. goods and supplies) and the ability to 
remove harmful outputs (i.e. garbage and hazardous waste) (Heinberg 2003, 181). Heinberg 
(2003, 175) notes that ―serious consequences of reduced transportation will be felt in disruptions 
in the distribution of goods. In the 1980s and ‗90s, increased global trade resulted in the moving 
of products and raw materials ever further distances from source to end user‖. Tight coupling 





Modern transportation systems depend critically on internal combustion engine vehicles: 
―More than 80 percent of everything ever built in America was built after World War II, and 
most of it was designed solely to be used in connection with cars‖ (Kunstler 2006, 26). There are 
certainly efficiency benefits to specializing in one interlinked mode of transportation (roads and 
the automobile). However, this system‘s resilience has been greatly reduced by its rapid growth 
up the adaptive cycle and extreme specialization. 
Unlike other subsystems, it is fairly easy to predict what shock will bring down present-
day transportation systems: a shortage of its key input, oil. The availability of fuel in turn is 
dependent on enough vehicles being available at the right place and time to transport it long 
distances from source to markets. Yet every indication is that the oil upon which so much of our 
present transportation system depends will become increasingly scarce and expensive in the 
decades ahead due to the well documented peak of world oil production (Gilbert and Perl 2008). 
Beyond the actual geological scarcity of cheap oil, supply interruptions may be caused by 
climate change or political strife in an era of environmental flux.  
Cheap oil has led to a dependence on overlong supply chains (both within nations and on 
a global scale) that will likely break down when oil becomes more expensive. Most urban centres 
are dependent on only a few arterial highways (e.g. 401) to provide their vital goods, and so are 
gambling with their resilience in the event of a shock like a road blockage or oil shortage. 
Supermarkets we assume will always be magically full of food actually carry only a few day‘s 
worth of stock and can be easily cut off from incoming produce, leading to chaos (Kunstler 2006, 
244). Similarly gas stations can be cut off from fuel and if electricity shuts off, gas pumps will 
not work (Stein 2000). A tanker truck bringing relief to a cut-off population is consuming the 
very energy it carries. Such breakdowns also have implications for health, including the 
transportation of sick and wounded and the distribution of drugs and vaccines. 
Conceptually, the easiest way to increase the resilience of our transportation system is to 
increase the redundancy of existing infrastructure by building more of it. In the Toronto area, 
highways are already at maximum capacity during rush hour, meaning in a breakdown situation 
they will quickly become gridlocked by evacuees. Locally in Waterloo Region, there are only 
two bridges over the Grand River – if those were cut off, our main supply lines would be as well. 
But building more bridges would require growth that compromises scale, unless we sacrifice 




traditional transportation can only go so far: for example, in the absence of continual 
maintenance in a situation of societal breakdown, pavement will rapidly degrade, especially in 
northern climates (Kunstler 2006, 264). We should consider whether we wish to continue 
expanding a highway system we may no longer have the societal resources to maintain (Gilbert 
and Perl 2008, 281).  
Deeper resilience thus requires us to heavily diversify our transportation system and stop 
policies that lock us into traditional transportation modes that presume infinite supplies of cheap 
oil (Gilbert ant Perl 2008, 238). This could mean simply changing the engine that powers our 
cars by rapidly investing in the expansion of electric battery infrastructure for automobiles and 
scooters (Gilbert and Perl 2008, 273). The economic shock that has hit the automotive industry 
has provided political leaders with an ideal opportunity to transform North America into a global 
leader in electric car manufacture, but so far this opportunity has been ignored in favour of 
bailouts for the status quo. More futuristic options include shifting to PRTs (personal rapid 
transporters), which are fully automated 1-6 person vehicles on reserved guideways (Gilbert and 
Perl 2008, 157) 
But economic resilience also requires diversifying away from the personal vehicle and 
towards public/mass transit. A key to this will be rebuilding North America‘s decrepit passenger 
rail service, which is decades behind Europe and Asia (Gilbert and Perl 2008). Kunstler (2006, 
268) believes this task is as monumental as originally building the highway system, yet its cost 
(mainly land re-acquisition) may be small compared to the challenge of trying to maintain the 
existing highway system in a societal breakdown.  
Electrified trains (passenger and even freight) are likely better for scale and resilience 
than diesel trains or buses because electricity can be generated closer to the citizens who use it 
rather than having to import fossil fuel from far away deposits (Gilbert and Perl 2008, 286). Most 
existing US rail infrastructure is already at maximum capacity hauling freight, making sharing 
lines with new passenger trains impractical, so dedicated high-speed rail lines between cities 
would enhance redundancy. This is another case where building resilience would benefit 
economic efficiency as well, since high speed trains can move commuters far faster than 
highways. We may even need to start preparing for the return of steam locomotives by studying 
the lost art of manufacturing condensed steam boilers because they are simple and cheap to make 




Within urban areas, major investment in urban light rail, trolley bus and tram transit 
could be undertaken (Gilbert and Perl 2008, 273; Heinberg 2003, 232). These rail lines would 
preferably stay above ground – without electricity to power pumps, water will flood subway 
systems (Weisman 2007). Municipalities could reclaim inter-urban rail lines from hiking trails 
and also start laying light rail lines along existing right-of-ways of roads for electric trolleys and 
streetcars. If things become truly desperate these could even be pulled by draft animals (Kunstler 
2006, 269). When considering efficiency implications, urban mass transit is certainly more 
efficient with fuel and moving people in crowded areas, but not as efficient in terms of flexibility 
or convenience as personal vehicles, again suggesting the resilience/efficiency tradeoff. 
Public and private sector investment in mass transit could be made economically viable 
by including the costs of environmental pollution and road infrastructure in gasoline taxes and 
license fees (Curtis 2003, 91; Gilbert and Perl 2008, 283). All of this would have implications for 
distribution –for example, it could at least temporarily put many auto workers and truckers out of 
work. Yet better public transit would improve distribution in the net because our current 
automobile based system is biased against lower income people who cannot afford cars (Gilbert 
and Perl 2008, 233). As an aging population increasingly migrates from the suburbs back to the 
inner city in the face of higher fuel prices, the demand for effective public transportation will 
only increase. 
As long as fuel was inexpensive, air travel could be considered highly beneficial for 
economic efficiency because of its speed. However, its heavy contribution to greenhouse gasses 
and oil depletion are at odds with the scale principle and it is not a particularly resilient form of 
transport because large planes are entirely dependent on high grade fossil fuel and well 
maintained runways. The 2010 volcanic ash cloud over Iceland illustrated how dependent we 
have become on airplanes for intercontinental travel with no redundant backup available, and 
dust storms arising from climate change may create similar situations. Taking resilience into 
account would suggest we stop subsidizing the expansion of the airline industry (including 
airports) (Gilbert and Perl 2008, 281). Propeller driven aircraft and perhaps even solar powered 
airships could be required by authorities to make up a greater percentage of commercial fleets to 





As the price of airfare rises due to compounding shocks, it may increasingly become an 
option only for the rich in spite of taxpayer subsidies, hurting distribution (Kunstler 2006, 270). 
We may therefore see a return to ocean liners as the main means of global passenger 
transportation, but perhaps with more of the luxuries found on modern cruise ships (Gilbert and 
Perl 2008, 294). Kunstler (2006) also calls for the reactivation of waterfronts and canals 
(including on the Great Lakes) so that maritime shipping can once again become a major source 
of trade. In the 20
th
 century, many wharfs and warehouses were dismantled in favour of parks 
and condo development, which are efficient land uses only so long as there is no disruption in the 
road network. Ships could also be mandated to carry sails in case of oil shortages (Gilbert and 
Perl 2008, 1). 
Because most vehicles would still be dependent on the electrical grid, ultimately the best 
principle when it comes to transportation is autarky: encouraging self-sufficiency so people do 
not depend on far away products and do not need to travel long distances to acquire critical 
supplies: ―Communities which have been designed to be walked and biked rather than driven can 
better withstand a disruption in the supply of gas‖ (Steffen 2006). Unfortunately in the last 
decades the trend has been in the opposite direction. Kunstler (2006, 233) believes the rush to 
suburbia after WW2 represents the greatest misallocation of resources in human history – it was 
efficient only so long as cheap energy prices held, and now we are stuck with a system that 
violates diversity and autarky principles (e.g. far from food).  
Walmart may have brought the efficiencies of standardization and economies of scale, 
however it has led to communities that are pedestrian and mass transit unfriendly. Heinberg 
(2003, 216) worries: ―Once a local economy has been destroyed by dependence on the ―big box‖, 
the chain frequently pulls out, forcing members of the community to drive tens of miles to the 
nearest larger town for basic consumer needs.‖ Cuba, which was forced to adapt after being cut-
off from Soviet oil, provides an interesting contrast and a possible glimpse of the future: ―Today 
there are few cars on Cuban roads, but nearly every vehicle is filled with passengers due to an 
official policy that systematically encourages hitchhiking. Bicycles are common, and animals 
(especially oxen) are often used both for human transport and for traction in agriculture‖ 
(Heinberg 2004, 107).  
In terms of autarky versus efficiency, stopping urban sprawl (e.g.. by municipally taxing 




raising national fuel taxes) are policies which can be said to be both resilient and efficient 
(Heinberg 2003, 218). Gilbert and Perl (2008, 286) believe we need to start transforming our 
transportation system sooner rather than later, and that the massive scope of the necessary 
overhaul will require diverting resources from other sectors of the economy. Yet it is not without 
precedent: in 1942, the United States forced its industry to stop making all cars and light trucks 
and within months had switched 75% of its machinery to war equipment in spite of claims by 
auto company executives that this goal was impossible to achieve (Gilbert and Perl 2008, 22). 
 
6.6  Communication and Information Systems 
 
The virtual information sector is now among the most important to 21
st
 century economies. 
Allenby and Fink (2005, 1035) note that in response to globalization, ―Institutional structures are 
shifting from rigid to more fluid and responsive network-centric organizational patterns‖, which 
helps them absorb, manage and respond to information quicker and thereby improve their 
efficiency and adaptive capacity. Yet the increasing dependency of firms and individuals on 
interconnected information networks also has the potential to reduce overall societal resilience: 
―Information and communication networks can all too easily be obstructed by a disruption at 
some key node‖ (Vale and Campanella 2005, 350). 
As communications technologies continuously evolve they open up new benefits and 
vulnerabilities. Compared to landline telephones, cell phones provide greater efficiency through 
mobility but in turn require more electricity to keep their batteries charged and receiver antennas 
operational. Similarly, as recent school shooting incidents in North America have demonstrated, 
cell phone frequencies can quickly become overloaded in a crisis. Unlike cell phones, landlines 
will continue to function for a number of days in a power blackout thanks to emergency batteries 
in central telephone exchange rooms. To greatly increase landline resilience, these batteries 
could be charged by solar panels. Alternatively, hand-cranked dynamos could be installed on 
every telephone: this technology from the last century allowed telephone networks to be set up in 
rural areas before electrification. 
 However, Vale and Campanella (2005, 35) have faith that because it is a distributed 
network, the internet can provide the resilient communication system modern society needs. The 




and Fink (2005, 1035) explain how a shift to telecommuting motivated by improvements in 
broadband infrastructure and higher fuel costs could simultaneously benefit resilience, scale, 
distribution and efficiency. First, the shift to working out of the home could enhance economic 
resilience by decentralizing the workforce so it is less vulnerable to a single shock (e.g. blizzards, 
bad air quality days or transportation disruptions). In the event of a sudden breakdown more 
people would be at home where they are most needed rather than stuck in workplaces. Second, 
fuel savings and the reduced demand for new road and highway infrastructure could substantially 
help sustainable scale. Third, by offering the flexibility of non-placed based work and temporary 
hours, telecommuting could improve just distribution by allowing more people, including 
women, the elderly and the disabled to participate actively in the economy: ―if properly 
managed, a network-centric society might well be more equitable, more productive, and 
therefore perhaps less fragile in the face of challenge‖ (Allenby and Fink 2005, 1036). Likewise, 
a better sense of community and security could result from more people working in their own 
neighbourhoods. Finally, telecommunicating could improve efficiency by reducing time spent 
travelling, freeing up time for more productive pursuits and reducing traffic congestion. The 
internet could also allow for a greater shift to just-in-time manufacturing and even a preorder 
economy, which have incredible efficiency benefits, allowing society to produce higher-valued 
goods yet reduce the scale of the economy by dispensing with unwanted products and 
unnecessary packaging and inventory (Stanley 2006).  
Clearly, computers and interconnected data networks have provided extraordinary 
benefits to economies, not just by improving the flow of information but by better coordinating 
the allocation of capital and labour. The internet also allows information to be spread digitally 
around the world at little cost to environmental scale or dependency on fossil fuel based 
transport. Yet like most efficient technologies in this chapter, information systems are 
tremendously beneficial so long as the system is functioning smoothly, but can immediately turn 
into liabilities when things start to break down.  
Our mass interconnected, interdependent computer network in many ways fundamentally 
violates the autarky principle. The great database of human knowledge and experience is 
increasingly tied up in and only accessible through computers and the internet which Heinberg 
(2003, 185) ominously warns are ―directly dependent on regional electrical grids. These grids are 




resources…. unless an alternative renewables-based electrical infrastructure is already in place, 
the information infrastructure of industrial societies will collapse and virtually all electronically 
coded data will become permanently irretrievable‖. Even computers with batteries like laptops 
and servers that have auxiliary generators can only last a short while off the grid. 
Online encyclopedias like Wikipedia are putting print ones out of business, and for the 
last 10 years many university libraries have stopped carrying print journals. It is efficient and 
saves paper to keep information on easily searchable centralized computer servers rather than for 
every home or university to have a copy, yet it is not disperse or redundant, for if the power fails 
people will instantly lose access to information. Holling (2008 personal communication) agrees 
that the shift to internet journals leaves our knowledge base vulnerable, but also points out that 
the open-source nature of online journals like Ecology and Society are better than print ones at 
helping to foster the creativity needed for the adaptability and transformability principles of 
economic resilience.  
Indeed copyright protection, patents and digital rights management that aid economic 
efficiency can serve as a barrier to making redundant copies of information. Peer to peer file 
sharing (e.g. bit torrent) perhaps better satisfies the dispersity principle than traditional central 
servers. Notorious website The Pirate Bay calls itself "The world's most resilient bittorent site" 
after resisting repeated attempts by copyright holders to have it shut down to prevent illegal file 
sharing, and even if they are successful the peer to peer connections it established will remain. 
The new trend toward cloud computing (storing data remotely on centralized servers) in 
the name of convenience (i.e. efficiency) can also enhance dispersity by providing an optional 
backup in another geographic location and at a higher system scale. Yet full cloud computing 
that does away entirely with local on-site data storage jeopardizes autarky because access to 
information becomes completely dependent on the internet staying up. Allenby and Fink (2005, 
1034) explain that the internet is a largely scale-free network, which makes it ―highly resistant to 
random failures, in that a substantial number of links can fail and still not affect the performance 
of the network as a whole. But such architectures are very vulnerable to a deliberate attack 
directed against the major hubs‖. They therefore recommend that information networks be 
designed with geographically separate hubs (dispersity principle), the duplication of critical ones 




Indeed, ―Ensuring that data and information are not located only in one area, but 
duplicated in facilities that would not be affected by the same local event, similarly helps protect 
against catastrophic loss‖ (Allenby and Fink 2005, 1035). This was made abundantly clear in the 
wake of the September 11 attack, where firms like Lehman Brothers and Cantor Fitzgerald that 
had backup data facilities were able to resume operations immediately whereas both the main 
and backup offices of the Bank of New York were caught in the cordoned off zone (Homer-
Dixon 2006, 399). Nevertheless, lessons from 9/11 have probably helped to make global 
computer facilities more disperse and redundant. 
Overall, digitization and networking have reduced the autarky of many key systems: 
―Whether these systems be military or industrial, financial or bureaucratic, the increased 
tightness of coupling, lack of redundancy, and speed of response, will make human intervention 
or control difficult at best when something goes wrong – particularly for those systems whose 
means and mechanisms of operation are so deeply embedded in the computers that operate them 
that no human being fully understands them‖ (Rochlin 1997, 215). Indeed, since few people 
know how their computers actually operate, if a breakdown upsets manufacturing, people could 
lose the ability to build or repair their computers and within a generation the knowledge they 
contain would be lost.  
Allenby and Fink (2005, 1034) claim that unlike telephone networks, internet-based 
networks ―are being designed to continuously monitor and tune their own performance; adapt to 
unpredictable conditions (making them resilient and not just engineered for redundancy); predict, 
prevent, and gracefully recover from failure‖. But Rochlin (1997) warns that computers can only 
do what they were programmed to do, and so are inherently much worse than humans at 
responding to situations out of the ordinary. Therefore, improving the adaptive capacity of 
information systems is not only about designing better technology, but also preparing people ―to 
make decisions on the basis of partial knowledge and partial information‖ (Rochlin 1997, 190).  
This also has implications for governance structures. Since some of the most critical 
information necessary for adaptive capacity is communicated by municipal governments, in 
metropolitan areas there is an advantage to having separate municipalities able to make decisions 
rather than mega-cities. The latter bring the efficiency of amalgamation but the former have 
greater dispersity and autarky (they are closer to the affected populace making it easier to 




purchase a hand-cranked radio to listen to emergency information (EMO 2006). One of the most 
resilient ways to pass on this and other information during breakdowns is through old fashioned 
word of mouth, yet neighbourhood social webs have unfortunately deteriorated in many modern 
suburbs. 
Rochlin (1997, 215) also worries that in this age of digital specialization where 
information can be looked up rather than memorized, we have lost vital experience and know-
how: ―the computerization and automation of complex and risky systems not only prevents 
humans from gaining expertise, but interferes with their learning how to respond at all without 
computer aid‖. One way to overcome this problem is by setting up modern academies to teach a 
proportion of the population endangered but vital skills from earlier times (like how to build and 
operate a steam engine or hand-spin wool). Because these skills are of little use as long as our 
technologically advanced system runs smoothly, we would have to pay people to learn them just 
like we do with army reservists. There is an efficiency cost to training these ‗resilience 
reservists‘ but it may be worth it. More broadly, our education systems should actively seek to 
develop Homer-Dixon‘s (2006) prospective mind in all young citizens so they will be better 
ready to adapt to whatever lies ahead. 
Since even acid-laden paper may disintegrate after a few hundred years, a prolonged 
breakdown in society could threaten most of the knowledge we have accumulated since the dawn 
of history (Heinberg 2007, 183). Both Lovelock (2006) and Heinberg (2004, 155) therefore 
believe strongly in the need to create dedicated cultural preservation centres to act as redundant 
repositories of the knowledge, tools and technologies that are as important to the resilience of 
economies as genetic information is to the resilience of ecosystems. Those in charge of running 
these institutions would be like ‗new monks‘, ready to emerge following a catastrophe to help the 
world adapt and transform: ―The monasteries carried through that earlier Dark Age the hard-won 
knowledge of the Greek and Roman civilizations, and perhaps these present-day guardians could 
do the same for us‖ (Lovelock 2006, 155). Like the seed bank, these centres could also house the 
genetic information of every known plant and animal species on earth, effectively creating 
modern-day Noah‘s Arks.  
Finally, because of the difficulty in picking out easily understood, useful and impartial 
information from the debris of civilization, Lovelock (2006, 156) suggests that ―One thing we 




help them rebuild civilization without repeating too many of our mistakes…an accurate record of 
all we know about the present and past environments‖. It must be written on durable paper with 
long-lasting print, not on any medium that needs electricity to read it. It would preserve and 
present the most vital accumulated knowledge of human civilization, including astronomy, 
chemistry, known fuel and mineral reserves, ecosystem dynamics, forms of government, farming 
skills, how to stop the spread of infectious diseases, and the necessity of never again 
overstepping ecological limits. Lovelock believes if the book was splendid enough, it would be 
found in every home, school and library (dispersity and redundancy in practice) so some copies 
would invariably survive the fires. 
 
6.7  Emergency Response Systems 
 
Speaking of fires, while the minutiae of disaster response procedures and equipment is not the 
domain of this paper, the proportion of society‘s scarce resources that should be allocated to 
these services is an important economic decision affecting a society‘s resilience, especially its 
adaptive capacity. The damage done by recent natural and human caused shocks suggests that as 
a civilization we have likely been under-investing in emergency response capability. According 
to Comfort (2005, 5), ―the sequence of events that followed Hurricane Katrina illustrates that the 
present US emergency response system is grossly inadequate for managing large-scale 
catastrophic events, let alone multiple incidents in different locations simultaneously‖.  
Environmental resource shocks like Hurricane Katrina and the massive wildfires (linked 
to climate change) in British Columbia, Australia, California, Greece and Israel in recent years 
have consistently overwhelmed local response crews. They could only be brought under control 
by bringing in significant emergency help from other areas of a country and even other countries 
(in the case of the 2007 fires, from across North America and the European Union). The future 
promises to bring environmental resource shocks that are not only bigger, but occur in multiple 
regions and countries simultaneously. This ―may overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to 
respond, and may even overtax national militaries, requiring a larger international response‖ 
(CNA Corporation 2007, 47). Yet the autarky principle suggests that even international non-
governmental relief organizations like the Red Cross cannot be relied upon because they would 




Again the efficiency/resilience tradeoff appears. It is efficient for jurisdictions (regions, 
provinces and countries) to share emergency resources (fire trucks, ambulances, helicopters, 
medical ships, water bombers and engineering equipment) rather than each having stockpiles of 
their own. However, if a crisis hits multiple areas simultaneously each local area will be 
overwhelmed without proper redundancy. Therefore, training more emergency workers and 
building more response vehicles, stations, coordination centres and medical/mortuary facilities 
(to handle a spike in injuries and deaths and control disease outbreaks) can all be very valuable 
for enhancing redundancy and adaptive capacity. But all come with a financial and 
environmental price. Since many redundant assets will stand idle until a large enough shock hits, 
and no one can predict with certainty when or where they will be called upon, they cannot be 
justified on efficiency grounds alone. If they come at the expense of consumer goods, they will 
reduce economic efficiency so long as the economy is functioning normally. If instead they are 
bought by expanding economic growth, this of course comes at the cost of environmental 
degradation.  
Depending on the tax structure in a society, these increasingly expensive government 
services could be disproportionately funded by the poor and middle class. But a more worrisome 
trend undermining just distribution is the privatization of emergency response capability. Klein 
(2007, 455) argues Hurricane Katrina and the Iraq War have forged ―a new paradigm‖ for the 
way human catastrophes are responded to. She describes the rise of the ―disaster capitalism 
complex‖: companies like Lockheed and Carlyle that provide for-profit response and rebuilding 
services. These companies benefit from disasters to such a degree, they may actually lobby for 
them to occur, as is theorized to have occurred with the Iraq war (Klein 2007, 372). More 
generally, rich corporations that have hands in both the resource extraction and engineering 
sectors stand to profit from the very environmental resource shocks they have helped to create. 
Meanwhile the poor of the world, those who have contributed least to creating the conditions for 
environmental resource shocks, will be most adversely affected by them and often forced to bear 
the costs of cleanup. Therefore, we must be vigilant that in the process of advocating and 
designing for economic resilience, a powerful industry does not develop which actively desires 
disasters because they benefit its bottom line. 
Yet a more resilient emergency system can also mutually benefit other ecological 




economic resilience and just distribution because all citizens benefit equally in good times and 
bad. Poor countries definitely lack in emergency response capability, and so supporting their 
development is an imperative for both resilience and equity. Allenby and Fink (2005, 1035) 
discuss the benefits of new technologies that ―aggregate and display complex information 
patterns at the urban systems level, such as the immersive Decision Theatre at Arizona State 
University. Such technologies not only facilitate coordinated emergency management and 
systemic responses to disasters, but enable better routine management of increasingly complex 
urban systems and can serve as important educational tools for city managers and the public. 
They are thus good examples of dual-use technology‖, that enhance scale, efficiency, and 
resilience goals. On the topic of urban planning, again interesting relationships arise between 
ecological economic goals: suburban neighbourhoods, otherwise the arch-nemesis of sustainable 
scale, are nevertheless robust against the spread of fires thanks to the geographic dispersity 
between houses. If fire departments should fail, fires will quickly devastate the dense centres of 
modern mega-cities. Constructing buildings out of less flammable materials would be helpful. 
The proportion of time and funds allocated to emergency capital and training must be 
made not only by nations and regions, but households as well. Individuals and families should be 
educated and encouraged to develop emergency survival plans to enhance adaptive capacity. Yet, 
―It is difficult to plan for personal survival in the context of unpredictable social chaos. If I have 
a garden but my neighbors are hungry, I must either defend my land with deadly force or watch 
my crops disappear. But what if someone else has more guns, or comes when I am asleep? 
Ultimately, personal survival will depend on community survival‖ (Heinberg 2004, 140).  
To begin with, it would be helpful for societies to refine emergency and evacuation plans 
and systems for every populated area, at every scale, including the provision for mass alternative 
shelter. This should not only be a top-down bureaucratic exercise: for redundancy reasons, power 
should be pre-invested in local people outside of traditional authority structures who can be 
ready to lead and respond by themselves. This ensures true community level autarky, dispersity 
and adaptive capacity in the emergency response system. The model to avoid is New Orleans, 
where most response work was done by outside contractors who were unfamiliar with the local 
area, distrusted by the community and prone to keeping surplus money rather than investing it in 
community rebuilding (Klein 2007, 559). Sterling (2007), drawing on firsthand experience of the 




emergency meeting locations designated by signs. There neighbourhood collectives can be 
formed to pool and store resources. Households must know to send a representative there during 
a breakdown to share want lists and get in contact with emergency personnel. Ultimately, 
fostering habits of mutual aid would help make people less dependent on the emergency 
response system (increasing their autarky) and building social capital would be valuable even in 
the absence of breakdown. 
In terms of governance more broadly during breakdowns, Daly and Farley (2004, 361) 
paint a grim picture of what may be required to prevent anarchy in the aftermath of breakdown: 
―Our historical experience with small life-support systems operating close to capacity – namely 
spaceships, or even ordinary ships or submarines – has thus far not permitted democracy. 
Military levels of order and discipline are required‖. This is only more true in the aftermath of a 
societal breakdown. Therefore, nations may wish to ensure that sufficiently large police, army or 
national guard reserve forces are located near all major urban areas, ready to act if called upon to 
prevent looting and violence. CNA Corporation (2007, 46) agrees that ―The U.S. should evaluate 
the capacity of the military and other institutions to respond to the consequences of climate 
change. All levels of government—federal, state, and local—will need to be involved in these 
efforts to provide capacity and resiliency to respond and adapt‖. The Canadian army, for its part, 
was very helpful during the 1998 ice storm.  
While enhancing the law and order aspect of resilience, such a force does carry costs and 
risks. Governments may be tempted to use a larger standing army for other purposes that could 
affect world equity, positively if they are used as peacekeepers or negatively if they are used to 
seize foreign resources. For example, the Louisiana and Mississippi national guard, which should 
have been available to help after Hurricane Katrina, was unable to do so because it was deployed 
overseas in Iraq. Instead the US Government turned to Blackwater Corporation to restore law 
and order, a private mercenary force that lacked the oversight built into the regular military.  
In the interests of the social equity goal of ecological economics, having a well funded 
public police and military force available to help in a post breakdown situation is preferable to 
defaulting control to either private security companies hired by the rich, survivalist militia 
groups, or roving criminal gangs (regarding the former see Klein 2007, 505). A public security 
force is the lesser of evils so long as strong safeguards are put in place to ensure it cannot be 




select elites as chaos descends. Having a sufficiently redundant domestic military force also 
removes the justification for bilateral agreements such as the Canada/US ―Civil Assistance 
Plan‖. This worrisome accord, signed in secret by generals without the debate or consent of the 
US Senate or Canadian parliament, provides American troops with the authority to freely occupy 
Canadian territory (or vice versa) in the event of a domestic crisis (see Canada Command 2008). 
Any emergency response system will mainly be reactive to shocks after they occur: ―Any 
suggestion that better technology for forecasting could reduce the danger of oncoming storms 
through earlier evacuations was certainly exposed as myth by the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina‖ 
(Ward 2007, 186). Likewise the 1984 Bhopal disaster showed the lack of resilience in emergency 
response systems: workers and people living nearby were told the gas was not dangerous, and 
―Emergency vehicles for evacuating the public were not used‖ (Perrow 1999, 356). Indeed, the 
above are all necessary but short term responses and more of a band-aid than a cure. If the only 
thing a society has is a good emergency response system, it is not resilient. If other economic 
systems are not resilient, then even the best emergency response system will fall prey to the same 
disruptions as the rest of civilian society: transportation systems break down so emergency crews 
cannot get where they are needed, trade interruptions mean they will not have the fuel and 
materials required to operate over a large range or for any extended time, and jurisdictional silos 
and communications failures mean they will not even know where they are needed. All of these 
factors affected FEMA‘s heavily criticized response to Hurricane Katrina. 
 
6.8  Appreciating Urban System Interrelationships 
 
For want of a nail… the Kingdom was lost. 
John Gower, 1390 
 
If we do nothing to build resilience into these and other sectors, they have the potential to be 
profoundly shaken by coming environmental resource shocks, jeopardizing their ability to meet 
our economic needs: ―Even businesses that incur no physical damage are likely to have to curtail 
their production if they are cut off from their electricity, natural gas, water, or communication 
links. Moreover, such disruptions will set off a chain reaction of further production cutbacks 




economy‖ (Liao and Rose 2005, 76). If these systems should fail entirely, there will essentially 
be no economy left to worry about. 
All of this leads to an important question: which of these economic sectors is most 
important? Should governments seeking to build economic resilience focus on one subsystem 
first and foremost? Because of scarce resources, there is an impetus to rank these systems by 
priority. In terms of highest priority systems for allocating society‘s resources, Allenby and Fink 
(2005) think information and communication are most important in the information age. 
Anonymous interviewee (2007) agrees and thinks financial systems and reducing trade linkages 
are next most important. According to Farley (2007 interview), ―The most important systems and 
linkages are those that are essential and have no substitutes‖. He ranks food/water first, followed 
by electricity, communication/information, transportation/trade, and money last. Rees (2007 
interview) shares Farley‘s #1 and 2 ranking. Kunstler (2006, 239) also agrees that in a future 
economy plagued by shocks, ―All other activities will be secondary to food production‖. Perrow 
(1999, 404) believes ―a failure of electricity is the most fearsome possibility‖. Patterson (1999, 
130) likewise observes that the electricity system is not only uniquely vital, but uniquely 
complex and vulnerable:  
a synchronized AC network differs profoundly from the other networks that criss-
cross a modern industrial society, including not only road and rail but waterways, 
natural gas grids, telecommunications and water pipes. A traffic jam near San 
Francisco, for example, has no effect on traffic flow around Los Angeles or 
Sacramento. On a synchronized AC system, by contrast, a major disturbance 
anywhere on the network can spread over a thousand kilometres almost 
instantaneously. 
 
On the other hand, Martinez-Alier (2007 interview) and Victor (2007 interview) believe 
all subsystems are of equal importance and that system interconnections are what we need to 
focus on most. Perrow (1999, 351) argues that the way a system is configured is often more 
important than its components, necessitating the need to be aware of hidden interactions. Indeed, 
―Because of infrastructure interdependencies, increasing risk in one system has ripple effects in 
other systems‖ (Chang et al. 2006, 35).  
Nowhere is the potential for synchronous failure greater than in cities, which currently 
house 50% of the world‘s population, projected to rise to 60% by 2030 (Allenby and Fink 2005, 




losses and leading to catastrophe‖ (Chang et al. 2006, 33). For example, there is a rapidly 
accelerating ―reliance on information infrastructures by other critical networks, such as 
transportation, financial, and corporate systems‖ (Allenby and Fink 2005, 1034). Mitchell and 
Townsend (2005, 317) explain: 
Since different types of networks are often functionally interdependent, failure of 
one type can produce failure of another. Telecommunication and electrical supply 
networks are particularly closely intertwined. Telecommunication devices require 
electric power, and increasingly, power grids are managed by means of 
sophisticated telecommunication systems. Similarly, if the power grid goes out, the 
traffic lights cease to function, and the traffic network rapidly snarls up. And, 
where pumps power water and air supply networks, power failures quickly render 
buildings uninhabitable. 
 
Another example of synchronous failure would be a breakdown in the financial system 
immediately affecting trade by destabilizing international currencies required for transactions 
(Heinberg 2007, 177). Likewise, the money system depends entirely on people having strong 
trust in its vitality and so is uniquely vulnerable to even mild shocks that shake another sector of 
the economy. Perrow (1999, 399) worries: ―It is not inconceivable that we could have at the 
same time a run on banks, a closing of stores because registers will not work and supplies cannot 
arrive, grid lock in traffic because of failed lights and stalled cars, unheated buildings with 
freezing pipes and no security alarms to prevent looting, contaminated water supplies because of 
filtration pump problems, equipment failures in hospitals and spoiled medicines, and so on‖. 
Clearly, it is very difficult to prioritize these systems since they are so fundamentally 
interlinked. Rees (2007 interview) reminds us of Liebig‘s Law of the Minimum – in any complex 
system with many inputs, what matters most is the one limiting factor, meaning a modern 
economy cannot afford to lose any subsystem if it wishes to function properly.  
Various real life examples illustrate interrelated failure of urban systems resulting from 
overinvestment in complexity. Following the August 2003 blackout that rippled across Ontario 
and parts of the Northeastern and Midwestern United States including New York, sewage 
systems and many water pumps including those in high-rise buildings stopped working; subway, 
rail and flight transportation was disrupted; cell phone communications and cash machines went 
offline; there was an accidental release of vinyl chloride; nuclear plants and gas stations shut 
down and millions were under a boil water advisory for days afterwards. The 2003 SARS 




outbreak in a crowded urban centre. While the Y2K disaster did not come to pass, it was an early 
reminder of the potential vulnerability introduced by making major societal systems so 
connected and interdependent on computers that a tiny failure (in lines of code) could in theory 
chaotically build into a serious, large scale one (Perrow 1999, 399). 
New Orleans is one of the most vivid examples of misplaced confidence in robust fail-
safe measures that did not take system linkages into account: ―Catastrophe models had 
predicted—before Katrina—that even with a major hurricane, there would not be significant 
flooding in the city because levees would remain intact and, importantly, the city‘s pumping 
system would be operating. The storm took out power, however, which prevented the pumps 
from working, and the forced evacuation meant there were not people to man the systems 
anyway‖ (Kousky et al. 2009, 13). In other words, the dike and pumping system lacked 
redundancy and autarky, power sources lacked diversity and dispersity, and emergency 
responders were not prepared to adapt. 
In their effort to standardize and increase efficiency, policymakers failed to consider the 
unique circumstances of New Orleans and instead treated it like any other cookie cutter urban 
centre. The subsequent partial collapse of New Orleans, according to Comfort (2005, 4):  
illustrates the vulnerability that is built into the infrastructure systems of any major 
city or metropolitan region…. flood waters shut down the electrical power system, 
which in turn shut down traffic lights, communications systems, water, gas, and 
sewage distribution systems. The dependencies among these critical infrastructures 
left the city without essential services, making it uninhabitable and escalating the 
disaster into a major catastrophe for the city. The collapse of these operating 
systems, especially the connecting systems of communication and transportation 
that allow individuals and organizations to mobilize response efforts to assist 
stranded or displaced persons, represented the threshold point of failure for the 
entire city. 
 
 Westrum (2006) elaborates further:  
What was not so evident previous to the flood is that many of the key resilience 
facilities would also be damaged or submerged, and thus put out of order. These 
included most police facilities, (such as the armoury and the morgue), the National 
Guard barracks (whose rescue boats were also submerged), hospitals, power and 
communication centers. This meant that the city would not only lose power, but 
also much of its landline communications (mobile communications, such as 
cellphones, had been lost when the hurricane knocked down the cellphone 
transmission towers). Power for the hospitals would become a major problem, 




All of these problems were inter-related, and so, when the electricity failed, so did 
most of the city’s ability to respond. 
 
The current reorganization and rebuilding phase in New Orleans presents the city with 
the perfect opportunity for a transformation into a greener, better city (Costanza et al, 2006, 317). 
Unfortunately, the continued neglect of health care and education services seems set to recreate 
the same old conditions of poverty (Brown 2005, 7). Indeed, both just distribution and economic 
resilience can be compromised by the efficiency optimization logic that we should have ―just 
enough‖ essential services with little redundancies. Klein (2007, 499) places the blame for the 
poor resilience of many urban areas on the spread of laissez-faire economic ideology: ―It‘s easy 
to imagine a future in which growing numbers of cities have their frail and long-neglected 
[public] infrastructures knocked out by disasters and then are left to rot, their core services never 
repaired or rehabilitated. The well-off, meanwhile, will withdraw into gated communities, their 




This chapter has hopefully illustrated both the need for and the difficulty of balancing ecological 
economic goals because every decision or indecision has very real practical benefits and costs to 
the economy, to the environment, to social justice, and to the ability of society to weather 
breakdowns and catastrophes. Ultimately, ―Urban systems provide ideal laboratories for 
understanding resiliency and for developing dual-use technologies, practices, and systems that 
provide value even if no negative events occur.‖ (Allenby and Fink 2005, 1034). Ecological 
economics has a golden opportunity to be at the forefront of this research, enhancing its own real 
world policy relevance by improving our understanding of how best to safeguard vital systems 






Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
The last chapter demonstrated that applying a resilience framework to ecological economics 
theory can reveal a variety of insights about traditional economic systems, helping us to look at 
them in a whole new way.  Let us now review what has been accomplished over the course of 
this thesis and evaluate what it has contributed to the literature. 
 
7.1  Answering the Research Question 
 
How can the concept and theory of resilience be incorporated into the study of ecological 
economics in order to improve society’s capacity to endure, adapt to and recover from 
impending environmental resource shocks and catastrophes?  
 
This paper explores the idea of incorporating resilience into ecological economics at a 
fundamental level and more importantly how this could possibly be done and the implications of 
doing so. In order to understand the need for resilience, it was necessary to establish that systems 
behave in non-linear, unpredictable ways (Chapter 1), that many civilizations before ours have 
eventually collapsed and there is no reason to think ours should be immune (Chapter 2), and that 
in other disciplines, especially ecology, resilience is now a very well developed concept and 
theory of change (Chapter 3).  
To help answer the ‗how‘ question, this thesis developed a conceptual framework 
(Chapter 4) by defining a new concept: economic resilience, and then identifying and unifying a 
set of six major guiding principles of resilience applicable to all systems, but especially 
economies. It then applied this framework to ecological economics to consider how resilience 
relates to all three existing major goals of ecological economics: scale, distribution and 
efficiency, leading to the next question: 
 
Would adding consideration of economic resilience enhance or undermine the three main 





This thesis concluded it has the potential to do both, depending on the goal, the particular 
economic issue (case by case), the value system used to prioritize decisions, and a host of other 
factors. There was no definitive overall answer, but the relationships between the goals were 
explored in depth (Chapter 5). In many cases the goals are complementary, however in some 
cases building desirable resilience into the economy will come with a cost of increasing scale or 
reducing efficiency. These profound interrelations warrant much further research, especially how 
the complementary aspects can be enhanced and the conflicts minimized. 
 
What are some practical implications for human economies? 
 
Implications for various economic subsystems and policies were discussed in Chapter 6. 
While this analysis was generalized, it was valuable in generating new insights and revealing 
various practical implications of applying the framework in real world contexts. 
 
The last remaining overarching research question left to answer is: How specifically 
should resilience be incorporated into the theory of ecological economics? Should resilience stay 
as a niche concept or become a guiding principle or even a fourth policy goal?  
 
7.2  Implications for Ecological Economic Theory: Time for a Fourth Goal 
 
Ecological economics has been called ―the science of sustainability‖. But fundamentally, to be 
considered effective and sustainable, a system must be resilient in the face of disturbance: 
―sustainability requires the ability to cope with, adapt to, and shape change without losing 
options for future adaptability‖ (Folke et al. 2003, 353). It is unfortunate then that ecological 
economics has so far paid insufficient attention to the problem of economic resilience.  
Hopefully this paper has encouraged ecological economists to focus not just on 
preventing environmental resource shocks but also the processes by which we can survive them 
and use them as springboards to transform us out of the fossil fuel age. Folke et al. (2003, 378) 
explain that:  
Learning to live with change and uncertainty and nurturing diversity for 
reorganization and renewal are an ongoing dynamic process of sustaining 
development. But they require a fundamental shift in thinking and perspective from 
assuming the world is in a steady state and can be preserved as it is, by focusing on 




than the exception, and thereby concentrating on managing the capacity in complex 
adaptive-ecological systems to live with change and shape change.  
 
In this sense it is time for ecological economics to supplement Daly‘s useful but rather 
simplistic idea of the ―steady-state economy‖ with a deeper model of system change. Daly‘s 
conceptualization of ecological economics is somewhat lacking when it comes to incorporating 
ecological dynamics or evolutionary phenomenon (Anonymous Interviewee 2007). Adding 
consideration of economic resilience would make a significant step toward correcting this, and 
could, together with other theoretical improvements, raise the relevance and stature of the field 
by improving its ability to tackle tomorrow‘s problems. Farley (2007 interview) notes that 
ecological economics‘ three existing goals of scale, distribution and efficiency ―are necessary but 
not sufficient objectives.  Arguably the higher level end we should focus on is to provide a high 
quality of life for this and future generations‖ (Farley 2007 interview). Insofar as maintaining 
long term welfare is one of the key criterion of this paper‘s definition of economic resilience, 
incorporating economic resilience into ecological economics would go some way toward 
meeting Farley‘s high level goal. 
 
7.2.1  Can resilience be subsumed under an existing goal? 
 
The complex interrelationships between resilience, scale, distribution and efficiency have been 
discussed at length in this paper. One larger question that arises from these relationships is 
whether there is potential for resilience to be successfully incorporated under the umbrella of one 
of these three existing goals. If this was possible, it might be the easiest way to start going about 
adding resilience into ecological economics because it would be the least disruptive to the 
theoretical status quo. 
Ecosystem resilience arguably can be subsumed. Resilience of natural environmental 
systems (forests, wetlands) cannot be directly designed for by humans. In fact, historically most 
human attempts to manage ecosystems for a desired (usually what we consider efficient) state 
has led to the steady erosion of their resilience. Efforts to specialize natural systems or increase 
their yields in the interests of economic export have led to monocultures with depleted diversity 
(Gale 2000). Indeed, ―The simpler, more uniform landscapes created by human activity have put 




and less tangible spiritual or cultural values‖ (MEA 2005). In the pursuit of growth and 
efficiency, we have taken most global ecosystems to the edge of their capacity and magnified 
their susceptibility to catastrophes: ―The paradox is that the processes of economic 
diversification, liberalization, and globalization ultimately depend on nature‘s subsidies, on 
diversity and resilience of ecosystems, but tend to create increasingly fragile ecosystems, as 
witnessed in modern food, fiber, and timber production systems‖ (Folke et al. 2003, 382). 
Therefore, ecosystem resilience is perhaps best achieved by ensuring nature is protected 
and left alone so it can manage its own resilience. Kristensen et al. (2003, 70) note that nature 
seems to be able to build its resilience in concert with other objectives like increasing biomass. 
Controlling the scale of our economic activity is therefore the most important thing we can do to 
help build nature‘s resilience. This entails safeguarding large tracts of wilderness from 
development, overuse and other harmful activities that disrupt natural systems (Kousky et al. 
2009, 13). Protecting unique bioregions of the earth along with the genetic diversity of wildlife is 
also fundamental to preserving the ecological memory required by these systems and species to 
transform and adapt to a rapidly changing planet (Folke et al. 2003). In that regard, holding the 
pace of climate change to a manageable level will be key to minimizing the number and severity 
of stresses that global ecosystems will face this century.  
Humans should not try to manage ecological resources to optimize a single attribute or 
tightly control spatial and temporal variation. Rather, a diverse use of resources that controls the 
scale of impacts would be more resilient (King 1995, 965, 976). Martinez-Alier (2007, 
interview) believes: ―Resilience and Scale clearly may be considered together. For instance, the 
collapse of a fishery will come from increased effort in fishing. Whether the fishery will recover 
(i.e. whether it is resilient) might depend on biological and economic factors‖. Therefore, 
ecosystem resilience can probably continue to be successfully subsumed for now under the 
existing sustainable scale goal, a framework ecological economists are already using to consider 
various ecological issues in their research and publications. 
As discussed, controlling scale is also compatible in many ways with efforts to boost 
economic resilience. A society with abundant natural capital is significantly more resilient than 
one with degraded ecosystems and undergoing frequent environmental resource shocks. Given 
this positive relationship, some (e.g. Rees, Lawn and Farley 2007 interviews) have wondered 




scale. Would not controlling scale, the argument goes, also ensure that resilience is not depleted? 
The problem is, economic activity can increase within set scale limits by raising efficiency, 
which often increases connectedness, centralization, specialization and monoculture at the 
expense of autarky, dispersity, redundancy, diversity, and thus resilience. Simply subsuming 
resilience under scale does not capture this critical relationship between efficiency and resilience 
to say nothing of resilience and distribution.  
On that note, given that distribution is a bit of a wildcard in terms of its relationship to 
economic resilience, opportunities for subsuming resilience under the just distribution goal seem 
slim. Improving equity is positively linked to building adaptive capacity and transformability 
(except if it increases scale), but the moral foundation of the just distribution goal makes it less 
well suited for incorporating the other more quantitative technical principles of economic 
resilience. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, one possible way of reconciling the 
resilience/efficiency tradeoff is to try and internalize environmental and resilience externalities 
into prices so the market can resolve these problems itself. This suggests the possibility of 
subsuming economic resilience under efficiency. However, Daly (2003) argues that ―If we use 
relative prices to solve the allocation problem, we cannot simultaneously use prices to solve the 
scale problem (or the distribution problem)‖. Or, more than likely, the resilience problem. 
Indeed, resilience must be designed into the economy at a system-wide level, which implies that 
a significant degree of planning oversight is required to ensure systemic resilience is achieved 
rather than simply adjusting prices and leaving it up to the market in the hope that resilience built 
in piecemeal at the individual level will be sufficient.  
Indeed we have to be careful about what policy tool we use to internalize resilience into 
prices – using a single tax to try and subsume all elements of resilience under efficiency might 
further confuse the scale/efficiency/resilience relationships. One of the arguments in favour of 
cap and trade policy is that it provides more certain results than environmental taxes because the 
level (scale) of pollution is decided on by the government before market trading is allowed to 
take place for efficiency reasons. In the same way, some sort of guaranteed level of resilience 
would need to be planned for (as a separate policy goal) before leaving it to the vagaries of the 
market. To summarize, subsuming resilience entirely under efficiency would be like mixing 




each one, in the exact proportions added, after bringing the brew to a boil. This is why Daly and 
Farley (2004, 360) stress that every separate policy goal requires a separate instrument, and is 
also in part why ecological economists believe scale and efficiency must be separate goals. 
Internalizing desirable resilience into prices is an idea worth pursuing, but first a level of 
resilience must be designed from outside of the market domain. 
Overall the potential of subsuming economic resilience under an existing goal starts to 
run up against real theoretical problems the more we think through all the dimensions. 
Neoclassical economists already argue that ecological economist‘s most cherished goal of scale 
could be subsumed under long run and even short run efficiency as well if we could make all 
prices reflect true costs. The fact that most ecological economists have come to the conclusion 
these two goals must be separate in turn lends strong weight to a similar separation of resilience 
in light of its well demonstrated tensions with the other goals that are described throughout this 
paper. Economic resilience is influenced by, but not addressed within, the other three goals. 
 
7.2.2  Resilient Design as a new fourth policy pillar  
 
Given that economic resilience clearly cannot be adequately subsumed under any of the existing 
goals, the only logical conclusion is that resilience must become its own distinct theoretical pillar 
within ecological economics, perhaps by creating a new fourth policy goal called Resilient 
Design. Resilient Design would encompass the concept and principles of economic resilience 
described in this paper along with consideration of the implications of adaptive cycle theory. It 
could also incorporate the study of natural ecosystem resilience and management rather than 
leaving it subsumed under scale. The word design denotes the idea that resilience must be 
planned for ahead of time, and also consciously and intelligently built in rather than being left for 
the market alone to build (or not). More broadly, examining the design of complex systems is 
key when trying to formulate theories such as ecological economics that seek to describe their 
fundamental characteristics (Carlson and Doyle 2002, 2545). Victor (2007 interview) prefers the 
term ―resilient structure‖ but the idea is similar enough. 
Making resilience into a goal of equal stature to the others highlights the possible 
tradeoffs which may have to be made between goals in some cases, or at the very least the need 




under efficiency (though other economists have said this is possible), so too does resilience 
deserve to stand alone. Only if the theory of ecological economics contains such counter-
balances can one argue, for example, that a redundancy may be inefficient, but it is still 
justifiable because it serves the equal, competing goal of resilience: ―It‘s not that optimization is 
wrong; it‘s that it so seldom has to defend itself against an equally muscular rival [i.e. 
resilience]‖ (Hamel and Valikangas 2003, 11).  Because resilience has its own unique principles, 
new and separate analytical and policy tools may need to be created to address it, and so adding 
resilience is not something that can be accomplished over night.  
Martinez-Alier (2007 interview) states: ―I think that the insistence on Resilience as a 
central concept (by Perrings, Folke) beyond the simple idea of carrying capacity, and also the 
insistence on Uncertainty and Ignorance in the work of Funtowicz and Ravetz (as opposed to 
quantifiable probabilistic risk), are very much part of Ecological Economics. Post-normal 
Science has its best audience among ecological economists‖. Integrating resilience into 
ecological economics will provide it with new tools that make it much better equipped than its 
peers to be effective in this new post normal world likely characterized by unpredictable shocks. 
Insofar as efficiency and to a lesser degree distribution were the only goals of conventional 20
th
 
century economics and policymakers, scale and resilience are brand new post-modern 21
st
 
century goals.  
Incorporating resilience as a fourth goal could even strengthen the usefulness and appeal 
of the existing ecological economic goals by making them a more coherent unified package for 
evaluating the overarching goals of sustainability and in turn a more comprehensive vision for 
our economy and society than is found in almost any other discipline. The broader environmental 
movement, for example, would finally gain a more persuasive theoretical economic argument for 
―small is beautiful‖ type localism to balance the efficiency arguments of neoclassical 
globalization and free trade theory.  
A revised goal statement of ecological economics might therefore read: our economy 
should be sustainable, equitable, efficient, and resilient, and this can be achieved by striving for 







7.2.3  Prioritizing the fourth goal 
 
We cannot add resilience as a new goal without in some way affecting the three other goals 
and/or some other economic variable: ―The biologist Garrett Hardin once pointed to a 
disarmingly simple lesson of systems analysis that has powerful implications: ‗We can never do 
merely one thing‘. His point was that good intentions are virtually irrelevant in determining the 
result of altering a large, complex system‖ (Tainter 1988, 207). 
This calls into question: in cases where tradeoffs are unavoidable, what priority order 
should the four goals be assigned in ecological economics? Following the lead of Daly, 
ecological economists traditionally rank scale as most important, followed by distribution and 
then efficiency last. While several of the ecological economists interviewed for this paper did not 
necessarily believe in fixed ranking when so many factors are interactive and critically 
important, they were still willing to share their thoughts. Farley (2007 interview) reasons: ―I 
would subsume resilience under scale, then rank them as scale, distribution, efficiency. If I did 
not subsume resilience under scale, then resilience would rank first‖. Lawn similarly ranks scale 
first (resilience subsumed), than distribution, and efficiency last. Rees ranks scale first, followed 
by resilience, distribution and lastly efficiency as defined by mainstream economists. Martinez-
Alier puts equity at the top of the list but thinks resilience is important too, and the Anonymous 
interviewee places efficiency at the bottom of the list. Taking these comments together, it would 
seem only scale could be argued to take priority over resilience. 
Victor (2007 interview) adds an additional insight: ―Daly and Farley‘s ‗logical‘ ordering 
(scale, equity, efficiency) has some appeal. Which should be prioritized depends on the issue 
under consideration. I rather like dealing with resilience as a separate characteristic worthy of 
attention‖. In effect, scale determines how much ‗stuff‘ gets made in total, efficiency determines 
exactly what gets made based on this constraint, and distribution determines who gets what and 
how much. However, as discussed in this paper, Resilient Design would need to encompass all of 
these elements in order to take into account all six principles of economic resilience. Perhaps 
then, as Victor suggests, resilience is a meta goal that must be considered at all times alongside 
the other three goals – it can neither supersede nor be subsumed or delegated in priority to any 




inseparable package and seek out policies and activities that work toward all four 
simultaneously. 
 
7.2.4  Conclusions for ecological economics 
 
Whether or not a fourth goal is created, if ecological economics wishes to stay current with our 
constantly changing world, it is time to begin considering the implications of economic resilience 
both as a concept (incorporating the six principle economic resilience framework of this thesis) 
and as a theory (incorporating insights from the adaptive cycle). Discussion of resilience moves 
emphasis of analysis in economics from simple models of static equilibrium to a more complex 
understanding of dynamic change (Davidson-Hunt and Berkes 2003, 76). A serious investigation 
needs to begin not just in ecological economics, but throughout the entire economic community 
to evaluate how the issue of resilience has been forsaken (along with the natural environment) in 
the quest for growth and efficiency. In applying this recipe too far, we have followed the human 
tendency through history to develop a logic for economic success and then extend that solution 
to all parts of an operation without due consideration for long-term consequences (Hurst 1995, 
125). If the increasingly recognized limits to environmental scale are the driver calling into 
question the wisdom of unlimited economic growth, then the need for societal resilience is the 
driver challenging the orthodoxy that more efficiency is always a good thing.  
By establishing the usefulness of the concept of economic resilience and its associated 
principles, this thesis has hopefully shown the value of integrating resilience at a deep level into 
ecological economic theory, possibly by creating a new fourth policy goal. In the process, it has 
demonstrated the striking complementarities that exist between the theory of ecological 
economics and the Resilience Alliance‘s theory of resilience, in particular their shared 
conceptual understanding of the world as a complex system, their critiques of growth and 
efficiency, and their transdisciplinary approach. It is fascinating that these two theories 
developed independently among two silos of scholars; the fact they have nevertheless reached 
similar conclusions lends weight to the validity of their findings. All things considered, some of 
the Resilience Alliance members could easily be thought of as honourary ecological economists. 
This thesis has provided a link toward bridging the gap between these transdisciplines and 




efficient and resilient. The usefulness of such a theory for charting the future course of 
civilization should not be underestimated. 
 
7.3  Areas for Future Research 
 
This thesis could spawn an almost infinite set of follow-up questions. However, the following are 
seven salient issues (not necessarily specific to ecological economics) that the literature would 
do well to examine in the future, the first being more technical and the latter relating more to 
philosophical/world system issues: 
 
1) As noted, the Resilience Alliance‘s figure-8 theory charting the loss of resilience due to 
growth also meshes readily with ecological economist‘s critique of the environmental costs of 
growth, even though both theories developed separately. There is thus a tremendous opportunity 
and need for dialogue and collaboration between these two distinct groups of scholars. If they 
could incorporate one another‘s research and synthesize their ideas, a new unified theory could 
potentially be created that would greatly enhance our understanding of how global 
socioeconomic and environmental systems interrelate. More broadly, it would be valuable for 
researchers to begin investigating how resilience ideas could be incorporated more fully into all 
existing branches of economics in order to have the greatest effect on real life policy creation. 
 
2) There is a need to propose alternative definitions and principles of economic resilience (other 
than the ones suggested in this thesis), to study them, and to accept or invalidate them. The 
validity of various resilience ideas is not something that can be easily proven or disproven 
because our civilization represents a sample size of one: by the time we test all alternative 
hypotheses, we may already have collapsed. Nevertheless, the quality of thinking and 
understanding would be enhanced by open discussion among many informed participants. There 
are bound to be conflicting interpretations of how resilience can or should be built-in, and these 
need to be given due attention and debate: ―there is a lot that needs to be done to create a broadly 
useful resilience economics‖ (Peterson 2007). An important consideration that bridges the 




function in the face of breakdowns are different from the ones needed to enhance capacity to 
recover from catastrophes and successfully transform system states.   
 
3) The next step will be to come up with useful indicators of a given economy‘s resilience, or 
lack thereof: ―If we agree that resilience is a useful concept even in the context of socioeconomic 
systems, then we must be able to answer the question ‗How resilient is a given socioeconomic 
system?‘ There is no way to answer this question without measuring resilience; hence the 
salience of this measurement issue‖ (Batabyal 1998, 236). Rose (2004) and Briguglio et al. 
(2003) have attempted to create resilience indicator indexes but only according to very narrowly 
defined definitions of resilience.  
 
4) Another question when it comes to quantification is: How much resilience in an economy is 
enough? What marginal benefit is provided by incorporating resilience versus other possible 
resource allocations, and how should they be prioritized? Yorque et al. (2002, 436) ask: ―How 
much societal redundancy is required to sustain the capacity to adapt in a flexible way to 
unpredictable change?‖ Petak (2002, 1) note the difficult in this area of research: ―when the 
occurrence of a disturbance and the consequences of its impact are highly uncertain, it is 
necessary to view system resilience and system sustainability probabilistically. This adds a 
difficult dimension to the process of determining what the acceptable level of resilience or 
sustainability… ought to be‖ (Petak 2002, 1).  
 
5) By extension, there is a need for developing suitable approaches for assessing where resilience 
is and is not desirable. This involves collectively agreeing as a society which system 
characteristics and functions are (and are not) worth preserving and regenerating in the wake of a 
catastrophe that alters our system‘s equilibrium state: "The important point is to recognize both 
the designed and self-organizing components of a SES and to study how they interact... Socio-
ecological systems are never fully designed or controllable, nor are they amenable to the 
definition of one simple, easily measurable performance index, such as output value minus input 
costs" (Anderies et al. 2004, 2). Similar approaches are needed for assessing where efficiencies 





6) Beyond theory, modelling, and philosophy, a much more in-depth examination is needed of 
how to operationalize economic resilience on the ground, on a city by city, country by country 
and sector by sector basis, and across international institutions and systems. The few existing 
books on enhancing the resilience of cities (such as Chernick 2005 and Vale and Campanella 
2005) are incomplete and only look at the engineering definition of resilience (time to return to 
normal). Furthermore, the communication of resilience ideas by scholars to those outside 
academia needs significant improvement: ―Critical scientific and economic conclusions about 
resilience need to be made available to decision-makers and the public at large in a way that aids 
understanding‖ (Levin et al. 1998, 233).  
 
7) There is a need to identify further opportunities for enhancing the complementarities between 
scale, distribution, efficiency and resilience while minimizing their conflicts. Insofar as 
unavoidable tensions remain, suitable processes and criteria are needed for assessing them and 
making difficult tradeoff decisions. In particular, the tension between resilience and efficiency 
remains unresolved and certainly requires further attention because of the profound implications. 
For example, is the otherwise positive trend toward an internet based, streamlined, 
environmentally efficient just-in-time economy better at handling sudden change or is it setting 
up our economy for disaster by stripping out redundancies and autarky? Could reducing the 
overproduction of goods that are not wanted in the first place (see Stanley 2006) be a way of 
achieving efficiency without resilience draining specialization? The impact on economic 
resilience becomes a question of how important a reserve of resources, built capital and 
manufactured goods are in an emergency. Could government legislate for redundancy and 
autarky in critical components while still allowing a just-in-time type economy for luxury goods? 
In all cases, the objective should be seeking ways to realize mutually reinforcing and lasting 
benefits. 
 
8) Gallopin (2002) asks an important meta question: if the figure-8 adaptive cycle is applicable 
to the global human system, does that mean our civilization must alternate forever between 
phases that maximize production and accumulation and phases of decline and reinvention? In 
other words, will civilization always inevitably collapse (to some degree) no matter what we do? 
Certainly civilization is a complex system like any other, yet most would agree human behaviour 




much time do we have left before the catastrophic release phase? Gallopin (2002, 392) goes on 
to ponder: ―is there a healthy strategy to maintain an advanced level of civilization while keeping 
adaptive fitness?‖ Might it be possible to freeze our current position on the cycle and maintain 
our current level of complexity by fixing the scale of the economy (i.e. finally achieving 
sustainable scale)?  
 
7.4  Final Thoughts on Our Common Future 
 
The great modern myth of perpetual progress is a relatively recent phenomenon dating from the 
15
th
 century on; prior to this people were more concerned with preserving what was left over 
from the previous golden age of the Roman empire. In some ways we are both blessed and 
cursed to be living during a new golden age of immense global economic complexity. We are 
witnessing the pinnacle of many human material pursuits, yet it is an age that may not last much 
longer. In this time of great technological advancement, the human species is also on the cusp of 
environmental change more profound than any it has experienced in recorded history, including a 
sixth great mass extinction and irreversible changes in our planet‘s atmosphere and oceans. 
Scientifically, socially and conceptually, we are entering unexplored territory: perhaps the only 
certainty is that everything is about to change.  
Lovelock (2006, 155) warns that we are ―unprepared for a catastrophe such as a global 
event that is wholly unexpected and unpredicted… something that could throw us into a new 
dark age‖. Diamond (2005, 7), whose twelve environmental challenges introduced this paper, 
believes: ―Much more likely than a doomsday scenario involving human extinction or an 
apocalyptic collapse of industrial civilization would be ‗just‘ a future of significantly lower 
living standards, chronically higher risks, and the undermining of what we now consider some of 
our key values. Such a collapse could assume various forms, such as the worldwide spread of 
diseases or else of wars, triggered ultimately by scarcity of environmental resources.‖ 
Future generations may soldier on, but it may be in a radically changed world where built 
capital and natural resources have become rare once again. If we are presently having difficulty 
as a global society affording policy objectives due to a relatively minor economic downturn, we 




base will be smaller at the same time as the world population is 35% larger and the 
environmental challenges perhaps several magnitudes larger.  
In this turbulent new century likely to be characterized by unpredictable breakdowns and 
catastrophes brought on by climate change, peak oil, and other problems we will create trying to 
solve those, it is imperative that much deeper consideration be given to how desirable resilience 
can be built into economics and economies in order to better prepare them to weather these 
coming storms and stave off complete collapse. Ecological economics needs to live up to the 
ecological part of its name and break from the clockwork Newtonian understanding of the world 
epitomized by neoclassical economics. It needs to move away from understanding the world as 
well behaved, linear, predictable, controllable, and able to be optimized to an understanding 
which assumes surprise, chaos and catastrophe are the new normal.  
This can perhaps best be achieved by creating a fourth policy pillar in ecological 
economics called Resilient Design. One of the key strengths of resilience thinking is how flexible 
it is as a concept and theory. No matter when or where shocks and breakdowns may occur, the 
precautionary principle which ecological economists support (Farley 2007 interview) demands 
our consideration of resilience so we can prepare for them. Homer-Dixon (2006, 293) concludes: 
Conventional economics is the dominant intellectual rationalization of today‘s 
world order. As we‘ve overextended the growth phase of our global adaptive cycle, 
this rationalization has become relentlessly more complex and rigid and 
progressively less tenable. Breakdown will, all at once, discredit this rationalization 
and create intellectual space for new ideas to flourish. But this space will be 
brutally competitive. We can boost the chances that humane alternatives will thrive 
by working them out in detail and disseminating them as widely as possible 
beforehand. 
 
Most certainly we need to begin the immediate transition to a more safe-fail society by 
designing for and building desirable forms of resilience into every aspect of our economies, 
while also being conscious of the potential tradeoffs involved and either balancing them smartly 
or seeking complementary solutions that lead to mutually reinforcing gains. Making the world 
economy resilient can potentially go hand-in-hand with global sustainability goals (O‘Hara and 
Stagl 2004, 550-51).  But we need to build in this resilience while keeping economic growth 
constant – in fact, we need to reduce the scale of the economy simultaneously to stay within 




―I think we have little option but to prepare for the worst and assume that we have 
already passed the threshold. Like paramedics, [government‘s] first priority is to keep the patient, 
civilization, alive during the journey to a world that at least is no longer undergoing rapid 
change‖ (Lovelock 2006, 153). We must start this process now, ahead of time, or our future will 
most certainly be marked by loss on a grand scale: ―Most people (including many policy makers) 
would be tempted to assume that policy can always catch up with history. If too little is done 
now, there is always the possibility to take stronger actions in the future, and thus the problem 
will be solved. The trouble with this notion is that it assumes an infinitely forgiving world, 
ignoring irreversible processes and the possibility of structural reorganizations in the global 
system that lead to situations that are, in practical terms, irrevocable‖ (Gallopin 2002, 379). In an 
era when political leaders seem oblivious to the coming catastrophes and concerned citizens feel 
powerless to persuade them, resilience thinking at least provides a comforting fallback: we can 
all do things to start preparing our own local communities for what lies ahead. Ideally we should 
seek out initiatives that have near term benefits as well as longer term catastrophe mitigation, 
transformation and recovery benefits.  
The seemingly insatiable drive for humans to expand, destroy and inevitably collapse 
may be a product of culture more than a fatal flaw of the human condition. Resilience theory 
gives us hope that the coming breakdowns will provide a once in a millennium opportunity to 
strip away the accumulated web of social structures and behaviours underlying our planet killing 
economic system. In its wake will be fresh ground for the creation of a truly ecologically minded 
society. While the future cannot be foreseen, that ground can be made more fertile by building 
the capacity and willingness to transform as necessary to survive and flourish no matter what 
comes our way, guided by shared goals such as those provided by ecological economics: ―As we 
approach bifurcations that lead to species extinction and the degradation of the biosphere, we 
seek the bifurcations of our technical knowledge and our social organization that will prevent a 
total collapse and allow for our survival and even for our improvement. Let us hope that as past 
crises have sometimes induced economic mutations, so our present ecologic crisis will lead us to 
mutate a new and better relationship with our environment and our world‖ (Rosser 1991, 269). 
The most central question of the 21
st
 century is how we should act in an age defined by 
uncertainty. For the survival of our civilization, it is imperative that we make the difficult and 




concerned most with minimizing our maximum losses. From an economics infatuated with 





“We can only hope that our race may be spared a decline as precipitous as is the upward slope along  
which we have been carried, heedless, for the most part, both of our privileges 
 and of the threatened privation ahead.” 
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Glossary / Definitions 
 
 
Adaptability (Adaptive Capacity) – The ability of human actors to adapt successfully to 
breakdowns by planning ahead, learning, adjusting and improvising. A principle needed for 
economic resilience. 
Autarky – The ability for a system component to survive and/or continue functioning even when 
cut off from other systems. A principle needed for economic resilience. 
Basin of Attraction – ―a region in state space in which the system tends to remain. For systems 
that tend toward an equilibrium, the equilibrium state is defined as an ‗attractor‘‖ (Holling et al. 
2004, 8). 
Bifurcation – The ―splitting of equilibria at critical points‖ (Rosser 1991, 2). 
Breakdown – Occurs when a shock overwhelms the traditional stability mechanisms of a system 
causing normal predictable system operations and organization to be disrupted. A system 
experiencing breakdown initially remains within the same basin of attraction, however 
breakdowns can potentially cascade into a Catastrophe that crosses thresholds. See also 
Synchronous Failure. 
Catagenesis – Renewal through breakdown (Homer-Dixon 2006, 22). See Transformability. 
Catastrophe – A partial or system-wide breakdown that has cascaded to the point where it 
causes the system to cross a threshold that significantly alters the behaviour and/or 
characteristics of that system, potentially leading to a new equilibrium basin of attraction.  
Catastrophe Theory – Theorizes ―that systems will undergo dramatic, sudden changes in a 
discontinuous way‖ (Kay and Schneider 1994, 34). Relies on concepts of system thresholds and 
flips. 
Chaos Theory – Establishes mathematically that tiny random undetectable variances in initial 
conditions can become magnified over time, leading to rapidly growing errors in any efforts to 
predict future outcomes.  In other words, even with perfect computer models, complex dynamic 
nonlinear systems remain completely unpredictable (Kay and Schneider 1994, 34). 
Collapse – A terminal, long-lasting reduction in the size and/or complexity of a system 




Collapse (human civilizations) – a ―drastic decrease in human population size and/or 
political/economic/social complexity, over a considerable area, for an extended time‖ (Diamond 
2005, 3). Significant welfare loss among the population must also occur. 
Complexity – A measure of the combined growth and efficiency in a system. 
Dispersity – The degree to which a system‘s components and functions are distributed and 
decentralized across scale, space and time. A principle needed for economic resilience. 
Diversity – The degree of variance in the type and characteristics of components that make up a 
system; similar to biodiversity in natural ecosystems. A principle needed for economic resilience. 
Ecological Economics – ―The study and modeling of the linkages between economic and 
ecological systems‖ with the economy viewed as a subsystem of the earth ecosystem (Field and 
Olewiler 2002, 429; Daly and Farley 2004, 431). Also called ―The science of sustainability‖ 
(Schiller et al. 2002, 323). 
Ecological Resilience – ―the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while 
undergoing change‖ (Holling et al. 2004, 6). Recognizes the potential for multiple stable states, 
but the need to preserve enough of the system to prevent its terminal collapse. 
Economic Development – The improvement in the quality of the economy and expansion of the 
psychological welfare/wellbeing/potential derived from the economy, it can be theoretically 
decoupled from material and energy use (Daly and Farley 2004, 6). 
Economic Growth – The physical (material and energy) expansion of the economy, in particular 
throughput – the flow of natural resources from the environment, through the economy and back 
to the environment as waste (Daly and Farley 2004, 6). Distinct in ecological economics from 
economic development. 
Economic Resilience – The capacity of an economy to endure, adapt to and successfully recover 
from shocks in order to maintain a base level of welfare for all people at least equal to that 
enjoyed before the shock occurred. It encompasses both preventing breakdowns from cascading 
into catastrophes, and avoiding collapse following a catastrophe. 
Ecosystem Resilience – The capacity of an ecological system to endure, adapt to and 
successfully recover from shocks in order to both prevent breakdowns from cascading into 
catastrophes (stay in the same basin of attraction), and avoid collapses following a catastrophe if 




Efficient Allocation – The allocation of society‘s limited resources to their most productive 
(highly valued) ends in order to maximize the total combined utility of all economic actors. One 
of the three primary goals of ecological economics. 
Endure (catastrophe) – To survive a catastrophe with a minimum amount of human suffering, 
economic disruption and ecological degradation so that society is left in a strong position to 
recover. 
Engineering resilience – The ability to return to the steady state following a disturbance. 
Environmental Resource Shock – A sudden and unexpected scarcity of natural resources 
and/or a failure of ecosystem services resulting primarily from unsustainable levels of economic 
throughput and/or human population. 
Fail-safe – A system designed to predict and evade all foreseeable failures. 
Functional Redundancy – The degree to which a system‘s functions are duplicated or there is 
functional substitutability of one element for another. A principle of economic resilience. 
Human-caused Catastrophes – Catastrophes that result from human action or inaction 
independent of the natural environment (e.g. ethnic wars). 
Just Distribution – the equitable apportionment of wealth and resources within and between 
generations (Daly and Farley 2004, 12). One of the three primary goals of ecological economics. 
Natural Catastrophes – Catastrophes that result entirely from natural phenomenon (e.g. 
asteroid impacts). 
Perturbation – Any disturbance or stress placed on a system, be it gradual or sudden, small or 
large, predicted or unforeseen. 
Recover (from catastrophe) – To return to a level of economic welfare for all approximating 
that enjoyed pre-catastrophe, though not necessarily with the same type or structure of economy, 
and preferably with more sustainable and equitable characteristics. 
Redundancy – see functional redundancy. 
Reliability –The ability of a system to withstand calculable, predictable kinds of failure (Lovins 
and Lovins 2001, 189). 
Resilience – ―the ability of a system to remain functionally stable in the face of stress and to 
recover following a disturbance‖, possibly in a new steady state (Redman and Kinzig 2003, 5). 





Revolt – See Synchronous Failure. 
Robustness– The ability to shrug off disturbances with no disruptions or changes in any part of 
the system. A fail-safe approach that focuses on maintaining all parts and their functions. 
Safe-fail – Approach to design and planning that advises being precautionary in case of 
unforeseen disasters or developments by taking the lowest risk path in order to minimize 
maximum losses and ensure recovery (i.e. you‘re safe if it fails).  
Shock – A sharp, sudden, unexpected disturbance or stress placed on a system. See also 
Environmental Resource Shock. 
Social-ecological System (SES) – ―an ecological system intricately linked with and affected by 
one or more social systems‖ (Anderies et al., 2004, 2). 
Sustainable Scale (Maximum) – The carrying capacity of the earth for humans, given current 
technology and managerial capacity. Continuing to exceed this invariably leads to environmental 
catastrophes and eventual system-wide collapse.  
Sustainable Scale (Optimum) – ―Occurs when the increasing marginal social and 
environmental cost of further expansion are equal to the declining marginal benefits of the extra 
production. Beyond the optimal scale growth becomes uneconomic‖ (Daly 2004, 437). Known 
as the ―When to stop‖ growing rule. One of the three primary goals of ecological economics. Not 
identifiable with any precision and also subject to unanticipated phenomena inevitable in 
complex systems, and therefore its pursuit must be combined with a substantial precautionary 
cushion. 
Synchronous Failure – The cascade and magnification of initial system breakdowns within and 
across different systems and scales of an economy (the domino/snowball effect). 
Throughput – The flow of low entropy raw material resources and energy through the global 
economy and back to the earth‘s ecosystem sinks as high entropy waste (Daly and Farley 2004, 
440). 
Transformability – ―the capacity to create untried beginnings from which to evolve a new way 
of living when existing ecological, economic, or social structures become untenable‖ (Holling et 
al. 2004, 8). A principle needed for economic resilience. 
